Editing World (section)

=== Philosophy of mind ===
In [[philosophy of mind]], the term "world" is commonly used in contrast to the term "mind" as that which is represented by the mind. This is sometimes expressed by stating that there is a gap between mind and world and that this gap needs to be overcome for representation to be successful.<ref name="Price">{{cite journal |last1=Price |first1=Huw |last2=McDowell |first2=John |title=Mind and World |journal=Philosophical Books |date=1994 |volume=38 |issue=3 |pages=169–181 |doi=10.1111/1468-0149.00066 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HUWMAW}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Avramides |first1=Anita |title=Philosophy of Mind: Overview |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/philosophy-mind-overview |website=www.encyclopedia.com |access-date=10 April 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Witmer |first1=D. Gene |title=Philosophy Of Mind |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/biographies/spanish-and-portuguese-history-biographies/philosophy-mind |website=www.encyclopedia.com |access-date=10 April 2021}}</ref> One problem in philosophy of mind is to explain how the mind is able to bridge this gap and to enter into genuine mind-world-relations, for example, in the form of perception, knowledge or action.<ref>{{cite web |title=Philosophy of mind |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy-of-mind |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=10 April 2021 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Sosa |first1=Ernest |title=Mind-World Relations |journal=Episteme |date=2015 |volume=12 |issue=2 |pages=155–166 |doi=10.1017/epi.2015.8 |s2cid=147785165 |url=https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=SOSMR&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1017%2Fepi.2015.8 |language=en |issn=1742-3600}}</ref> This is necessary for the world to be able to rationally constrain the activity of the mind.<ref name="Price"/><ref name="Brandom">{{cite journal |last1=Brandom |first1=Robert B. |title=Perception and Rational Constraint: McDowell's Mind and World |journal=Philosophical Issues |date=1996 |volume=7 |pages=241–259 |doi=10.2307/1522910 |jstor=1522910 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BRAPAR}}</ref> According to a realist position, the world is something distinct and independent from the mind.<ref name="Miller">{{cite web |last1=Miller |first1=Alexander |title=Realism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2019}}</ref> Idealists conceive of the world as partially or fully determined by the mind.<ref name="Miller"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Guyer |first1=Paul |last2=Horstmann |first2=Rolf-Peter |title=Idealism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=10 April 2021 |date=2021}}</ref> [[Immanuel Kant]]'s [[transcendental idealism]], for example, posits that the spatiotemporal structure of the world is imposed by the mind on reality but lacks independent existence otherwise.<ref>{{cite web |authorlink1=Nicholas Stang|last1=Stang |first1=Nicholas F. |title=Kant's Transcendental Idealism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental-idealism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=10 April 2021 |date=2021}}</ref> A more radical idealist conception of the world can be found in Berkeley's [[subjective idealism]], which holds that the world as a whole, including all everyday objects like tables, cats, trees and ourselves, "consists of nothing but minds and ideas".<ref>{{cite web |last1=Flage |first1=Daniel E. |title=Berkeley, George |url=https://iep.utm.edu/berkeley/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=10 April 2021}}</ref>