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== Partition and independence == In the [[1946 Indian provincial elections]], the Congress won a large majority of the elected seats, dominating the Hindu electorate. However the [[All-India Muslim League|Muslim League]] led by [[Muhammad Ali Jinnah]] won a large majority of Muslim electorate seats. The League had [[Lahore Resolution|resolved in 1940]] to demand [[Pakistan]]{{snd}}an independent state for Muslims{{snd}}and was a fierce critic of the Congress. The Congress formed governments in all provinces save [[Sindh]], [[Punjab, India|Punjab]], and [[Bengal]], where it entered into coalitions with other parties. === Cabinet mission and partition === {{See also|Partition of India}} When the [[1946 Cabinet Mission to India|British mission]] proposed two plans for transfer of power, there was considerable opposition within the Congress to both. The plan of 16 May 1946 proposed a loose federation with extensive provincial autonomy, and the "grouping" of provinces based on religious-majority. The plan of 16 May 1946 proposed the [[partition of India]] on religious lines, with over [[List of Indian Princely States|565 princely states]] free to choose between independence or accession to either dominion. The League approved both plans while the Congress flatly rejected the proposal of 16 May. Gandhi criticised the 16 May proposal as being inherently divisive, but Patel, realising that rejecting the proposal would mean that only the League would be invited to form a government, lobbied the [[Congress Working Committee]] hard to give its assent to the 16 May proposal. Patel engaged in discussions with the British envoys [[Sir Stafford Cripps]] and [[Frederick Pethick-Lawrence, 1st Baron Pethick-Lawrence|Lord Pethick-Lawrence]] and obtained an assurance that the "grouping" clause would not be given practical force, Patel converted [[Jawaharlal Nehru]], [[Rajendra Prasad]], and [[C. Rajagopalachari|Rajagopalachari]] to accept the plan. When the League retracted its approval of the 16 May plan, the viceroy [[Archibald Wavell, 1st Earl Wavell|Lord Wavell]] invited the Congress to form the government. Under Nehru, who was styled the "Vice President of the Viceroy's Executive Council", Patel took charge of the departments of home affairs and information and broadcasting. He moved into a government house on Aurangzeb Road in Delhi, which would be his home until his death in 1950.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Agrawal |first=Lion M.G. |title=Freedom fighters of India (Volume 2) |date=2008 |publisher=ISHA Books |location=New Delhi |page=238}}</ref> Vallabhbhai Patel was one of the first Congress leaders to accept the partition of India as a solution to the rising Muslim separatist movement led by [[Muhammad Ali Jinnah]]. He had been outraged by Jinnah's [[Direct Action Day|Direct Action]] campaign, which had provoked communal violence across India, and by the viceroy's vetoes of his home department's plans to stop the violence on the grounds of constitutionality. Patel severely criticised the viceroy's induction of League ministers into the government, and the revalidation of the grouping scheme by the British government without Congress's approval. Although further outraged at the League's boycott of the assembly and non-acceptance of the plan of 16 May despite entering government, he was also aware that Jinnah did enjoy popular support amongst Muslims, and that an open conflict between him and the nationalists could degenerate into a Hindu-Muslim civil war of disastrous consequences. The continuation of a divided and weak central government would, in Patel's mind, result in the wider fragmentation of India by encouraging more than 600 princely states towards independence.