Editing Theocracy (section)

=== Islamic theocracies ===
{{see also|Islamic state}}
An [[Islamic republic]] is the name given to several states that are officially ruled by [[Islamic laws]], including the Islamic Republics of [[Iran]], [[Pakistan]], and [[Mauritania]]. Pakistan first adopted the title under the constitution of 1956. Mauritania adopted it on 28 November 1958. Iran adopted it after the 1979 [[Iranian Revolution]] that overthrew the [[Pahlavi dynasty]].

The term "Islamic republic" has come to mean several different things, at times contradictory. To some Muslim religious leaders in the Middle East and Africa who advocate it, an Islamic republic is a [[Sovereign state|state]] under a particular [[Islam]]ic [[form of government]]. They see it as a compromise between a purely Islamic [[caliphate]] and secular nationalism and [[republicanism]]. In their conception of the Islamic republic, the [[penal code]] of the state is required to be compatible with some or all laws of [[Sharia]], and the state does not necessarily have to be a monarchy, as many Middle Eastern states presently are.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Government type - The World Factbook |url=https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/government-type/#:~:text=Islamic%20republic%20-%20a%20particular%20form%20of%20government%20adopted%20by%20some%20Muslim%20states;%20although%20such%20a%20state%20is,%20in%20theory,%20a%20theocracy,%20it%20remains%20a%20republic,%20but%20its%20laws%20are%20required%20to%20be%20compatible%20with%20the%20laws%20of%20Islam. |access-date=2024-11-16 |website=www.cia.gov}}</ref>

==== Afghanistan ====
Afghanistan was an Islamic theocracy when the [[Taliban]] first ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 and since their reinstatement of the [[Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan]] in 2021, Afghanistan is an Islamic theocracy again.

Spreading from [[Kandahar]], the Taliban eventually captured [[Kabul]] in 1996. By the end of 2000, the Taliban controlled 90% of the country, aside from the opposition ([[Northern Alliance]]) strongholds which were primarily found in the northeast corner of [[Badakhshan Province]]. Areas under the Taliban's direct control were mainly Afghanistan's major cities and highways. Tribal khans and warlords had ''de facto'' direct control over various small towns, villages, and rural areas.<ref>Griffiths 226.</ref> The Taliban sought to establish [[Law and order (politics)|law and order]] and to impose a strict interpretation of Islamic ''[[Sharia law]]'', along with the religious edicts of Mullah [[Mullah Omar|Mohammed Omar]], upon the entire country of Afghanistan.<ref name="Matinuddin">{{cite book |last=Matinuddin |first=Kamal |author-link=Kamal Matinuddin |year=1999 |title=The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994–1997 |chapter=The Taliban's Religious Attitude |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BIyVMkjat2MC&pg=PA34 |location=[[Karachi]] |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |pages=34–43 |isbn=0-19-579274-2 |access-date=8 July 2020 |archive-date=19 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230119145219/https://books.google.com/books?id=BIyVMkjat2MC&pg=PA34 |url-status=live }}</ref>

