Editing Balfour Declaration (section)

==== 1915–16: Prior British commitments over Palestine ====
{{Main|McMahon–Hussein correspondence|Sykes–Picot Agreement}}
{{multiple image
| total_width=450|height1=120|height2=120|height3=120
| image2 = 1918 British Government Map illustrating Territorial Negotiations between H.M.G. and King Hussein.png
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| caption2 = Map from FO 371/4368 (Nov. 1918) showing Palestine in the "Arab" area{{sfn|Kattan|2009|p=xxxiv (Map 2), and p.109}}
| image1 = Conflicting British Government interpretations of the Hussein McMahon correspondence of 1915, showing interpretations from 1918 and 1922.png
| width1 = 225
| caption1 = Excerpts from CAB 24/68/86 (Nov. 1918) and the [[Churchill White Paper]] (June 1922)
| footer = The Cabinet document states that Palestine was included in the McMahon pledge to the Arabs, whereas the White Paper states that it "has always been regarded" as being excluded.{{sfn|Posner|1987|p=144}}{{efn|group=lower-roman|Kedourie described the White Paper's 1922 statement as: "... the untruth that the government had 'always' regarded McMahon's reservation as covering the vilayet of Beirut and the sanjaq of Jerusalem, since in fact this argument was no older than Young's memorandum of November 1920"{{sfn|Kedourie|1976|p=246}}}}
}}
In late 1915 the [[List of diplomats of the United Kingdom to Egypt|British High Commissioner to Egypt]], [[Henry McMahon]], [[McMahon–Hussein correspondence|exchanged ten letters]] with [[Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca]], in which he promised Hussein to recognize Arab independence "in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca" in return for Hussein launching a revolt against the Ottoman Empire. The pledge excluded "portions of [[Syria]]" lying to the west of "the districts of Damascus, [[Homs]], [[Hama]] and [[Aleppo]]".{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|p=65}}{{efn|group=qt|See [[:File:McMahon–Hussein Letter 25 October 1915.jpg|the original 25 October 1915 letter here]]. [[George Antonius]]&nbsp;– who had been the first to publish the correspondence in full&nbsp;– described this letter as "by far the most important in the whole correspondence, and may perhaps be regarded as the most important international document in the history of the Arab national movement&nbsp;... is still invoked as the main piece of evidence on which the Arabs accuse Great Britain of having broken faith with them."{{sfn|Antonius|1938|p=169}}}} In the decades after the war, the extent of this coastal exclusion was hotly disputed{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|pp=65–70}} since Palestine lay to the southwest of [[Damascus]] and was not explicitly mentioned.{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|p=65}}
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| caption=Palestine in the [[Sykes–Picot Agreement]] map under "international administration", with [[Haifa Bay]], [[Acre, Israel|Acre]] and [[Haifa]] as a British enclave, and excluding the area from [[Hebron]] south{{efn|group=qt|In a 27&nbsp;February 1916 letter, prior to his departure to Russia, Sykes wrote to Samuel: "I read [[The Future of Palestine|[your 1915] memorandum]] and have committed it to memory."{{sfn|Kamel|2015|p=109}} With respect to the borders, Sykes explained: "By excluding Hebron and the East of the Jordan there is less to discuss with the Moslems, as the Mosque of Omar then becomes the only matter of vital importance to discuss with them and further does away with any contact with the bedouins, who never cross the river except on business. I imagine that the principal object of Zionism is the realization of the ideal of an existing centre of nationality rather than boundaries or extent of territory."{{sfn|Sanders|1984|p=347}}}}
| image=MPK1-426 Sykes Picot Agreement Map signed 8 May 1916.jpg
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The [[Arab Revolt]] was launched on June{{nbsp}}5th, 1916,{{sfn|Kattan|2009|p=103}} on the basis of the ''quid pro quo'' agreement in the correspondence.{{sfn|Kattan|2009|p=101}} However, less than three weeks earlier the governments of the United Kingdom, France, and Russia [[secret treaty|secretly concluded]] the [[Sykes–Picot Agreement]], which Balfour described later as a "wholly new method" for dividing the region, after the 1915 agreement "seems to have been forgotten".{{efn|group=qt|In his August 1919 memo Balfour noted, "In 1915 it was the Sherif of Mecca to whom the task of delimitation was to have been confided, nor were any restrictions placed upon his discretion in this matter, except certain reservations intended to protect French interests in Western Syria and Cilicia. In 1916 all this seems to have been forgotten. The Sykes–Picot Agreement made no reference to the Sherif of Mecca, and, so far as our five documents are concerned, he has never been heard of since. A wholly new method was adopted by France and England, who made with each other in the Sykes–Picot Agreement the rough and ready territorial arrangements already described—arrangements which the Allied and Associated Powers have so far neither explicitly accepted nor explicitly replaced."<ref name="Balfour1919" />}}