{{sfn|Rajmohan Gandhi|1990|pp=395–397}} In December 1946 and January 1947, Patel worked with civil servant [[V. P. Menon]] on the latter's suggestion for a separate [[dominion]] of [[Pakistan]] created out of Muslim-majority provinces. Communal violence in Bengal and Punjab in January and March 1947 further convinced Patel of the soundness of partition. Patel, a fierce critic of Jinnah's demand that the Hindu-majority areas of Punjab and Bengal be included in a Muslim state, obtained the partition of those provinces, thus blocking any possibility of their inclusion in Pakistan. Patel's decisiveness on the partition of Punjab and Bengal had won him many supporters and admirers amongst the Indian public, which had tired of the League's tactics, but he was criticised by Gandhi, Nehru, secular Muslims, and socialists for a perceived eagerness to do so. When Lord [[Louis Mountbatten, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma|Louis Mountbatten]] formally proposed the plan on 3 June 1947, Patel gave his approval and lobbied Nehru and other Congress leaders to accept the proposal. Knowing Gandhi's deep anguish regarding proposals of partition, Patel engaged him in frank discussion in private meetings over what he saw as the practical unworkability of any Congress–League coalition, the rising violence, and the threat of civil war. At the [[All India Congress Committee]] meeting called to vote on the proposal, Patel said: {{blockquote|I fully appreciate the fears of our brothers from [the Muslim-majority areas]. Nobody likes the division of India and my heart is heavy. But the choice is between one division and many divisions. We must face facts. We cannot give way to emotionalism and sentimentality. The Working Committee has not acted out of fear. But I am afraid of one thing, that all our toil and hard work of these many years might go waste or prove unfruitful. My nine months in office has completely disillusioned me regarding the supposed merits of the Cabinet Mission Plan. Except for a few honourable exceptions, Muslim officials from the top down to the chaprasis ([[peon]]s or servants) are working for the League. The communal veto given to the League in the Mission Plan would have blocked India's progress at every stage. Whether we like it or not, de facto Pakistan already exists in the Punjab and Bengal. Under the circumstances I would prefer a de jure Pakistan, which may make the League more responsible. Freedom is coming. We have 75 to 80 percent of India, which we can make strong with our own genius. The League can develop the rest of the country.{{sfn|Menon|1997|p=385}}}} After Gandhi rejected and Congress approved the plan, Patel represented India on the Partition Council,{{sfn|Balraj Krishna|2007|p=87}}{{sfn|Menon|1997|p=397}} where he oversaw the division of public assets, and selected the Indian council of ministers with Nehru.{{sfn|Syed|2010|p=18}} However, neither Patel nor any other Indian leader had foreseen the intense violence and population transfer that would take place with partition. Patel took the lead in organising relief and emergency supplies, establishing refugee camps, and visiting the border areas with Pakistani leaders to encourage peace. Despite these efforts, the death toll is estimated at between 500,000 and 1 million people.<ref>{{Cite book |last=French, Patrick |title=Liberty and Death: India's Journey to Independence and Division |publisher=HarperCollins |year=1997 |location=London |pages=347–349 |author-link=Patrick French}}</ref> The estimated number of refugees in both countries exceeds 15 million.<ref name="consequences">{{Cite web |last="Postcolonial Studies" project |first=Department of English, Emory University |title=The Partition of India |url=http://www.english.emory.edu/Bahri/Part.html |access-date=19 May 2006 |archive-date=2 September 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110902112115/http://www.english.emory.edu/Bahri/Part.html |url-status=live }}</ref> Understanding that Delhi and Punjab policemen, accused of organising attacks on Muslims, were personally affected by the tragedies of partition, Patel called out the [[Indian Army]] with South Indian regiments to restore order, imposing strict curfews and shoot-on-sight orders. Visiting the [[Nizamuddin Auliya Dargah]] area in Delhi, where thousands of Delhi Muslims feared attacks, he prayed at the shrine, visited the people, and reinforced the presence of police. He suppressed from the press reports of atrocities in Pakistan against Hindus and [[Sikh]]s to prevent retaliatory violence. Establishing the [[Delhi Emergency Committee]] to restore order and organising relief efforts for refugees in the capital, Patel publicly warned officials against partiality and neglect. When reports reached Patel that large groups of Sikhs were preparing to attack Muslim convoys heading for Pakistan, Patel hurried to [[Amritsar]] and met Sikh and Hindu leaders. Arguing that attacking helpless people was cowardly and dishonourable, Patel emphasised