During the five-year history of the [[Emirate|Islamic Emirate]], the Taliban regime interpreted the ''Sharia'' in accordance with the [[Hanafi]] [[Fiqh|school of Islamic jurisprudence]] and the religious edicts of [[Mullah Omar]].<ref name="Matinuddin"/> The Taliban forbade pork and alcohol, many types of consumer technology such as [[Music of Afghanistan|music]],<ref name="Matinuddin"/> [[Television in Afghanistan|television]],<ref name="Matinuddin"/> and [[Cinema of Afghanistan|film]],<ref name="Matinuddin"/> as well as most forms of art such as [[paintings]] or [[photography]],<ref name="Matinuddin"/> male and female participation in [[sport]],<ref name="Matinuddin"/> including [[association football|football]] and [[chess]];<ref name="Matinuddin"/> [[Recreation|recreational activities]] such as [[Kite|kite-flying]] and keeping [[pigeons]] or other [[pets]] were also forbidden, and the birds were killed according to the Taliban's ruling.<ref name="Matinuddin"/> [[Movie theater]]s were closed and repurposed as [[mosque]]s.<ref name="Matinuddin"/> Celebration of the [[New Year's Day|Western]] and [[Nauruz in Afghanistan|Iranian New Year]] was forbidden.<ref name="Matinuddin"/> Taking photographs and displaying pictures or portraits was forbidden, as it was considered by the Taliban as a form of [[Idolatry#Islam|idolatry]].<ref name="Matinuddin"/> Women were [[Taliban treatment of women#Employment|banned from working]],<ref name="Matinuddin"/> girls were [[Taliban treatment of women#Education|forbidden to attend schools or universities]],<ref name="Matinuddin"/> were requested to observe [[purdah]] and to be accompanied outside their households by male relatives; those who violated these restrictions were punished.<ref name="Matinuddin"/> Men were forbidden to shave their beards and required to let them grow and keep them long according to the Taliban's liking, and to wear turbans outside their households.<ref name="Matinuddin"/><ref name="cr">{{cite web |url=https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/sa/8222.htm |title=US Country Report on Human Rights Practices – Afghanistan 2001 |publisher=State.gov |date=4 March 2002 |access-date=4 March 2020 |archive-date=10 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210310082903/https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/sa/8222.htm |url-status=live }}</ref> [[Communist]]s were systematically executed. [[Salah|Prayer]] was made compulsory and those who did not respect the religious obligation after the ''[[Adhan|azaan]]'' were arrested.<ref name="Matinuddin"/> [[Gambling in Islam|Gambling]] was banned.<ref name="Matinuddin"/> Thieves were punished by [[Islam and violence#Islam and crime|amputating their hands or feet]].<ref name="Matinuddin"/> In 2000, the Taliban leader Mullah Omar officially banned [[Opium production in Afghanistan|opium cultivation]] and [[Illegal drug trade|drug trafficking]] in Afghanistan;<ref name="Matinuddin"/><ref name="drugpolicy2005">{{cite journal |last1=Farrell |first1=Graham |last2=Thorne |first2=John |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/28576871 |title=Where Have All the Flowers Gone?: Evaluation of the Taliban Crackdown Against Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan |date=March 2005 |journal=[[International Journal of Drug Policy]] |publisher=[[Elsevier]] |volume=16 |issue=2 |pages=81–91 |doi=10.1016/j.drugpo.2004.07.007 |via=[[ResearchGate]] |access-date=8 July 2020 |archive-date=15 August 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210815132213/https://www.researchgate.net/publication/28576871_Where_have_all_the_flowers_gone_Evaluation_of_the_Taliban_crackdown_against_poppy_cultivation_in_Afghanistan |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Maziyar2019">{{cite book |last=Ghiabi |first=Maziyar |chapter=Crisis as an Idiom for Reforms |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=HoOWDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA101 |year=2019 |title=Drugs Politics: Managing Disorder in the Islamic Republic of Iran |location=[[Cambridge]] |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |pages=101–102 |isbn=978-1-108-47545-7 |lccn=2019001098 |access-date=8 July 2020 |via=[[Google Books]] |archive-date=19 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230119145157/https://books.google.com/books?id=HoOWDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA101 |url-status=live }}</ref> the Taliban succeeded in nearly eradicating opium production (99%) by 2001.<ref name="drugpolicy2005"/><ref name="Maziyar2019"/><ref>{{cite web |url=http://opioids.com/afghanistan/index.html |title=Afghanistan, Opium and the Taliban |access-date=4 March 2020 |archive-date=7 February 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120207055512/http://opioids.com/afghanistan/index.html |url-status=live }}</ref> Under the Taliban governance of Afghanistan, both drug users and dealers were severely prosecuted.<ref name="Matinuddin"/>

[[Cabinet (government)|Cabinet]] ministers and deputies were mullahs with a "[[madrasah]] education." Several of them, such as the Minister of Health and Governor of the State bank, were primarily military commanders who were ready to leave their administrative posts to fight when needed. Military reverses that trapped them behind lines or led to their deaths increased the chaos in the national administration.<ref>{{cite book |last=Rashid |first=Ahmed |date=2010 |orig-date=2000 |title=Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia |publisher=Yale University Press |isbn=9780300163681 |url={{GBurl|Cv8_EAAAQBAJ}} |page=100}}</ref> At the national level, "all senior [[Tajiks|Tajik]], [[Uzbeks|Uzbek]] and [[Hazaras|Hazara]] bureaucrats" were replaced "with Pashtuns, whether qualified or not." Consequently, the ministries "by and large ceased to function."<ref name="rashid 101-102">{{Harvnb|Rashid|2010|pp=101–102}}.</ref>

Journalist [[Ahmed Rashid]] described the Taliban government as "a secret society run by [[Kandahar]]is ... mysterious, secretive, and dictatorial."<ref name="Rashid 2000 98"/> They did not hold elections, as their spokesman explained:

{{blockquote|The ''[[Sharia]]'' does not allow politics or political parties. That is why we give no salaries to officials or soldiers, just food, clothes, shoes, and weapons. We want to live a life like the Prophet lived 1400 years ago, and jihad is our right. We want to recreate the time of the Prophet, and we are only carrying out what the Afghan people have wanted for the past 14 years.<ref>{{Harvnb|Rashid|2010|p=43}} Interview with Mullah Wakil, March 1996</ref>}}

They modeled their decision-making process on the Pashtun tribal council (''[[jirga]]''), together with what they believed to be the early Islamic model. Discussion was followed by a building of a consensus by the "believers".<ref>{{Harvnb|Rashid|2010|p=95}}</ref> Before capturing Kabul, there was talk of stepping aside once a government of "good Muslims" took power, and law and order were restored.

