Editing Xi'an Incident (section)

== Immediate reactions ==
News spread overnight through Bao'an, the CCP capital. The Communists were surprised but ecstatic. A mass meeting held the following morning approved a proposal by Mao Zedong to put Chiang on trial as a traitor.{{sfn|Pantsov|2012|pp=299-300}} Zhou Enlai was dispatched to Xi'an. The CCP advised Zhang to prepare for attacks by the Nationalist central government, and promised that the Red Army would not take advantage of the situation to occupy any Northeastern Army territory.{{sfn|Chen|2024|p=163}} They also notified the Comintern of what had occurred and asked permission to form a "revolutionary government of national defense" with Zhang, Yang, and other dissident Nationalists.{{sfn|Chen|2024|p=163}} A meeting of the CCP Central Committee was held on December 13 to discuss the situation in more detail. The vast majority approved the plan to force Chiang to step down and stand trial, and to sentence him to death. They also planned to make Xi'an the center of a government of national resistance to Japan.{{sfn|Chen|2024|p=163}} On December 15, the CCP sent a telegram to Nanjing urging them to comply with the Eight Demands, force Chiang to step down, and allow him to be tried.{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=249}}

{{multiple image
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 | image1 = 何應欽 07.jpg
 | caption1 = He Yingqin, Minister of War
 | alt1 = A Chinese man with glasses in a military uniform
 | image2 = T. V. Soong Edit.jpg
 | alt2 = A Chinese man wearing round glasses and a western-style business suit
 | caption2 = T. V. Soong, Chiang's brother-in-law
 | image3 = HHKung.jpg
 | caption3 = H. H. Kung, Vice-President of the Executive Yuan
 | alt3 = Chinese man wearing a tangzhuang
 | footer = Three leading figures in the Nationalist Government}}

Nanjing received word of Chiang's arrest by 1 pm on December 12.{{efn|He Yingqin had learned of the revolt earlier, via Zhu Shaozhou.{{sfn|Wu|1976|p=89}}}} An emergency meeting of the Central Standing Committee was convened that night.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|p=146}} The committee members were uncertain over whether Chiang was dead or alive. He Yingqin may have been convinced that Chiang was dead, and argued for an immediate military attack on Xi'an.{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=251}} The Committee placed He Yingqin in charge of handling the military response.{{sfn|Worthing|2016|p=168}} However, the following day, [[H.H. Kung]] and [[Soong Mei-ling]] arrived in the capital and began lobbying hard for a negotiated settlement.{{sfn|Worthing|2016|p=169}} They had received a personal telegram from Zhang assuring them that Chiang was alive, and as the Generalissmo's relatives, they feared that they would lose their influence if he were killed in an attack.{{sfn|Wu|1976|p=85}}{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=251}} Soong Mei-ling even argued that Zhang Xueliang's demands were worth hearing out.{{sfn|Worthing|2016|p=169}} In contrast, the mood in the army was sanguine. Hundreds of officers signed a letter to He requesting permission to attack Xi'an. Hundreds more sent a threatening telegram to Zhang demanding that he stand down.{{sfn|Wu|1976|p=92}} In the end, He decided to put military pressure on the mutineers rather than attack or negotiate right away. On December 16, he received a mandate from the Central Standing Committee to begin a punitive expedition.{{sfn|Wu|1976|p=97}} The Central Army took up positions surrounding Xi'an.{{sfn|Worthing|2016|p=170}} The Nationalist government attempted (unsuccessfully) to induce defections from the mutinous armies and pressure Zhang to surrender.{{sfn|Wu|1976|pp=92-93,97}} Bombing raids were conducted on [[Weinan]] and [[Huazhou District|Huaxian]] and the [[List of German-trained divisions of the National Revolutionary Army|Training Division]] of the Central Army launched an unsanctioned attack that ended in defeat.{{sfn|Wu|1976|pp=92-93}}

{{Gallery
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| File:Ta Kung Pao 1936.12.18 Open Letter.png
| The December 18 editorial "An Open Letter to the Military Vocation in Xi'an" published in ''[[Ta Kung Pao (1902–1949)|Ta Kung Pao]]''. Critical of the coup, the newspaper dropped their editorial by plane into Xi'an.}}

