Editing Winter War (section)

==Opposing forces==
===Soviet military plan===
Before the war, Soviet leadership had expected total victory within a few weeks. The Red Army had just completed the invasion of eastern Poland at a cost of fewer than 4,000 casualties after Germany attacked Poland from the west. Stalin's expectations of a quick Soviet triumph were backed up by politician [[Andrei Zhdanov]] and military strategist [[Kliment Voroshilov]], but other generals were more reserved. Red Army Chief of Staff [[Boris Shaposhnikov]] advocated a narrow-front assault right on the Karelian isthmus.<ref name ="Kotkin_981_994">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], pp. 981, 994</ref> Additionally, Shaposhnikov argued for a fuller build-up, extensive [[fire support]] and logistical preparations, a rational [[order of battle]] and the deployment of the army's best units. Zhdanov's military commander, [[Kirill Meretskov]], reported, "The terrain of coming operations is split by lakes, rivers, swamps, and is almost entirely covered by forests.... The proper use of our forces will be difficult". These doubts were not reflected in Meretskov's troop deployments, and he publicly announced that the Finnish campaign would take two weeks at most. Soviet soldiers had even been warned not to cross the border mistakenly into Sweden.<ref name="Trotter_34">[[#Trotter2002|Trotter (2002)]], p. 34</ref>

Stalin's purges in the 1930s had devastated the officer corps of the Red Army; those purged included three of its five marshals, 220 of its 264 division or higher-level commanders and 36,761 officers of all ranks. Fewer than half of all the officers remained.<ref name="RConquest">[[#Conquest2007|Conquest (2007)]], p. 450</ref><ref>[[#Bullock1993|Bullock (1993)]], p. 489</ref> They were commonly replaced by soldiers who were less competent but more loyal to their superiors. Unit commanders were overseen by [[political commissars]], whose approval was needed to approve and ratify military decisions, which they evaluated based on their political merits. The dual system further complicated the Soviet chain of command<ref>[[#Glanz1998|Glanz (1998)]], p. 58</ref><ref name="Ries1988_56">[[#Ries1988|Ries (1988)]], p. 56</ref> and annulled the independence of commanding officers.<ref name="Edwards_189">[[#Edwards2006|Edwards (2006)]], p. 189</ref>

After the Soviet success at the [[Battles of Khalkhin Gol]] against Japan, on the USSR's eastern border, Soviet High Command had divided into two factions. One side was represented by the [[Spanish Civil War]] veterans General [[Pavel Rychagov]] from the [[Soviet Air Forces]]; the tank expert General [[Dmitry Pavlov (general)|Dmitry Pavlov]] and Stalin's favourite general, Marshal [[Grigory Kulik]], the chief of artillery.<ref>[[#Coox1985|Coox (1985)]], p. 996</ref> The other faction was led by Khalkhin Gol veterans General [[Georgy Zhukov]] of the Red Army and General [[Grigory Kravchenko]] of the Soviet Air Forces.<ref>[[#Coox1985|Coox (1985)]], pp. 994–995</ref> Under this divided command structure, the lessons of the Soviet Union's "first real war on a massive scale using tanks, artillery, and aircraft" at Khalkin Gol went unheeded.<ref name=autogenerated1>[[#Coox1985|Coox (1985)]], p. 997</ref> As a result, Russian [[BT tank]]s were less successful during the Winter War, and it took the Soviet Union three months and over a million men to accomplish what Zhukov had managed at Khalkhin Gol in ten days (albeit in completely different circumstances).<ref name=autogenerated1 /><ref>[[#Goldman2012|Goldman (2012)]], p. 167</ref>

===Soviet order of battle===
{{See also|Red Army}}
[[File:Ladoga Karelia terrain.jpg|thumb|Dense forests of Ladoga Karelia at [[Kollaa River|Kollaa]]. A Soviet tank on the road in the background according to the photographer.|alt=A ground-level photo at Kollaa, with trees in the foreground, a snowy field in-between and dense forests as well as a Soviet tank in the distance.]]

Soviet generals were impressed by the success of German ''[[Blitzkrieg]]'' [[Military tactics|tactics]], but they had been tailored to conditions in [[Central Europe]], with its dense well-mapped network of paved roads. Armies fighting there had recognised supply and communications centres, which could be easily targeted by armoured vehicle regiments. Finnish Army centres, in contrast, were deep inside the country. There were no paved roads, and even gravel or dirt roads were scarce. Most of the terrain consisted of trackless forests and swamps. The war correspondent [[John Langdon-Davies]] observed the landscape: "Every acre of its surface was created to be the despair of an attacking military force".<ref>[[#LangdonDavies1941|Langdon-Davies (1941)]], p. 7</ref> Waging ''Blitzkrieg'' in Finland was a highly-difficult proposition, and according to Trotter, the Red Army failed to meet the level of tactical co-ordination and local initiative that would be required to execute such tactics in Finland.<ref name="Trotter_35-36">[[#Trotter2002|Trotter (2002)]], pp. 35–36</ref>

Commander of the [[Leningrad Military District]] Kiril Meretskov initially ran the overall operation against the Finns.<ref name="Edwards_93">[[#Edwards2006|Edwards (2006)]], p. 93</ref> The command was passed on 9 December 1939 to the General Staff Supreme Command (later known as [[Stavka]]), directly under Kliment Voroshilov (chairman), [[Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov|Nikolai Kuznetsov]], Stalin and Boris Shaposhnikov.<ref name="Edwards_125">[[#Edwards2006|Edwards (2006)]], p. 125</ref><ref>[[#Manninen2008|Manninen (2008)]], p. 14</ref> On 28 December, when Stalin asked for volunteers to take over military command, Semyon Timoshenko offered himself on the condition that he be allowed to implement Shaposhnikov's initial plan of a focused attack on the Karelian Isthmus to break the Mannerheim Line; it was accepted.<ref name ="Kotkin_994">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], p. 994</ref><ref name="Trotter_204">[[#Trotter2002|Trotter (2002)]], p. 204</ref> In January 1940, the Leningrad Military District was reformed and renamed "North-Western Front".<ref name="Trotter_204"/>