that Sikh actions would result in further attacks against Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan. He assured the community leaders that if they worked to establish peace and order and guarantee the safety of Muslims, the Indian government would react forcefully to any failures of Pakistan to do the same. Additionally, Patel addressed a massive crowd of approximately 200,000 refugees who had surrounded his car after the meetings: {{blockquote|Here, in this same city, the blood of Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims mingled in the [[Amritsar Massacre|bloodbath of Jallianwala Bagh]]. I am grieved to think that things have come to such a pass that no Muslim can go about in Amritsar and no Hindu or Sikh can even think of living in Lahore. The butchery of innocent and defenceless men, women and children does not behove brave men ... I am quite certain that India's interest lies in getting all her men and women across the border and sending out all Muslims from East Punjab. I have come to you with a specific appeal. Pledge the safety of Muslim refugees crossing the city. Any obstacles or hindrances will only worsen the plight of our refugees who are already performing prodigious feats of endurance. If we have to fight, we must fight clean. Such a fight must await an appropriate time and conditions and you must be watchful in choosing your ground. To fight against the refugees is no fight at all. No laws of humanity or war among honourable men permit the murder of people who have sought shelter and protection. Let there be truce for three months in which both sides can exchange their refugees. This sort of truce is permitted even by laws of war. Let us take the initiative in breaking this vicious circle of attacks and counter-attacks. Hold your hands for a week and see what happens. Make way for the refugees with your own force of volunteers and let them deliver the refugees safely at our frontier.{{sfn|Shankar|1974–1975|pp=104–105}}}} Following his dialogue with community leaders and his speech, no further attacks occurred against Muslim refugees, and a wider peace and order was soon re-established over the entire area. However, Patel was criticised by Nehru, secular Muslims, and Gandhi over his alleged wish to see Muslims from other parts of India depart. While Patel vehemently denied such allegations, the acrimony with [[Maulana Azad]] and other secular Muslim leaders increased when Patel refused to dismiss Delhi's Sikh police commissioner, who was accused of discrimination. Hindu and Sikh leaders also accused Patel and other leaders of not taking Pakistan sufficiently to task over the attacks on their communities there, and Muslim leaders further criticised him for allegedly neglecting the needs of Muslims leaving for Pakistan, and concentrating resources for incoming Hindu and Sikh refugees. Patel clashed with Nehru and Azad over the allocation of houses in Delhi vacated by Muslims leaving for Pakistan; Nehru and Azad desired to allocate them for displaced Muslims, while Patel argued that no government professing [[secularism]] must make such exclusions. However, Patel was publicly defended by Gandhi and received widespread admiration and support for speaking frankly on communal issues and acting decisively and resourcefully to quell disorder and violence.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Agrawal |first=Lion M.G. |title=Freedom fighters of India (Volume 2) |date=2008 |publisher=ISHA Books |location=New Delhi |pages=241–242}}</ref> === Political integration of independent India === {{Main|Political integration of India}} [[File:Chandamama 1948 01 (page 11 crop).jpg|thumb|upright=0.8|Painting of Vallabhai Patel as deputy prime minister that appeared in the 1948 issue of ''[[Chandamama]]'' magazine.]]As the first Home Minister, Patel played one of the major role in the integration of the princely states into the Indian federation.<ref name="autogenerated65">{{cite journal |author=Buta Singh |title=Role of Sardar Patel in the Integration of Indian States |journal=Calcutta Historical Journal |date=Jul–Dec 2008 |volume=28 |issue=2 |pages=65–78}}</ref> This achievement formed the cornerstone of Patel's popularity in the post-independence era. He is, in this regard, compared to [[Otto von Bismarck]] who unified the many German states in 1871.