This Anglo-French treaty was negotiated in late 1915 and early 1916 between Sir [[Mark Sykes]] and [[François Georges-Picot]], with the primary arrangements being set out in draft form in a joint memorandum on 5 January 1916.{{sfn|Kedourie|2013|p=66}}{{sfn|Dockrill|Lowe|2002|pp=539–543, full memorandum}} Sykes was a British Conservative [[Kingston upon Hull Central (UK Parliament constituency)|MP]] who had risen to a position of significant influence on Britain's Middle East policy, beginning with his seat on the 1915 [[De Bunsen Committee]] and his initiative to create the [[Arab Bureau]].{{sfn|Ulrichsen|Ulrichsen|2014|pp=155–156}} Picot was a French diplomat and former [[Consul (representative)#Consular rank|consul-general]] in Beirut.{{sfn|Ulrichsen|Ulrichsen|2014|pp=155–156}} Their agreement defined the proposed spheres of influence and control in Western Asia should the Triple Entente succeed in defeating the Ottoman Empire during World War{{nbsp}}I,{{sfn|Schneer|2010|pp=75–86}}<ref name="Khouri">{{harvnb|Khouri|1985|pp=8–10}}</ref> dividing many Arab territories into British- and French-administered areas. In Palestine, internationalisation was proposed,{{sfn|Schneer|2010|pp=75–86}}<ref name="Khouri" /> with the form of administration to be confirmed after consultation with both Russia and Hussein;{{sfn|Schneer|2010|pp=75–86}} the January draft noted Christian and Muslim interests, and that "members of the Jewish community throughout the world have a conscientious and sentimental interest in the future of the country."{{sfn|Dockrill|Lowe|2002|pp=539–543, full memorandum}}{{sfn|Kedourie|2013|p=81}}{{efn|group=qt|Sykes had discussed the matter with Picot, suggesting the creation of an Arab Sultanate of Palestine under French and British protection; he was reprimanded by Grey, Buchanan should tell Sykes 'to obliterate from his memory that Mr Samuel's Cabinet memorandum made any mention of a British protectorate and that I told Mr Samuel at the time that a British protectorate was quite out of the question and Sir M. Sykes should never mention the subject without making this clear'.{{sfn|Lieshout|2016|p= 196}}}}

Prior to this point, no active negotiations with Zionists had taken place, but Sykes had been aware of Zionism, was in contact with [[Moses Gaster]] – a former President of the English Zionist Federation{{sfn|Halpern|1987|pp=48, 133}} – and may have seen Samuel's 1915 memorandum.{{sfn|Kedourie|2013|p=81}}{{sfn|Rosen|1988|p=61}} On 3 March, while Sykes and Picot were still in Petrograd, [[Lucien Wolf]] (secretary of the Foreign Conjoint Committee, set up by Jewish organizations to further the interests of foreign Jews) submitted to the Foreign Office, the draft of an assurance (formula) that could be issued by the allies in support of Jewish aspirations:

<blockquote>In the event of Palestine coming within the spheres of influence of Great Britain or France at the close of the war, the governments of those powers will not fail to take account of the historic interest that country possesses for the Jewish community. The Jewish population will be secured in the enjoyment of civil and religious liberty, equal political rights with the rest of the population, reasonable facilities for immigration and colonisation, and such municipal privileges in the towns and colonies inhabited by them as may be shown to be necessary.</blockquote>

