Editing West Bank (section)

===Early economic impact===
The Jordanians neglected to invest much in the area during their time governing the area, although there was some investment in the immediate vicinity of Jerusalem.

Soon after the 1967 war, [[Yigal Allon]] produced the [[Allon Plan]], which would have annexed a strip along the Jordan River valley and excluded areas closer to the pre-1967 border, which had a high density of Palestinians. [[Moshe Dayan]] proposed a plan which [[Gershom Gorenberg]] likens to a "photo negative of Allon's."{{efn|"In fact, Dayan had submitted his own secret plan. Predictably, it was the photo negative of Allon's. The mountain ridge – not the lowlands along the Jordan – was the strategic land Israel needed, Dayan asserted."{{sfn|Gorenberg|2007|pp=81–83}}}} The Allon plan evolved over a period of time to include more territory. The final draft dating from 1970 would have annexed about half of the West Bank.{{sfn|Lein|Weizman|2002|pp=12–13}} Israel had no overall approach for integrating the West Bank.{{efn|[[Ilan Pappe]] holds a dissenting view, claiming that a Shacham Plan existed for the occupation and administration of the West Bank before 1967.{{sfn|Pappe|2017|p={{page needed|date=January 2021}}}}}}

The early occupation set severe limits on public investment and comprehensive development programmes in the territories. British and Arab commercial banks operating in the West Bank were closed down soon after Israel assumed power there. [[Bank Leumi]] then opened nine branches, without successfully replacing the earlier system. Farmers could get loans, but Palestinian businessmen avoided taking out loans from them, since they charged 9% compared to 5% interest in Jordan.{{sfn|Cohen|1985|p=245}}{{sfn|Van Arkadie|1977|pp=112–113}} By June 1967, only a third of West Bank land had been registered under Jordan's ''Settlement of Disputes over Land and Water Law''. In 1968, Israel moved to cancel the possibility of registering one's title with the Jordanian Land Register.{{sfn|Nicoletti|Hearne|2012|p=14}}

[[Ian Lustick]] states that Israel "virtually prevented" Palestinian investment in local industry and agriculture.{{sfn|Lustick|2018|p=11}} At the same time, Israel encouraged Arab labour to enter into Israel's economy, and regarded them as a new, expanded and protected market for Israeli exports. Limited export of Palestinian goods to Israel was allowed.{{sfn|Van Arkadie|1977|pp=104,111}} Expropriation of prime agricultural land in an economy where two thirds of the workforce had farmed is believed to account for the flight of labourers to work in Israel.{{sfn|Kadri|1998|p=518}}

As much as 40% of the workforce commuted to Israel on a daily basis finding only poorly paid menial employment.{{sfn|Bergman|2018|p=309}} Remittances from labourers earning a wage in Israel were the major factor in Palestinian economic growth during the 1969–73 boom years.{{sfn|Van Arkadie|1977|p=110}} The migration of workers from the territories had a negative impact on local industry, by creating an internal labour scarcity in the West Bank and consequent pressure for higher wages there.{{sfn|Van Arkadie|1977|pp=110–111}} The contrast between the quality of their lives and Israelis' growing prosperity stoked resentment.{{sfn|Bergman|2018|p=309}}

Attempting to impose governmental authority, Israel established a licensing system according to which no industrial plant could be built without obtaining a prior Israeli permit. With Military Order No. 393 (14 June 1970), the local commander was given the power and authority to block any construction if, in his evaluation, the building might pose a danger to Israel's security. The overall effect was to obstruct manufacturing development and subordinate any local industrial activity to the exigencies of Israel's economy, or to block the creation of industries that might compete with Israel's. For example, entrepreneurs were denied a permit for a cement factory in Hebron. In order to protect Israeli farmers, melon production was forbidden, imports of grapes and dates were banned, and limits were set to how many cucumbers and tomatoes could be produced.{{sfn|Quigley|2005|p=186}} Israeli milk producers exerted pressure on the [[Ministry of Economy (Israel)|Ministry for Industry and Trade]] to stop the establishment of a competitive dairy in [[Ramallah]].{{sfn|El-Farra|MacMillen|2000|p=161}}

The sum effect after two decades was that 15% of all Palestinian firms in the West Bank and Gaza employing over eight people, and 32% with seven or less, were prohibited from selling their products in Israel.{{sfn|El-Farra|MacMillen|2000|p=164}} Israeli [[Protectionism|protectionist policies]] distorted wider trade relations to the point that, by 1996, 90% of all West Bank imports came from Israel, with consumers paying more than they would for comparable products had they been able to exercise commercial autonomy.{{sfn|Kadri|1998|pp=517–518}}