{{sfn|Balraj Krishna|2007}} Under the plan of 3 June, more than 565 princely states were given the option of joining either India or Pakistan, or choosing independence. Indian nationalists and large segments of the public feared that if these states did not accede, most of the people and territory would be fragmented. The Congress, as well as senior British officials, considered Patel the best man for the task of achieving conquest of the princely states by the Indian dominion. Gandhi had said to Patel, "The problem of the States is so difficult that you alone can solve it."{{sfn|Rajmohan Gandhi|1990|p=406}} Patel was considered a statesman of integrity with the practical acumen and resolve to accomplish a monumental task. He asked V.{{nbsp}}P.{{nbsp}}Menon, a senior civil servant with whom he had worked on the partition of India, to become his right-hand man as chief secretary of the States Ministry. On 6 August 1947, Patel began lobbying the princes, attempting to make them receptive towards dialogue with the future government and forestall potential conflicts. Patel used social meetings and unofficial surroundings to engage most of the monarchs, inviting them to lunch and tea at his home in Delhi. At these meetings, Patel explained that there was no inherent conflict between the Congress and the princely order. Patel invoked the patriotism of India's monarchs, asking them to join in the independence of their nation and act as responsible rulers who cared about the future of their people. He persuaded the princes of 565 states of the impossibility of independence from the Indian republic, especially in the presence of growing opposition from their subjects. He proposed favourable terms for the merger, including the creation of ''[[Privy Purse in India|privy purses]]'' for the rulers' descendants. While encouraging the rulers to act out of patriotism, Patel did not rule out force. Stressing that the princes would need to accede to India in good faith, he set a deadline of 15 August 1947 for them to sign the instrument of accession document. All but three of the states willingly merged into the Indian union; only [[Jammu and Kashmir (state)|Jammu and Kashmir]], [[Junagadh State|Junagadh]], and [[Hyderabad state|Hyderabad]] did not fall into his basket.{{sfn|Syed|2010|p=21}} {{multiple image | align = right | direction = vertical | header = [[Somnath temple#Restoration of temple after Independence|Somnath temple Restoration]] | width = 250 | image1 = Somnath temple ruins (1869).jpg | caption1 = Somnath temple ruins, 1869 | image2 = Somanatha view-II.JPG | caption2 = Patel ordered [[Somnath temple]] reconstructed in 1948. | total_width = | alt1 = }} [[File:Hyderabad state 1909.jpg|thumb|upright=1.15|[[Hyderabad state]] in 1909. Its area stretched over large parts of the current Indian states of [[Telangana]], Karnataka, and [[Maharashtra]].]] [[File:British Indian Empire 1909 Imperial Gazetteer of India.jpg|thumb|upright=1.15|The [[British Raj|British Indian Empire]] in 1909]] Junagadh was especially important to Patel, since it was in his home state of [[Gujarat]]. It was also important because in this Kathiawar district was the ultra-rich [[Somnath temple]] (which in the 11th century had been plundered by [[Mahmud of Ghazni]], who damaged the temple and its idols to rob it of its riches, including emeralds, diamonds, and gold). Under pressure from Sir [[Shah Nawaz Bhutto]], the Nawab had acceded to Pakistan. It was, however, quite far from Pakistan, and 80% of its population was Hindu. Patel combined diplomacy with force, demanding that Pakistan annul the accession, and that the Nawab accede to India. He sent the Army to occupy three principalities of Junagadh to show his resolve. Following widespread protests and the formation of a civil government, or ''Aarzi Hukumat'', both Bhutto and the Nawab fled to [[Karachi]], and under Patel's orders the [[Indian Army]] and police units marched into the state. A plebiscite organised later produced a 99.5% vote for merger with India.{{sfn|Rajmohan Gandhi|1990|p=438}} In a speech at the Bahauddin College in Junagadh following the latter's take-over, Patel emphasised his feeling of urgency on Hyderabad, which he felt was more vital to India than Kashmir: {{blockquote|If Hyderabad does not see the writing on the wall, it goes the way Junagadh has gone. Pakistan attempted to set off Kashmir against Junagadh. When we raised the question of settlement in a democratic way, they (Pakistan) at once told us that they would consider it if we applied that policy to Kashmir. Our reply was that we would agree to Kashmir if they agreed to Hyderabad.