Editing Alcibiades (section)

===Negotiations with the Athenian oligarchs===
Alcibiades seemed to assume that the "radical democracy" would never agree to his recall to Athens.<ref name="Buckley411">T. Buckley, ''Aspects of Greek History'', 411.</ref> He exchanged messages with the Athenian leaders at [[Samos]] and suggested that if they could install an [[oligarchy]] friendly to him he would return to Athens and bring with him Persian money and possibly the Persian fleet of 147 triremes.<ref name="Plut25">{{cite Plutarch|Alcibiades|25}}</ref> Alcibiades set about winning over the most influential military officers, and achieved his goal by offering them a threefold plan: the Athenian constitution was to be changed, the recall of Alcibiades was to be voted, and Alcibiades was to win over Tissaphernes and the King of Persia to the Athenian side. Most of the officers in the Athenian fleet accepted the plan and welcomed the prospect of a narrower constitution, which would allow them a greater part in determining policy. According to Thucydides, only one of the Athenian generals at Samos, [[Phrynichus (oligarch)|Phrynichus]], opposed the plan and argued that Alcibiades cared no more for the proposed oligarchy than for the traditional democracy.<ref name="Sealey359">R. Sealey, ''A History of the Greek City States'', 359.</ref> The involvement in the plot of another general, [[Thrasybulus]], remains unclear.{{efn|Kagan has suggested that Thrasybulus was one of the founding members of the scheme and was willing to support moderate oligarchy, but was alienated by the extreme actions taken by the plotters.<ref>Donald Kagan, ''The Peloponnesian War'', 385.</ref> Robert J. Buck, on the other hand, maintains that Thrasybulus was probably never involved in the plot, possibly because he was absent from Samos at the time of its inception.<ref>R.J. Buck, ''Thrasybulus and the Athenian Democracy'', 27–28.</ref>}}

These officers of the Athenian fleet formed a group of conspirators, but were met with opposition from the majority of the soldiers and sailors; these were eventually calmed down "by the advantageous prospect of the pay from the king".<ref name="Th8.48">Thucydides, [[s:History of the Peloponnesian War/Book 8#8:48|8.48]].</ref> The members of the group assembled and prepared to send [[Pisander]], one of their number, on an embassy to Athens to treat for the restoration of Alcibiades and the abolition of democracy in the city, and thus to make Tissaphernes the friend of the Athenians.<ref name="Th8.49">Thucydides, [[s:History of the Peloponnesian War/Book 8#8:49|8.49]].</ref>

Phrynichus, fearing that Alcibiades if restored would avenge himself upon him for his opposition, sent a secret letter to the Spartan Admiral, Astyochus, to tell him that Alcibiades was ruining their cause by making Tissaphernes the friend of the Athenians, and containing an express revelation of the rest of the intrigue. Astyochus went up to Alcibiades and Tissaphernes at [[Magnesia on the Maeander|Magnesia]] and communicated to them Phrynichus's letter. Alcibiades responded in kind, sending to the authorities at Samos a letter against Phrynichus, stating what he had done, and requiring that he should be put to death.<ref name="Th8.50">Thucydides, [[s:History of the Peloponnesian War/Book 8#8:50|8.50]].</ref> Phrynichus in desperation wrote again to Astyochus, offering him a chance to destroy the Athenian fleet at Samos. This also Astyochus revealed to Alcibiades who informed the officers at Samos that they had been betrayed by Phrynichus. Alcibiades however gained no credit, because Phrynichus had anticipated Alcibiades's letter and, before the accusations could arrive, told the army that he had received information of an enemy plan to attack the camp and that they should fortify Samos as quickly as possible.<ref name="Th8.51">Thucydides, [[s:History of the Peloponnesian War/Book 8#8:51|8.51]].</ref>

Despite these events, Pisander and the other envoys of the conspirators arrived at Athens and made a speech before the people. Pisander won the argument, putting Alcibiades and his promises at the center. The Ecclesia deposed Phrynichus and elected Pisander and ten other envoys to negotiate with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades.<ref name="Th8.53">Thucydides, [[s:History of the Peloponnesian War/Book 8#8:53|8.53]].</ref>

At this point, Alcibiades's scheme encountered a great obstacle. Tissaphernes would not make an agreement on any terms, wanting to follow his policy of neutrality.<ref name="Kagan136-138">D. Kagan, ''The Fall of the Athenian Empire'', 136–38.</ref> As Kagan points out, Tissaphernes was a prudent leader and had recognized the advantages of wearing each side out without direct Persian involvement.<ref>Kagan, ''The Peloponnesian War'', 366.</ref> Alcibiades realized this and, by presenting the Athenians with stiffer and stiffer demands on Tissaphernes's behalf, attempted to convince them that he had persuaded Tissaphernes to support them, but that they had not conceded enough to him. Although the envoys were angered at the audacity of the Persian demands, they nevertheless departed with the impression that Alcibiades could have brought about an agreement among the powers if he had chosen to do so.<ref name = "Th8.56">Thucydides, ''The Peloponnesian War'', [[s:History of the Peloponnesian War/Book 8#8:56|8.56]].</ref> This [[wikt:fiasco|fiasco]] at the court of Tissaphernes, however, put an end to the negotiations between the conspirators and Alcibiades.<ref name="Kagan136-138" /> The group was convinced that Alcibiades could not deliver his side of the bargain without demanding exorbitantly high concessions of them and they accordingly abandoned their plans to restore him to Athens.<ref name="Th8.56" />