Editing Battle of Iwo Jima (section)

==First day – 19 February 1945==
===Amphibious landing===
During the night of 18 February 1945, Vice Admiral [[Marc Mitscher]]'s large carrier force, [[Fast Carrier Task Force|Task Force 58]], arrived off Iwo Jima. Also in this flotilla was Admiral [[Raymond A. Spruance]], the overall commander for the invasion, in his flagship {{USS|Indianapolis|CA-35|6}}. Smith was once again deeply frustrated that Mitscher's powerful carrier group had been bombing the Japanese home islands instead of softening the defenses of Iwo Jima. Mitscher's fliers did, however, assist the additional surface vessel bombardment that accompanied the launch of the amphibious landing craft toward the island.{{sfn|Wright|2004|p=23}}
[[File:80-G-304972 (29474492816).jpg|thumb|19 February 1945 air view of Marines landing on the beach]]
[[File:80-G-307196 (29219205340).jpg|thumb|19 February 1945 air view of Marines landing on the beach]]
Unlike many days during the three-day preliminary bombardment, D-Day dawned clear and bright.{{sfn|Wright|2004|p=23}} At 08:59, one minute ahead of schedule, the first wave of Marines landed on the beaches of the southeastern coast of Iwo Jima. Under Major Howard Connor, [[5th Marine Division (United States)|5th Marine Division]] signal officer, six [[Navajo code talkers]] worked around the clock during the first two days of the battle. These six men sent and received over 800 messages, all without error. Connor later stated, "Were it not for the Navajos, the Marines would never have taken Iwo Jima."{{sfn|Navy Department Library, "Navajo Code Talkers"}}
[[File:Tracked landing vehicles (LVTs) approach Iwo Jima;fig14.jpg|thumb|LVTs approach Iwo Jima.]]
[[File:USMC-17446.jpg|thumb|Marines landing on the beach]]

===Situation on the beaches===
Unfortunately for the landing force, the planners at Pearl Harbor severely misjudged the situation that would face Schmidt's Marines. The beaches had been described as "excellent," and the thrust inland was expected to be "easy." The apparent lack of a vigorous Japanese response to the landings led the Navy to conclude that its bombardment had effectively suppressed the Japanese defenses. The Marines initially began deployment on the beach in good order,{{sfn|Wright|2004|p=26}} but the landings swiftly became congested due to the loose volcanic ash that covered the island. After allowing the Americans to concentrate men and materiel on the beach for just over an hour, throughout which they maintained cohesive fire discipline, the Japanese opened fire. Shortly after 10:00 machine guns, mortars, and heavy artillery began to rain down on the crowded beach.{{sfn|Wright|2004|p=26–27}}

{{blockquote|At first it came as a ragged rattle of machine-gun bullets, growing gradually lower and fiercer until at last all the pent-up fury of a hundred hurricanes seemed to be breaking upon the heads of the Americans. Shells screeched and crashed, every hummock spat automatic fire and the very soft soil underfoot erupted underfoot with hundreds of exploding land mines&nbsp;... Marines walking erect crumpled and fell. Concussion lifted them and slammed them down, or tore them apart&nbsp;...{{sfn|Leckie|1967|p=28}}}}Furthermore, after crossing the beach, the Marines were faced with {{cvt|15|ft|m|adj=mid|-high}} slopes of soft black volcanic ash.{{sfn|Wright|2004|p=26}} This ash allowed for neither secure footing nor the construction of [[Defensive fighting position|foxholes]] to protect the Marines from hostile fire. However, the ash did help to absorb some of the [[Fragmentation (weaponry)|fragments]] from Japanese artillery.<ref name="Allen" />{{blockquote|Marines were trained to move rapidly forward; here they could only plod. The weight and amount of equipment was a terrific hindrance and various items were rapidly discarded. First to go was the gas mask&nbsp;...{{sfn|Wright|2004|p=26}}}}
[[File:Marines burrow in the volcanic sand on the beach of Iwo Jima.jpg|thumb|Members of the [[1st Battalion 23rd Marines]] burrow in the volcanic sand on Yellow Beach 1. A beached LCI is visible upper left with Mount Suribachi upper right.]]
The Japanese crews manning the heavy artillery in Mount Suribachi opened reinforced steel doors shielding their positions in order to fire, and then closed them immediately afterward to prevent counterfire from the Marines and U.S. Navy gunners. This made it exceedingly difficult for American units to destroy a Japanese artillery piece.<ref name="Allen" /> To make matters worse for the Americans, most bunkers were connected to the elaborate tunnel system that ran through most of the island, such that bunkers that were cleared with [[flamethrower]]s and grenades were often reoccupied shortly afterwards by Japanese troops moving underground. This tactic caused many casualties among the Marines, as they walked past reoccupied bunkers without expecting to suddenly take fresh fire from them.<ref name="Allen" />

