Editing Timor-Leste Defence Force (section)

== Command arrangements ==
[[File:Lere Anan Timur in October 2012.jpg|thumb|upright|Major General Lere Anan Timor in 2012]]
The constitution of Timor-Leste states that the president is the supreme commander of the defence force and has the power to appoint the F-FDTL's commander and chief of staff. The [[Council of Ministers of Timor-Leste|Council of Ministers]] and [[National Parliament of Timor-Leste|National Parliament]] are responsible for funding the F-FDTL and setting policy relating to Timor-Leste's security.<ref name="Rees"/> A {{ill|Superior Council for Defence and Security (Timor-Leste)|de|Konsellu Superior Defeza no Seguransa|lt=Superior Council for Defence and Security}} was established in 2005 to advise the president on defence and security policy and legislation and the appointment and dismissal of senior military personnel. The council is chaired by the president and includes the prime minister, the defence, justice, interior and foreign affairs ministers, the heads of the F-FDTL and PNTL a national state security officer and three representatives from the national parliament. The council's role is not clear, however, and neither it nor the parliament served as a check against the decision to sack large numbers of F-FDTL personnel in 2006.<ref>Burton (2007), pp. 100–101</ref> A parliamentary committee also provides oversight of Timor-Leste's security sector.<ref name="UNMIT_2010_11">UNMIT (2010), p. 11</ref> Major General [[Lere Anan Timor]] is the current commander of the F-FDTL, and was appointed to this position on 6 October 2011.<ref name="UNMIT_2011_p38">UNMIT (2011), p. 38</ref>

A small ministry of defence (which was renamed the Ministry of Defence and Security in 2007) was established in 2002 to provide civilian oversight of the F-FDTL. A lack of suitable staff for the ministry and the close political relationship between senior F-FDTL officers and government figures rendered this oversight largely ineffectual and retarded the development of Timor-Leste's defence policy up to at least 2004.<ref>Rees (2004), pp. 11–14</ref> The failure to institute effective civilian oversight of the F-FDTL also limited the extent to which foreign countries are willing to provide assistance to the F-FDTL<ref>Rees (2004), p. 28</ref> and contributed to the 2006 crisis.<ref>UNMIT (2006), p. 17</ref> As at early 2010 the Ministry of Defence and Security was organised into elements responsible for defence (including the F-FDTL) and security (including the PNTL), each headed by their own secretary of state. At this time the East Timorese Government was working to expand the ministry's capacity with assistance from UNMIT, but continuing shortages of qualified staff limited the extent to which the ministry could provide civilian oversight to the security sector.<ref>UNMIT (2010), pp. 11 and 14</ref> Moreover, elements of the F-FDTL were continuing to resist civilian control over the security forces at this time, and the force had not opened itself to international scrutiny.<ref name=Sedra_11 />