Editing Analytic philosophy (section)

=== Philosophy of science ===
{{Main|Philosophy of science}}

Science and the [[philosophy of science]] have also had increasingly significant roles in analytic metaphysics. The theory of special relativity has had a profound effect on the philosophy of time, and quantum physics is routinely discussed in the free will debate.<ref name="inwagenetall1998" /> The weight given to scientific evidence is largely due to commitments of philosophers to [[scientific realism]] and [[Naturalism (philosophy)|naturalism]]. Others will see a commitment to using science in philosophy as [[scientism]].

==== Confirmation theory ====
Carl Hempel advocated confirmation theory or [[Bayesian epistemology]]. He introduced the famous [[Raven paradox|raven's paradox]].<ref name="Fitelson">{{cite book |last1=Fitelson |first1=Branden |title=The Place of Probability in Science |last2=Hawthorne |first2=James |date=2010 |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-90-481-3614-8 |series=Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science |volume=284 |pages=247–275 |chapter=How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens |doi=10.1007/978-90-481-3615-5_11 |chapter-url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HAWHBC}}</ref>

==== Falsification ====
[[File:Karl Popper.jpg|thumb|130px|Karl Popper]]

In reaction to what he considered excesses of logical positivism, [[Karl Popper]], in ''[[The Logic of Scientific Discovery]]'', insisted on the role of [[falsifiability|falsification]] in the philosophy of science, using it to solve the [[demarcation problem]].<ref>{{cite book |author=Popper, Karl R. |title=The Logic of Scientific Discovery |publisher=Routledge |year=2002 |isbn=978-0-415-27844-7}}</ref>

==== Confirmation holism ====
The [[Duhem–Quine thesis]], or problem of [[underdetermination]], posits that no [[Hypothesis|scientific hypothesis]] can be understood in isolation, a viewpoint called [[confirmation holism]].<ref name=qui/>

==== Constructivism ====
In reaction to both the logical positivists and Popper, discussions of the philosophy of science during the last 40 years were dominated by [[social constructivism|social constructivist]] and [[cognitive relativism|cognitive relativist]] theories of science. Following Quine and Duhem, subsequent theories emphasized [[theory-ladenness]]. [[Thomas Samuel Kuhn]], with his formulation of [[paradigm shift]]s, and [[Paul Feyerabend]], with his [[epistemological anarchism]], are significant for these discussions.<ref>Glock 2008, p. 47.</ref>

==== Biology ====
The [[philosophy of biology]] has also undergone considerable growth, particularly due to the considerable debate in recent years over the nature of [[evolution]], particularly [[natural selection]].<ref>Hull, David L. and [[Michael Ruse|Ruse, Michael]], "Preface" in ''The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Biology'' (Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. xix, xx.</ref> Daniel Dennett and his 1995 book ''[[Darwin's Dangerous Idea]]'', which defends [[Neo-Darwinism]], stand at the forefront of this debate.<ref>Lennox, James G., "Darwinism and Neo-Darwinism" in Sakar and Plutynski (eds.), ''A Companion to the Philosophy of Biology'' (Blackwell Publishing, 2008), p. 89.</ref> [[Jerry Fodor]] criticizes natural selection.