''Time-Life'' correspondent [[Robert Sherrod]] described the landing simply as "a nightmare in hell."{{sfn|Wright|2004|p=27}}
[[File:Marines with LVT(A)-5 in Iwo Jima 1945.jpg|thumb|U.S. Marines of the Second Battalion, Twenty-Seventh Regiment, wait to move inland on Iwo Jima, soon after going ashore on 19 February 1945. An LVT(A)-5 amphibious tractor is in the background. Red Beach One.]]

===Moving off the beaches===
[[Landing Vehicle Tracked|Amtracs]], unable to gain traction in the black ash, made no progress up the slopes dominating the beach; their Marine passengers had to dismount and slog forward on foot.{{sfn|Leckie|1967|p=25}} Men of [[Seabee|Naval Construction Battalions]] 31 and 133, braving enemy fire, were eventually able to bulldoze roads off of the beach. This allowed the Marines to finally make some progress inland and get off the beach, which had become overcrowded with both men and materiel as follow-on waves of landing craft continued to unload. Casualties on the beach were heavy, with historian Derrick Wright noting "in virtually every shell hole there lay at least one dead Marine."{{sfn|Wright|2004|p=32}}

By 11:30, some Marines had managed to reach the southern tip of Airfield No. 1, the seizure of which had been one of the original American objectives for the first day. The Marines endured a fanatical charge by the over 100 Japanese troops, but were able to keep their toehold on Airfield No. 1 as night fell.{{sfn|Wright|2004|p=32}}

===Crossing the island===
In the left-most sector of the landings, the Americans did manage to achieve one of their objectives for the battle that day. Led by Colonel [[Harry B. Liversedge|Harry B. "Harry the Horse" Liversedge]], the 28th Marines drove across the island at its narrowest width, around {{cvt|800|m|yd}}, thereby isolating the Japanese dug in on Mount Suribachi.

===Action on the right flank===
The rightmost landing area was dominated by Japanese fortifications located at "the Quarry". The 25th Marine Regiment conducted a two-pronged attack to neutralize this position. 2nd Lieutenant Benjamin Roselle, part of a ground team directing naval gunfire, described the following experience:

{{blockquote|Within a minute a mortar shell exploded among the group&nbsp;... his left foot and ankle hung from his leg, held on by a ribbon of flesh&nbsp;... Within minutes a second round landed near him and fragments tore into his other leg. For nearly an hour he wondered where the next shell would land. He was soon to find out as a shell burst almost on top of him, wounding him for the third time in the shoulder. Almost at once another explosion bounced him several feet into the air and hot shards ripped into both thighs&nbsp;... as he lifted his arm to look at his watch a mortar shell exploded only feet away and blasted the watch from his wrist and tore a large jagged hole in his forearm: "I was beginning to know what it must be like to be crucified," he was later to say.{{sfn|Wright|2004|pp=30–31}}}}

The 25th Marines' 3rd Battalion had landed approximately 900 men on the island that morning. Japanese resistance at the Quarry was so fierce that by nightfall, only 150 Marines were left in fighting condition, an 83.3% casualty rate.{{sfn|Wright|2004|p=31}}

By the evening of 19 February, 30,000 Marines had landed. About 40,000 more would follow.<ref name=Allen/> Aboard the command ship ''[[USS Eldorado]]'', Smith saw the lengthy casualty reports and was briefed on the slow progress of the ground forces. To the war correspondents covering the operation, Smith remarked: "I don't know who he is, but the Japanese general running this show is one smart bastard."{{sfn|Wright|2004|p=33}}