On 11 March, telegrams{{efn|The full text of the telegram to Sazonov may be found in Jeffries{{sfn|Jeffries|1939|pages=112–114}}}} were sent in Grey's name to Britain's Russian and French ambassadors for transmission to Russian and French authorities, including the formula, as well as:

<blockquote>The scheme might be made far more attractive to the majority of Jews if it held out to them the prospect that when in course of time the Jewish colonists in Palestine grow strong enough to cope with the Arab population they may be allowed to take the management of the internal affairs of Palestine (with the exception of Jerusalem and the holy places) into their own hands.</blockquote>

Sykes, having seen the telegram, had discussions with Picot and proposed (making reference to Samuel's memorandum{{efn|In ascertaining what Zionists will accept and what refuse I am guided by your telegram coupled with my memory of Mr Samuel's memorandum to the Cabinet in March 1915.  Telegram say international regime unacceptable memorandum says French dominion equally unacceptable.  As against this [? French omitted] [If Picot represents them correctly] would never consent to England having temporary or provisional charge of Palestine; not even if we offered Cyprus as a gift and appointed French Governor for Jerusalem Bethlehem Nazareth and Jaffa. They seem hardly normal on this subject and any reference seems to excite memories of all grievances from Joan of Arc to Fashoda}}) the creation of an Arab Sultanate under French and British protection, some means of administering the holy places along with the establishment of a company to purchase land for Jewish colonists, who would then become citizens with equal rights to Arabs.{{efn|group=qt|Sykes was reprimanded by Grey, Buchanan should tell Sykes 'to obliterate from his memory that Mr Samuel's Cabinet memorandum made any mention of a British protectorate and that I told Mr Samuel at the time that a British protectorate was quite out of the question and Sir M. Sykes should never mention the subject without making this clear'.{{sfn|Lieshout|2016|p= 196}}}}

Shortly after returning from Petrograd, Sykes briefed Samuel, who then briefed a meeting of Gaster, Weizmann and Sokolow. Gaster recorded in his diary on 16 April 1916: "We are offered French-English condominium in Palest[ine]. Arab Prince to conciliate Arab sentiment and as part of the Constitution a Charter to Zionists for which England would stand guarantee and which would stand by us in every case of friction&nbsp;... It practically comes to a complete realisation of our Zionist programme. However, we insisted on: national character of Charter, freedom of immigration and internal autonomy, and at the same time full rights of citizenship to [illegible] and Jews in Palestine."{{sfn|Friedman|1973|pp=119–120}} In Sykes's mind, the agreement which bore his name was outdated even before it was signed – in March 1916, he wrote in a private letter: "to my mind the Zionists are now the key of the situation".{{efn|group=lower-roman|On his return from Petrograd, following his reprimand, Sykes wrote to Sir Arthur Nicholson "I am afraid from your telegram that I have caused you some uneasiness in regard to Picot & Palestine. But I can assure you no harm has been done, P is in the highest spirits over his new Castle in Armenia, and S[azonow] is apparently delighted to get out of having to take over any more Armenians than he can help. To my mind the Zionists are now the key of the situation-the problem is how are they to be satisfied?...." The full text of this letter may be found at<ref>{{cite journal|title=Sir Mark Sykes and Palestine 1915–16|last=Kedourie|first=Elie |year=1970|journal=Middle Eastern Studies|volume=6|issue=3|pages=340–345|jstor=4282341|doi=10.1080/00263207008700157| issn=0026-3206 }}</ref>}}{{sfn|Dockrill|Lowe|2001|pp=228–229}} In the event, neither the French nor the Russians were enthusiastic about the proposed formulation and eventually on 4 July, Wolf was informed that "the present moment is inopportune for making any announcement."{{sfn|Lieshout|2016|p=189}}

These wartime initiatives, inclusive of the declaration, are frequently considered together by historians because of the potential, real or imagined, for incompatibility between them, particularly in regard to the disposition of Palestine.{{sfn|Shlaim|2005|pp=251–270}} In the words of Professor [[Albert Hourani]], founder of the Middle East Centre at [[St Antony's College, Oxford]]: "The argument about the interpretation of these agreements is one which is impossible to end, because they were intended to bear more than one interpretation."{{sfn|Hourani|1981|p=211}}