Editing Battle of Britain (section)

====Independent air attack====
Under the continuing influence of the 1935 "Conduct of the Air War" doctrine, the main focus of the Luftwaffe command (including Göring) was in concentrating attacks to destroy enemy armed forces on the battlefield, and "blitzkrieg" [[close air support]] of the army succeeded brilliantly. They reserved [[Strategic bombing during World War II|strategic bombing]] for a stalemate situation or revenge attacks, but doubted if this could be decisive on its own and regarded bombing civilians to destroy homes or undermine morale as a waste of strategic effort.{{sfn|Overy|2013|pp=42–43, 60–65}}{{sfn|Magenheimer|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=fsFACgAAQBAJ&pg=PT20 20]}}

The defeat of France in June 1940 introduced the prospect for the first time of independent air action against Britain. A July ''[[1st Air Corps (Germany)|Fliegercorps I]]'' paper asserted that Germany was by definition an air power: "Its chief weapon against England is the Air Force, then the Navy, followed by the landing forces and the Army." In 1940, the Luftwaffe would undertake a "''strategic offensive'' ... on its own and independent of the other services", according to an April 1944 German account of their military mission. Göring was convinced that strategic bombing could win objectives that were beyond the army and navy, and gain political advantages in the Third Reich for the Luftwaffe and himself.{{sfn|Overy|2013|pp=66–67, 70, 75, 690}} He expected air warfare to decisively force Britain to negotiate, as all in the OKW hoped, and the Luftwaffe took little interest in planning to support an invasion.{{sfn|Bungay|2000|p=114}}<ref name="Murray 44-5" />