Editing Avro Canada CF-105 Arrow (section)

===Political issues===
From 1953, some senior Canadian military officials at the chiefs of staffs began to question the program.<ref>Story, Donald C. and Russel Isinger. "The origins of the cancellation of Canada's Avro CF-105 arrow fighter program: A failure of strategy". ''Journal of Strategic Studies'', 30(6), December 2007.</ref> The chiefs of staff of the army and navy were both strongly opposed to the Arrow, since "substantial funds were being diverted to the air force", while Air Marshal [[Hugh Lester Campbell|Hugh Campbell]], RCAF Chief of Staff, backed it right up until its cancellation.<ref>Stewart 1988, p.&nbsp;235.</ref> In June 1957, when the governing [[Liberal Party of Canada|Liberals]] lost the federal election and a [[Progressive Conservative Party of Canada|Progressive Conservative]] government under [[John Diefenbaker]] took power, the aircraft's prospects began to noticeably change. Diefenbaker had campaigned on a platform of reining in what the Conservatives described as "rampant Liberal spending". Nonetheless, by 1958, the parent company had become Canada's third largest business enterprise and had primary interests in rolling stock, steel and coal, electronics, and aviation with 39 different companies under the A.&nbsp;V. Roe Canada banner.<ref>Stewart, 1988, p.&nbsp;238.</ref>

In September 1957,<ref>{{Cite web |title=North American Aerospace Defense Command > About NORAD > NORAD Agreement |url=https://www.norad.mil/About-NORAD/NORAD-Agreement/#:~:text=as%20a%20bi-national%20command,that%20established%20NORAD%20was%20formalized. |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20250407195725/https://www.norad.mil/About-NORAD/NORAD-Agreement/ |archive-date=2025-04-07 |access-date=2025-05-01 |website=www.norad.mil |language=en-US}}</ref> the Diefenbaker government signed the [[NORAD]] (North American Air Defense)<ref>[https://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/airdef/norad-overview.htm "NORAD at 40 Historical Overview"]. ''fas.org''. Retrieved: 4 September 2010.</ref> Agreement with the United States, making Canada a partner with American command and control. The USAF was in the process of completely automating their air defence system with the [[Semi Automatic Ground Environment|SAGE]] project, and offered Canada the opportunity to share this sensitive information for the air defence of North America.<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20110615013937/http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/uploads/cdai/2009/04/rodzinyak02.pdf "Good Neighbours Make Good Fences: Canadian Continental Defence Planning and the 1954 Decision to fund the Mid-Canada Early Warning Line"]. Conference of Defence Associates Institute, April 2009.</ref> One aspect of the SAGE system was the [[Bomarc]] nuclear-tipped anti-aircraft missile. This led to studies on basing Bomarcs in Canada in order to push the defensive line further north, even though the deployment was found to be extremely costly. Deploying the missiles alone was expected to cost C$164&nbsp;million, while SAGE would absorb another C$107&nbsp;million, not counting the cost of improvements to radar; in all, it was projected to raise Canada's defence spending by "as much as 25 to 30%", according to [[George Pearkes]], the minister of national defence.<ref>Campagna 1998</ref>

Defence against ballistic missiles was also becoming a priority. The existence of ''Sputnik'' had also raised the possibility of attacks from space, and, as the year progressed, word of a "[[missile gap]]" began spreading. An American brief of the meeting with Pearkes records his concern that Canada could not afford defensive systems against both ballistic missiles and manned bombers.<ref>"Canada-U.S. Defence Problems, File: DDE Trip to Canada, Memcons, 8–11 July 1958." ''Eisenhower Library''.</ref> It is also said Canada could afford the Arrow or Bomarc/SAGE, but not both.<ref>Campagna 1998, p.&nbsp;88.</ref>

By 11 August 1958, Pearkes requested cancellation of the Arrow, but the Cabinet Defence Committee (CDC) refused. Pearkes tabled it again in September and recommended installation of the Bomarc missile system. The latter was accepted, but again the CDC refused to cancel the entire Arrow program. The CDC wanted to wait until a major review on 31 March 1959. They cancelled the Sparrow/Astra system in September 1958.<ref name = 'campagna108'>Campagna 1998, p.&nbsp;108.</ref> Efforts to continue the program through cost-sharing with other countries were then explored. In 1959, Pearkes would say the ballistic missile was the greater threat, and Canada purchased Bomarc "in lieu of more airplanes".<ref>"File 79/469 Folder 19." ''Directorate of History, Department of National Defence''</ref>