Editing Vagueness (section)

=== Subvaluationism<!--'Subvaluationism' redirects here--> ===
{{see also|Dialetheism}}
'''Subvaluationism'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> is the logical dual of supervaluationism, and has been defended by Dominic Hyde (2008) and Pablo Cobreros (2011). Whereas the supervaluationist characterises truth as 'supertruth', the subvaluationist characterises truth as 'subtruth', or "true on at least some precisifications".<ref>Pablo Cobreros, (2011) "[https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-010-9760-0 Paraconsistent Vagueness: A Positive Argument]" ''Synthese'' 183(2): 211–227.</ref>

Subvaluationism proposes that borderline applications of vague terms are both true and false. It thus has "truth-value gluts". According to this theory, a vague statement is true if it is true on at least one precisification and false if it is false under at least one precisification. If a vague statement comes out true under one precisification and false under another, it is both true and false. Subvaluationism ultimately amounts to the claim that vagueness is a truly contradictory phenomenon.<ref>Dominic Hyde and Mark Colyvan (2008) “[https://ojs.victoria.ac.nz/ajl/article/download/1798/1649 Paraconsistent Vagueness: Why Not?]” ''Australasian Journal of Logic'' 6: 107–121.</ref> Of a borderline case of "bald man" it would be both true and false to say that he is bald, and both true and false to say that he is not bald.