Editing Anti-realism (section)

=== Moral anti-realism ===
In the [[Ethics|philosophy of ethics]], moral anti-realism (or moral irrealism) is a [[Meta-ethics|meta-ethical]] doctrine that there are no objective [[Morality|moral values]] or normative facts. It is usually defined in opposition to [[moral realism]], which holds that there are objective moral values, such that a moral claim may be either true or false. Specifically the moral anti-realist is committed to denying at least one of the following three statements: <ref>{{Citation|last=Joyce|first=Richard|title=Moral Anti-Realism|date=2016|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/moral-anti-realism/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Winter 2016|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2021-03-08}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last= Vayrynen |first= Pekka |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/61151356|title=Encyclopedia of philosophy|date=2006|publisher=Thomson Gale/Macmillan Reference USA|others=Donald M. Borchert|isbn=0-02-865780-2|edition=2nd|location=Detroit|oclc=61151356 |pages = 379–382 |quote=No single description is likely to capture all realist views, but a reasonably accurate rule is to understand moral realism as the conjunction of three theses: The semantic thesis: The primary semantic role of moral predicates (such as "right" and "wrong") is to refer to moral properties (such as rightness and wrongness), so that moral statements (such as "honesty is good" and "slavery is unjust") purport to represent moral facts, and express propositions that are true or false (or approximately true, largely false and so on).  The alethic thesis: Some moral propositions are in fact true.  The metaphysical thesis: Moral propositions are true when actions and other objects of moral assessment have the relevant moral properties (so that the relevant moral facts obtain), where these facts and properties are robust: their metaphysical status, whatever it is, is not relevantly different from that of (certain types of ordinary non-moral facts and properties).}}</ref>

# ''The Semantic Thesis:'' Moral statements have meaning, they express propositions, or are the kind of things that can be true or false.
# ''The Alethic Thesis:'' Some moral propositions are true.
# ''The Metaphysical Thesis'': The metaphysical status of moral facts is robust and ordinary, not importantly different from other facts about the world.

Different version of moral anti-realism deny different statements: specifically, [[non-cognitivism]] denies the first claim, arguing that moral statements have no meaning or truth content,<ref>{{Cite book|last= Harrison|first=Ross|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/57283356|title=The Oxford companion to philosophy|date=2005|others=Ted Honderich|isbn=0-19-926479-1|edition=2nd|location=Oxford|oclc=57283356|quote= This one is used to designate that family of ethical positions in which it is supposed that moral judgements do not possess truth-value and hence can not be known.  An example of a non-cognitivist position is emotivism; that is, the claim that moral judgements are merely expressions of emotion.}}</ref> [[Error Theory|error theory]] denies the second claim, arguing that all moral statements are false,<ref>{{Citation|last=Joyce|first=Richard|title=Moral Anti-Realism|date=2016|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/moral-anti-realism/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Winter 2016|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2021-03-10 |quote = The moral error theorist thinks that although our moral judgments aim at the truth, they systematically fail to secure it. The moral error theorist stands to morality as the atheist stands to religion.}}</ref> and [[ethical subjectivism]] denies the third claim, arguing that the truth of moral statements is mind dependent.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/61151356|title=Encyclopedia of philosophy |last= Harrison |first=Jonathan |date=2006|publisher=Thomson Gale/Macmillan Reference USA |editor-last=Borchert|editor-first=Donald M.  |isbn=0-02-865780-2|edition=2nd |location=Detroit|oclc=61151356 |quote= A subjectivist ethical theorist is a theory according to which moral judgements about men or their actions are judgements about the way people react to these men and actions - that is, the way they think or feel about them. }}</ref>

Examples of anti-realist moral theories might be:<ref>{{Citation|last=Joyce|first=Richard|title=Moral Anti-Realism|date=2016|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/moral-anti-realism/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Winter 2016|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2019-07-25}}</ref>
{{cols|colwidth=20em}}
*[[Ethical subjectivism]]
*[[Non-cognitivism]]
*[[Emotivism]]
*[[Universal prescriptivism|Prescriptivism]]
*[[Quasi-realism]]
*[[Projectivism]]
*[[Moral fictionalism]]
*[[Moral nihilism]]
*[[Moral skepticism]]
{{colend}}
There is a debate as to whether [[moral relativism]] is actually an anti-realist position. While many versions deny the metaphysical thesis, some do not, as one could imagine a system of morality which requires you to obey the written laws in your country.<ref>{{Citation|last=Joyce|first=Richard|title=Moral Anti-Realism (Supplement on Moral Objectivity and Moral Relativism)|date=2016|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/moral-objectivity-relativism.html |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Winter 2016|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2021-03-08 |quote= In all cases, it may be that what determines the difference in the relevant contexts is something “mind-dependent”—in which case it would be anti-realist relativism—but it need not be; perhaps what determines the relevant difference is an entirely mind-independent affair, making for an objectivist (and potentially realist) relativism.}}</ref> Such a system would be a version of moral relativism, as different individuals would be required to follow different laws, but the moral facts are physical facts about the world, not mental facts, so they are metaphysically ordinary. Thus, different versions of moral relativism might be considered anti-realist or realist.<ref>{{Citation|last=Joyce|first=Richard|title=Moral Anti-Realism (Supplement on Moral Objectivity and Moral Relativism)|date=2016|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/moral-objectivity-relativism.html |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Winter 2016|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2021-03-08 |quote= Moral relativism is sometimes thought of as a version of anti-realism, but (short of stipulating usage) there is no basis for this classification; it is better to say that some versions of relativism may be anti-realist and others may be realist.}}</ref>