Editing Argument from nonbelief (section)

=== Skeptical theism ===
[[Skeptical theism]] is the view that we should remain skeptical of claims that our perceptions about God's purposes can reasonably be considered good evidence of what they are.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/sceptical-theism/v-1|title=Sceptical theism|last=McBrayer|first=Justin|date=2015|website=The Rutledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy|access-date=10 October 2016|quote=Sceptical theists are ... sceptical of our abilities to discern whether the evils in our world constitute good evidence against the existence of God.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/sceptical-theism/v-1|title=Sceptical theism|last=McBrayer|first=Justin|date=2015|website=Rutledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy|access-date=10 October 2016|quote=The sceptical element of sceptical theism can be used to undermine various arguments for atheism including both the argument from evil and the argument from divine hiddenness.}}</ref> The central thesis of skeptical theism is that it would not be surprising for an infinitely intelligent and knowledgeable being's reasons for permitting a perception of evil or alleged hiddenness to be beyond human comprehension.<sup>[[Skeptical theism#cite note-2|[2]]]</sup> That is, what is perceived as hiddenness may be necessary for a greater good or to prevent equal or even greater evils.

Schellenberg has responded to skeptical theism (i.e. noseeum/unknown-purpose defense).<ref>Schellenberg, J.L., 2007a, The Wisdom to Doubt, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.</ref> First, Schellenberg says that he has given known reasons to think that a perfectly loving being would always be open to a personal relationship; ipso facto, God would not sacrifice some time in the relationship for the sake of unknown greater goods,<ref>Schellenberg, J. L. ‘Divine Hiddenness: Part 1 (Recent Work on the Hiddenness Argument).' Philosophy Compass, 2017.</ref> and if the greatest good for finite creatures is to be in a relationship with God, then God would not sacrifice that for the sake of unknown greater goods.<ref>Schellenberg, J.L., 2015, The Hiddenness Argument: Philosophy’s New Challenge to Belief in God, New York: Oxford University Press.</ref><ref name="Schellenberg, J. L. 2014">Schellenberg, J. L., 2014, Skeptical Theism and Skeptical Atheism. In Justin McBrayer Trent Dougherty (ed.), _Skeptical Theism: New Essays_. Oxford University Press.</ref> Finally, Schellenberg's position is that all known and unknown goods are ultimately in God; hence, God can bring about unknown greater goods without hiddenness.<ref>Schellenberg, J.L., 2016, “Divine Hiddenness and Human Philosophy”, in Green and Stump 2016: 13–32.</ref><ref name="Schellenberg, J. L. 2014"/>

==== Noseeum defense ====
The philosophers Michael Bergmann and Michael Rea described the philosopher William Rowe's justification for the second premise of the argument from evil, which is equally applicable to a perception of hiddenness:<blockquote>Some evidential arguments ... rely on a “noseeum” inference of the following sort: NI: If, after thinking hard, we can’t think of any God-justifying reason for permitting some horrific evil then it is likely that there is no such reason. (The reason NI is called a ‘noseeum’ inference is that it says, more or less, that because we don’t see ‘um, they probably ain’t there.)<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal |last=Rowe|first=William|year=1979|title=The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism, American|journal=American Philosophical Quarterly |volume=16 |pages=335–41}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |year=2005 |title=Michael Bergmann and Michael Rea |url=https://www3.nd.edu/~mrea/papers/In%20Defense%20of%20Skeptical%20Theism.pdf |journal=The Australasian Journal of Philosophy |volume=83 |pages=241–51 |access-date=2016-10-31 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161109033308/http://www3.nd.edu/~mrea/papers/In%20Defense%20of%20Skeptical%20Theism.pdf |archive-date=2016-11-09 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Rowe|first=William|year=1988|title=Evil and Theodicy|journal=Philosophical Topics|volume=16|issue=2|pages=119–32|doi=10.5840/philtopics198816216}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Rowe|first=William|title=Ruminations about Evil|journal=Philosophical Topics|volume=5|pages=69–88}}</ref></blockquote>Various analogies are offered to show that the noseeum inference is logically unsound. For example, a novice chess player's inability to discern a chess master's choice of moves cannot be used to infer that there is no good reason for the move.<ref name=":22">{{Cite book|url=http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~bergmann/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/OHPT-bergmann-preprint.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140407231539/http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~bergmann/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/OHPT-bergmann-preprint.pdf |archive-date=2014-04-07 |url-status=live|title=Oxford Handbook to Philosophical Theology (Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Evil) |last=Bergmann |first=Michael|publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2009|editor-last=Flint|editor-first=Thomas|location=Oxford|pages=374–99}}</ref> The skeptical theist and noseeum defense place the burden of proof on the atheist to prove that their intuitions about God are trustworthy.