Editing Werwolf (section)

==Assessment by historians==
Historians [[Antony Beevor]] and [[Earl F. Ziemke]] have argued that Werwolf never amounted to a serious threat, and furthermore propose that the plan barely existed. According to a study by former ambassador [[James Dobbins (diplomat)|James Dobbins]] and a team of [[RAND Corporation]] researchers, there were no American combat casualties after the German surrender.<ref name="rand">{{Cite journal |last1=Dobbins |first1=James |last2=McGinn |first2=John G. |last3=Crane |first3=Keith |last4=Jones |first4=Seth G. |last5=Lal |first5=Rollie |last6=Rathmell |first6=Andrew |last7=Swanger |first7=Rachel M. |last8=Timilsina |first8=Anga |title=America's Role in Nation-Building From Germany to Iraq |date = January 2003 |publisher=[[RAND Corporation]] |format=PDF |url=https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1753/index.html |access-date=2007-08-03 |journal=RAND }}</ref>

German historian [[Golo Mann]], in his ''The History of Germany Since 1789'' (1984) stated: {{quote|"The [Germans'] readiness to work with the victors, to carry out their orders, to accept their advice and their help was genuine; of the resistance which the Allies had expected in the way of 'werwolf' units and nocturnal guerrilla activities, there was no sign."<ref name="golomann">{{cite book |last=Mann |first=Golo  |author-link=Golo Mann |title=The History of Germany Since 1789 |publisher=Vintage/Ebury |year=1984 |page=560 |isbn=978-0-7011-1346-9 }}</ref>}}

Historian [[Richard Bessel]] concurs that "'Werewolf' resistance to Allied occupation never really materialized," noting one exception in the form of the assassination of the American-installed mayor of Aachen, [[Franz Oppenhoff]], on 28 March 1945.<ref name="Germany 1945: From War to Peace">{{Citation |last = Bessel |first = Richard |title = Germany 1945: From War to Peace |place = Great Britain |publisher = Simon & Schuster UK Ltd. |orig-date = 2009 |year = 2010 |chapter = 7. The Beginning of Occupation |isbn = 978-1-84983-201-4}}</ref> He highlights that the threat was nonetheless taken seriously by the Allies and that fear of the Werwolf among the Americans may have had hysterical characteristics, pointing to the "Intelligence Information Bulletins" issued by the American 6th Army Group which anticipated a guerrilla war and warned American soldiers of concealed explosives and hidden strongholds.<ref name="Germany 1945: From War to Peace"/> Similarly, he observes that the NKVD appear to have believed that such an organization existed and posed a real threat to the Soviet occupation forces,<ref>See report of 22 June 1945 by the head of the NKVD in Germany, Serov, to L.J. Beria concerning Werewolf activity, printed in: {{cite encyclopedia |last = von Platow |first = Alexander |editor-last = Reif-Spirek |editor-first = Peter |editor-last2 = Ritscher |editor-first2 = Bodo |title = Sowjetische Speziallager in Deutschland 1945 bis 1950. Ergebnisse eines deutsch-russischen Kooperationsprojektes |encyclopedia = Speziallager in der SBZ. Gedenkstätten mit ‘doppelter Vergangenheit |pages = 138–139 |location = Berlin |language = German |date = 1999}}</ref> with the Soviets using unfounded suspicions of Werwolf activity as a pretext to tighten police control and secure forced labor.<ref name="Germany 1945: From War to Peace"/>

[[Perry Biddiscombe]] has offered a somewhat different view. In his books ''Werwolf!: The History of the National Socialist Guerrilla Movement, 1944–1946'' (1998)<ref name="biddis"/> and ''The Last Nazis: SS Werwolf Guerrilla Resistance in Europe, 1944–1947'' (2000), Biddiscombe asserts that after retreating to the [[Black Forest]] and the [[Harz mountains]], the Werwolf continued resisting the occupation until at least 1947, possibly until 1949–50. However, he characterizes German post-surrender resistance as "minor",<ref>{{harvnb|Biddiscombe|1998|p=275}}</ref> and calls the post-war Werwolfs "desperadoes"<ref>{{harvnb|Biddiscombe|1998|p=151}}</ref> and "fanatics living in forest huts".<ref>{{harvnb|Biddiscombe|1998|p=80}}</ref> He further cites U.S. Army intelligence reports that characterized Nazi partisans as "nomad bands"<ref>{{harvnb|Biddiscombe|1998|p=197}}</ref> and judged them as less serious threats than attacks by foreign slave laborers<ref>{{harvnb|Biddiscombe|1998|p=152}}</ref> and considered their sabotage and subversive activities to be insignificant.<ref>{{harvnb|Biddiscombe|1998|p=115}}</ref> He also notes that: "The Americans and British concluded, even in the summer of 1945, that, as a nationwide network, the original Werwolf was irrevocably destroyed, and that it no longer posed a threat to the occupation."<ref>{{harvnb|Biddiscombe|1998|p=51}}</ref>

Biddiscombe also says that Werwolf violence failed to mobilize a spirit of popular national resistance, that the group was poorly led, poorly armed, and poorly organized, and that it was doomed to failure given the [[war-weariness]] of the populace and the hesitancy of young Germans to sacrifice themselves on the funeral pyre of the former Nazi regime. He concludes that the only significant achievement of the Werwolfs was to spark distrust of the German populace in the Allies as they occupied Germany, which caused them in some cases to act more repressively than they might have done otherwise, which in turn fostered resentments that helped to enable far right ideas to survive in Germany, at least in pockets, into the post-war era.<ref name="biddis"/>

Nevertheless, says Biddiscombe, "The Werewolves were no bit players";<ref name="Biddiscombe, The Last Nazis, p. 8">Biddiscombe, The Last Nazis, p. 8.</ref> they caused tens of millions of dollars of property damage at a time when the European economies were in an already desperate state, and were responsible for the killing of thousands of people.<ref name="Biddiscombe, The Last Nazis, p. 8"/>