Editing Arthur Schopenhauer (section)

=== World as will ===
{{main|The World as Will and Representation}}

In Book Two of ''The World as Will and Representation'', Schopenhauer considers what the world is beyond the aspect of it that appears to us—that is, the aspect of the world beyond representation, the world considered "[[thing-in-itself|in-itself]]" or "[[noumena]]", its inner essence. The very being in-itself of all things, Schopenhauer argues, is will (''Wille''). The empirical world that appears to us as representation has plurality and is ordered in a spatio-temporal framework. The world as thing in-itself must exist outside the subjective forms of space and time. Although the world manifests itself to our experience as a multiplicity of objects (the "objectivation" of the will), each element of this multiplicity has the same blind essence striving towards existence and life. Human rationality is merely a secondary phenomenon that does not distinguish humanity from the rest of nature at the fundamental, essential level. The advanced cognitive abilities of human beings, Schopenhauer argues, serve the ends of willing—an illogical, directionless, ceaseless striving that condemns the human individual to a life of suffering unredeemed by any final purpose. Schopenhauer's philosophy of the will as the essential reality behind the world as representation is often called [[Voluntarism (philosophy)|metaphysical voluntarism]].<ref name=Brit/>

For Schopenhauer, understanding the world as will leads to ethical concerns (see the [[#Ethics|ethics section below]] for further detail), which he explores in the Fourth Book of ''The World as Will and Representation'' and again in his two prize essays on ethics, ''[[On the Freedom of the Will]]'' and ''[[On the Basis of Morality]]''. No individual human actions are free, Schopenhauer argues, because they are events in the world of appearance and thus are subject to the principle of sufficient reason: a person's actions are a necessary consequence of motives and the given character of the individual human. Necessity extends to the actions of human beings just as it does to every other appearance, and thus we cannot speak of freedom of individual willing. Albert Einstein quoted the Schopenhauerian idea that "a man can ''do'' as he will, but not ''will'' as he will."<ref>Einstein, Albert (1935). ''The World as I See It'', p. 14. Snowball Publishing. {{ISBN|1-4948-7706-6}}.</ref> Yet the will as thing in-itself is free, as it exists beyond the realm of representation and thus is not constrained by any of the forms of necessity that are part of the principle of sufficient reason.

According to Schopenhauer, salvation from our miserable existence can come through the will's being "tranquillized" by the metaphysical insight that reveals individuality to be merely an illusion. The saint or 'great soul' intuitively "recognizes the whole, comprehends its essence, and finds that it is constantly passing away, caught up in vain strivings, inner conflict, and perpetual suffering".<ref>''The World as Will and Representation, Vol. 1'', §68</ref> The negation of the will, in other words, stems from the insight that the world in-itself (free from the forms of space and time) is one. [[Asceticism|Ascetic]] practices, Schopenhauer remarks, are used to aid the will's "self-abolition", which brings about a blissful, redemptive "will-less" state of emptiness that is free from striving or suffering.