{{sfn|Rajmohan Gandhi|1990|p=438}}}} Hyderabad was the largest of the princely states, and it included parts of present-day [[Telangana]], Andhra Pradesh, [[Karnataka]], and [[Maharashtra]] states. Its ruler, the [[Nizam]] [[Osman Ali Khan, Asif Jah VII|Osman Ali Khan]], was a Muslim, although over 80% of its people were Hindu. The Nizam sought independence or accession with Pakistan. Muslim forces loyal to Nizam, called the [[Razakars (Hyderabad)|Razakars]], under [[Qasim Razvi]], pressed the Nizam to hold out against India, while organising attacks on people on Indian soil. Even though a [[Standstill agreement (India)|Standstill Agreement]] was signed due to the desperate efforts of Lord Mountbatten to avoid a war, the Nizam rejected deals and changed his positions.{{sfn|Rajmohan Gandhi|1990|p=480}} On 7 September, [[Jawaharlal Nehru]] gave ultimatum to Nizam, demanding ban on the Razakars and return of Indian troops to [[Secunderabad Cantonment Board|Secunderabad]].<ref name="Siddiqi 1960 p.">{{cite book | last=Siddiqi | first=A. | title=Pakistan Seeks Security | publisher=Longmans, Green, Pakistan Branch | year=1960 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=EsM9AAAAMAAJ | page=21 | access-date=14 March 2024 | archive-date=14 March 2024 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240314170954/https://books.google.com/books?id=EsM9AAAAMAAJ | url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Benichou 2000">{{cite book | last=Benichou | first=L. D. | title=From Autocracy to Integration: Political Developments in Hyderabad State, 1938-1948 | publisher=Orient Longman | year=2000 | isbn=978-81-250-1847-6 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Loiq3YrFy40C&pg=PA231 | page=231 | access-date=14 March 2024 | archive-date=14 March 2024 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240314171609/https://books.google.com/books?id=Loiq3YrFy40C&pg=PA231 | url-status=live }}</ref> Pakistan foreign minister [[Muhammad Zafarullah Khan]] warned India against this ultimatum.<ref name="Best 2003 p. 224">{{cite book | title=British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. From 1946 through 1950. Asia 1948. | publisher=Univ. Publ. of America | series=E (Asia) |editor=Anthony Best | issue=pt. 4, v. 9 | year=2003 | isbn=978-1-55655-768-2 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aTyk_neEmg0C&pg=PA224 | page=224 | access-date=14 March 2024 | archive-date=14 March 2024 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240314171006/https://books.google.com/books?id=aTyk_neEmg0C&pg=PA224 | url-status=live }}</ref> The invasion of Hyderabad was then launched on 13 September, after the death of Jinnah on 11 September.<ref name="Hangloo Murali 2007 p.">{{cite book | last=Hangloo | first=Rattan Lal | last2=Murali | first2=A. | title=New Themes in Indian History: Art, Politics, Gender, Environment, and Culture | publisher=Black & White | year=2007 | isbn=978-81-89320-15-7 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nwVuAAAAMAAJ | pages=240–241}}</ref><ref name="Pakistan Institute">{{cite journal | title=Vol. 17, No. 2, Second Quarter, 1964 | journal=Pakistan Horizon | publisher=Pakistan Institute of International Affairs | volume=17 | issue=2 | year=1964 | issn=0030-980X | jstor=41392796 | page=169 | url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/41392796 | access-date=2023-08-25 | archive-date=25 August 2023 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230825042231/https://www.jstor.org/stable/41392796 | url-status=live }}</ref> After the defeat of Razakars, the Nizam signed an instrument of accession, joining India.<ref>{{cite web | last=Apparasu | first=Srinivasa Rao | title=How Hyd merger with Union unfolded | website=Hindustan Times | date=2022-09-16 | url=https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/how-hyd-merger-with-union-unfolded-101663352521085.html | access-date=14 March 2024 | archive-date=18 January 2024 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240118095707/https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/how-hyd-merger-with-union-unfolded-101663352521085.html | url-status=live }}</ref>
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