The Soviet forces were organised as follows:<ref name="Trotter_38-39">[[#Trotter2002|Trotter (2002)]], pp. 38–39</ref>

* The [[7th Army (Soviet Union)|7th Army]], comprising nine divisions, a tank corps and three tank brigades, was located on the Karelian Isthmus. Its objective was to quickly overrun the Finnish defenses on the Karelian Isthmus and conquer Viipuri. From there, the 7th Army was to continue towards Lappeenranta, then turn west towards Lahti, before the final push to the capital Helsinki. The force was later divided into the 7th and [[13th Army (Soviet Union)|13th Armies]].<ref name="KR2007_13">[[#KilinRaunio2007|Kilin and Raunio (2007)]], p. 13</ref><ref>[[#Nenye2015|Nenye (2015)]], p. 54</ref>
* The [[8th Army (Soviet Union)|8th Army]], comprising six divisions and a tank brigade, was north of Lake Ladoga. Its mission was to execute a flanking manoeuvre around the northern shore of Lake Ladoga to strike at the rear of the [[Mannerheim Line]].<ref name="KR2007_13" />
* The [[9th Army (Soviet Union)|9th Army]] was positioned to strike into Central Finland through the [[Kainuu]] region. It was composed of three divisions with one more on its way. Its mission was to thrust westward to cut Finland in half.<ref name="KR2007_13" />
* The [[14th Army (Soviet Union)|14th Army]], comprising three divisions, was based in [[Murmansk]]. Its objectives were to capture the [[Arctic]] port of [[Pechenga (urban-type settlement), Murmansk Oblast|Petsamo]] and then advance to the town of [[Rovaniemi]].<ref name="KR2007_13" />

===Finnish order of battle===
{{See also|Finnish Army}}
[[File:Winterwar-december1939-soviet-attacks.png|thumb|alt=Diagram of Soviet offensives at the start of the war illustrating the positions of the four Soviet armies and their attack routes. The Red Army invaded dozens of kilometres deep into Finland along the 1,340 km border during the first month of the war.|Offensives of the four Soviet armies from 30 November to 22 December 1939 displayed in red<ref>[[#Trotter2002|Trotter (2002)]]</ref><ref>[[#Lesk&Juuti1999|Leskinen and Juutilainen (1999)]]</ref>]]

The Finnish strategy was dictated by geography. The {{convert|1340|km|mi|abbr=on}}{{refn|This is the border length currently, not before the Winter War.|group="F"}} border with the Soviet Union was mostly impassable except along a handful of [[Dirt roads|unpaved road]]s. In prewar calculations, the Finnish [[Defence Command (Finland)|Defence Command]], which had established its wartime headquarters at [[Mikkeli]],<ref name="Trotter_38-39" /> had estimated seven Soviet divisions on the Karelian Isthmus and no more than five along the whole border north of Lake Ladoga. In the estimation, the manpower ratio would have favoured the attacker by three to one. The true ratio was much higher, however, since for example, 12 Soviet divisions were deployed north of Lake Ladoga.<ref name="Trotter_42-44">[[#Trotter2002|Trotter (2002)]], pp. 42–44</ref>

Finland had a large force of reservists, which was trained in regular maneuvers, some of which had experience from the recent Finnish Civil War. The soldiers were also almost universally trained in basic survival techniques, such as skiing. The Finnish Army was not able to equip all its soldiers with proper uniforms at the outbreak of war, but its reservists were equipped with warm civilian clothing. However, the sparsely-populated highly-agrarian Finland had to draft so many of its working men that the [[Finnish economy]] was massively strained because of a lack of workers. An even greater problem than lack of soldiers was the lack of materiel since foreign shipments of anti-tank weapons and aircraft were arriving only in small quantities. The ammunition situation was alarming, as stockpiles had cartridges, shells and fuel to last only 19 to 60 days. The ammunition shortage meant the Finns could seldom afford [[counter-battery fire|counter-battery]] or [[saturation fire]]. Finnish tank forces were operationally nonexistent.<ref name="Trotter_42-44" /> The ammunition situation was alleviated somewhat since Finns were largely armed with [[Mosin–Nagant]] rifles dating from the Finnish Civil War, which used the same [[7.62×54mmR]] cartridge that was used by Soviet forces. The situation was so severe that Finnish soldiers sometimes had to maintain their ammunition supply by looting the bodies of dead Soviet soldiers.<ref>[[#Laemlein2013|Laemlein (2013)]] pp. 95–99</ref>

The Finnish forces were positioned as follows:<ref name="Trotter_47">[[#Trotter2002|Trotter (2002)]], p. 47</ref>

* The [[Army of the Isthmus]] was composed of six divisions under the command of [[Hugo Viktor Österman|Hugo Österman]]. The [[Finnish II Corps (Winter War)|II&nbsp;Army Corps]] was positioned on its right flank and the [[Finnish III Corps (Winter War)|III&nbsp;Army Corps]], on its left flank.
* The [[Finnish IV Corps (Winter War)|IV&nbsp;Army Corps]] was located north of Lake Ladoga. It was composed of two divisions under [[Juho Heiskanen]], who was soon replaced by [[Woldemar Hägglund]].
* The [[North Finland Group]] was a collection of White Guards, [[border guard]]s and drafted [[reservist]] units under [[Wiljo Tuompo]].