Most warlords chose to stay neutral in the conflict rather than risk backing the losing side. Many, such as [[Liu Xiang (warlord)|Liu Xiang]] of Sichuan, [[Han Fuju]] of Shandong, and [[Song Zheyuan]] of Hebei, were privately sympathetic to the coup. They publicly reassured the central government of their loyalty while voicing support for a negotiated settlement.{{sfn|Wu|1976|pp=93, 115-119}} Zhang Xueliang had counted on the support of Yan Xishan, the governor of Shanxi who had also signed a secret deal with the CCP.{{sfn|Wu|1976|p=113}} But Yan was afraid that a civil war would break out between Xi'an and Nanjing. He urged Zhang to let Chiang go—although simultaneously expressing his desire for Chinese unity against Japan and converting his anti-Communist militias into anti-Japanese militias.{{sfn|Gillin|1967|p=232}} Only one warlord faction, the Guangxi Clique, openly supported the rebels. They had recently led their own rebellion against the central government and shared Zhang and Yang's desire for a common front against Japan.{{sfn|Wu|1976|p=116}}

The Chinese public reacted with shock at the news of Chiang's arrest. There was widespread concern for Chiang's safety.{{sfn|Eastman|1991|p=48}} ''[[Ta Kung Pao (1902–1949)|Ta Kung Pao]]'', a major newspaper, published an editorial excoriating Zhang and calling for Chiang's immediate release.{{sfn|Wu|1976|pp=123-124}} Even members of the National Salvation Association, who also wanted a ceasefire with the Communists and war against Japan, feared that Chiang's captivity could give Japan an opening to conquer China. Groups across the political spectrum  advocated for Chiang's release.{{sfn|Coble|1991|p=344}} A major exception were Chinese students. In [[North China]] they strongly supported the coup, while in South China there was a divide between left-wing students, who largely supported the coup, and right-wing students, who largely opposed it.{{sfn|Wu|1976|p=121}}

New Zealand journalist [[James Munro Bertram|James Bertram]], who managed to enter Xi'an shortly after the incident began, reported on the mood of the city. He observed [[Republic of China Air Force|fleets of government aircraft]] flying low over the roofs, and hearing H. H. Kung's declare over radio that there would be "no dealings with armed rebellion, no truce with the 'Communist bandits.'"{{sfn|Bertram|1938|pp=118-122}} The city's population remained strongly supportive of the rebels and their cause.{{sfn|Wu|1976|p=98}}

===Stalin's intervention and CCP reversal===
{{Gallery
| height       = 200px
| align        = right
| File:Page of Pravda.png
| The December 14 article in ''Pravda'' "Events in China" condemned the coup as a Japanese plot
}}
Moscow received news of Chiang's arrest on December 13. The head of the Comintern, [[Georgi Dimitrov]], was delighted. He was preparing to authorize Chiang's execution until he read the articles in ''[[Pravda]]'' and ''[[Izvestia]]'', which condemned the Xi'an Incident as a plot by "pro-Japanese elements". In a subsequent meeting, Stalin made it clear to Dimitrov that he viewed Chiang as indispensable.{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=248}}

Stalin feared that in Chiang's absence, a figure like Wang Jingwei, perhaps assisted by He Yingqin (who had already contacted Wang in Italy after Chiang's arrest), would take control of the Nationalists and create a pro-Japanese Chinese regime, placing the Soviet Union in extreme danger of a Japanese invasion of the Soviet Union. His anxieties were confirmed when Chiang's rival Wang Jingwei met with Adolf Hitler to discuss the prospect of China enlisting in the anti-Communist Axis in exchange for greater German aid to China.{{sfn|Frank|2020|pp=21-22}} Following Chiang's abduction, Pan Hannian had advised Stalin that without Chiang, "China would be without a leader to fight the Japanese and this would not benefit the Soviet Union."{{sfn|Frank|2020|pp=21-22}}{{efn|Wang Jingwei was in Europe recovering from an assassination attempt the previous year. He Yingqin notified him when Chiang was abducted, but he did not arrive back in China until January 14, 1937, after the incident was already over.{{sfn|Worthing|2016|pp=174-175}}{{sfn|So|2002|p=244}}}}

Following Stalin's orders, the Comintern sent a telegram on December 16 instructing the CCP to bring the Xi'an incident to a peaceful conclusion.{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=249}}{{sfn|van de Ven|2003|p=187}} The telegram was not received until the 17th, and would not be fully decrypted for several days. However, by the 17th the CCP's leadership had already learned of Moscow's stance from public news sources and decided to change course.{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|pp=249-250}} On that day, the CCP announced that they desired a peaceful settlement. On December 18, they recanted their former call for a public trial of Chiang as "inappropriate".{{sfn|van de Ven|2003|p=187}}