Editing Battle of Cannae (section)

== Tactical deployment ==
The conventional deployment for armies of the time was placement of infantry in the center, with the cavalry in two flanking wings. The Romans followed this convention fairly closely, but chose extra depth rather than breadth for the infantry in hopes of breaking quickly through the center of Hannibal's line.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2001|p=100}} Varro knew how the Roman infantry had managed to penetrate Hannibal's center at [[Battle of the Trebia|Trebia]], and he planned to recreate this on an even greater scale.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2001|p=102}} The {{lang|la|[[principes]]}} were stationed immediately behind the {{lang|la|[[hastati]]}}, ready to push forward at first contact to ensure the Romans presented a unified front. As Polybius wrote, "the [[maniple (military unit)|maniples]] were nearer each other, or the intervals were decreased... and the maniples showed more depth than front".<ref name="Fordham University website" /><ref name="Dodge2004">{{cite book |last=Dodge |first=Theodore |title=Hannibal |publisher=Da Capo |location=Cambridge, Massachusetts |date=2004 |isbn=0-306-81362-9 |orig-date=1891}}</ref>

Even though they outnumbered the Carthaginians, this depth-oriented deployment meant that the Roman lines had a front of roughly equal size to their numerically inferior opponents. The typical style of Roman warfare was to continuously push with the infantry in the center and attempt to overpower the enemy line. Despite what these tactics might suggest, the center was not commanded by either of the two consuls, but by Geminus Servilius. The consuls commanded the two wings, Terentius Varro the left and Aemilius Paullus the right.<ref>Livy, Book 22, Chapters 44-52</ref> Hannibal understood that the Romans fought their battles like this, and he took his outnumbered army and strategically placed them around the enemy to win a tactical victory.<ref>Mills, Cliff. ''Hannibal''. New York: Chelsea House, 2008. Print.</ref>

[[File:Battle of Cannae, 215 BC - Initial Roman attack.svg|thumb|upright=1.35|The initial deployment and Roman attack (in red)]]
Hannibal had deployed his forces based on the particular fighting qualities of each unit, taking into consideration both their strengths and weaknesses.<ref>Cottrell, Leonard. ''Enemy of Rome''. Evans Bros, 1965, {{ISBN|0-237-44320-1}}. p. 95</ref> This aspect of Hannibal's leadership was highlighted in the use of a Spanish unit, the Balearic slingers, whom he placed behind the infantry to hurl their ranged missiles into the masses of Roman troops.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2001|p=54}} He placed his [[Iberians]], [[Celtiberians]] and [[Gauls]] in the middle, alternating the ethnic composition between Hispanics and Gauls across the front line, with himself at the front and center alongside his brother [[Mago Barca|Mago]].{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2001|p=110}}

Roman sources claim their placement was chosen for being the most expendable and unreliable troops, but modern reflections believe those forces were actually selected for their battle-hardening to carry the weight of the Punic side, as they would be tasked with the controlled retreat that ultimately made possible Hannibal's pincer movement.<ref>Fernando Quesada-Sanz, ''De guerreros a soldados: el ejército de Aníbal como un ejército cartaginés atípico'', Trabajos del Museo Arqueologico de Ibiza y Formentera, {{ISSN|1130-8095}}, No. 56, 2005, {{ISBN|84-87143-37-7}}</ref> Meanwhile, infantry from Punic Africa was on the wings at the very edge of his infantry line. This infantry would remain cohesive and attack the Roman flanks.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2001|pp=110–111}}

[[Hasdrubal, commander of the service corps|Hasdrubal]] led the Hispanic and Gallic cavalry on the left (south near the river Aufidus) of the Carthaginian army.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2001|p=112}} By placing the flank of his army on the Aufidus, Hannibal prevented this flank from being overlapped by the more numerous Romans. Hasdrubal was given 6,000–7,000 cavalry, and [[Hanno, son of Bomilcar|Hanno]] had 3,000–4,000 [[Numidians]] on the right.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2001|p=108}}{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2001|p=112}}

Hannibal intended that his cavalry, comprising mainly medium Hispanic cavalry and Numidian light horse, and positioned on the flanks, would defeat the weaker Roman cavalry and swing around to attack the Roman infantry from the rear as it pressed upon Hannibal's weakened center.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2001|pp=111–112}} His veteran African troops would then press in from the flanks at the crucial moment, and encircle the overextended Romans.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2001|p=112}}

The Romans were in front of the hill leading to Cannae and hemmed in on their right flank by the river Aufidus, so that their left flank was the only viable means of retreat.<ref>Bradford, E. ''Hannibal''. London: Macmillan, 1981.</ref> In addition, the Carthaginian forces had maneuvered so that the Romans would face east. Not only would the morning sun shine low into the Romans' eyes, but the southeasterly winds would blow sand and dust into their faces as they approached the battlefield.<ref name="Dodge2004" /> Hannibal's deployment of his army, based on his perception of the terrain and understanding of the capabilities of his troops, proved decisive.