As the Taliban's power grew, decisions were made by Mullah Omar without consulting the ''jirga'' and without consulting other parts of the country. One such instance is the rejection of Loya Jirga decision about expulsion of [[Osama bin Laden]]. Mullah Omar visited the capital, Kabul, only twice while in power. Instead of an election, their leader's legitimacy came from an oath of allegiance ("[[Bay'ah]]"), in imitation of [[Muhammad|the Prophet]] and the [[Rashidun|first four]] [[Caliph]]s. On 4 April 1996, Mullah Omar had "the [[Cloak of Muhammad]]" taken from its shrine, [[Kirka Sharif]], for the first time in 60 years. Wrapping himself in the relic, he appeared on the roof of a building in the center of Kandahar while hundreds of Pashtun [[mullah]]s below shouted "[[Amir al-Mu'minin]]!" (Commander of the Faithful), in a pledge of support. Taliban spokesman Mullah Wakil explained:

{{blockquote|Decisions are based on the advice of the Amir-ul Momineen. For us, consultation is not necessary. We believe that this is in line with the ''Sharia''. We abide by the Amir's view even if he alone takes this view. There will not be a head of state. Instead, there will be an Amir al-Mu'minin. Mullah Omar will be the highest authority, and the government will not be able to implement any decision to which he does not agree. General elections are incompatible with ''Sharia'' and therefore we reject them.<ref>
Interview with Taliban spokesman Mullah Wakil in Arabic magazine ''Al-Majallah'', 1996-10-23.</ref>}}

The Taliban were reluctant to share power, and since their ranks were overwhelmingly Pashtun they ruled as overlords over the 60% of Afghans from other ethnic groups. In local government, such as the Kabul city council<ref name="Rashid 2000 98">{{Harvnb|Rashid|2010|p=98}}</ref> or Herat,<ref name="rashid 39-40">{{Harvnb|Rashid|2010|pp=39–40}}</ref> Taliban loyalists, not locals, dominated, even when the [[Pashto]]-speaking Taliban could not communicate with roughly half of the population who spoke [[Dari]] or other non-Pashtun tongues.<ref name="rashid 39-40"/> Critics complained that this "lack of local representation in urban administration made the Taliban appear as an occupying force."<ref name="rashid 101-102"/>

==== Iran ====
[[File:جوان پیشرو، دلیل امید.jpg|thumb|500px|[[Supreme Leader of Iran|Supreme Leader]] [[Ali Khamenei]] propaganda poster]]
[[Iran]] has been described as a "theocratic republic" by various sources,<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=tzUlDwAAQBAJ&dq=%22theocratic+republic%22+%22iran%22&pg=PA27 |title=Iran: Stuck in Transition (The Contemporary Middle East)|via=Routledge |date=2017 |isbn=978-1-351-98545-1 |last1=Ehteshami |first1=Anoushiravan |publisher=Taylor & Francis }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nyUMNew7j70C&dq=%22theocratic+republic%22+%22iran%22&pg=PA137 |title=Iran|via=Benchmark Books|date=2004 |isbn=978-0-7614-1665-4 |last1=Rajendra |first1=Vijeya |last2=Kaplan |first2=Gisela T. |last3=Rajendra |first3=Rudi |publisher=Marshall Cavendish }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=05GNDwAAQBAJ&dq=%22theocratic+republic%22+%22iran%22&pg=PA195|title=Iran and the West : cultural perceptions from the Sasanian Empire to the Islamic Republic|via=Benchmark Books|date=2018 |isbn=978-1-83860-876-7 |last1=Whiskin |first1=Margaux |last2=Bagot |first2=David |publisher=Bloomsbury }}</ref> including the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] [[The World Factbook|World Factbook]].<ref name="wfbiran">{{cite web |url=https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/iran/ |title=CIA World Factbook – Iran |publisher=[[CIA]] |access-date=2009-08-10 |archive-date=2021-01-10 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210110162554/https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/iran |url-status=live }}</ref>  Its constitution has been described as a "hybrid" of "theocratic and democratic elements" by [[Francis Fukuyama]].<ref>While articles One and Two vest sovereignty in God, article six "mandates popular elections for the presidency and the Majlis, or parliament." source: [https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203946904574300374086282670 July 27, 2009, "Iran, Islam and the Rule of Law". Francis Fukuyama] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150102204314/https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203946904574300374086282670 |date=January 2, 2015 }}</ref> Like other Islamic states, it maintains religious laws and has religious courts to interpret all aspects of law. According to Iran's constitution, "all civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria."<ref name=servat>{{cite web |title=Iran – Constitution |url=http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html |publisher=International Constitutional Law (ICL) |access-date=21 April 2015 |date=24 October 1979 |archive-date=21 August 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180821093931/http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

In addition, Iran has a religious ruler and many religious officials in powerful governmental positions. The head of state, or "[[Supreme Leader of Iran|Supreme Leader]]", is a ''[[faqih]]'' (scholar of Islamic law)<ref>article 109 of the constitution states that among the "essential qualifications and conditions for the Leader" are "scholarship, as required for performing the functions of mufti in different fields of fiqh" [http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/government/constitution-8.html Chapter 8 – The Leader or Leadership Council] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101123063337/http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/Government/constitution-8.html |date=2010-11-23 }} Constitution of Iran</ref> and has more power than [[President of Iran|the president of Iran]]. Iran's current Supreme Leader is [[Ali Khamenei]], a role he has held since 1989. The Leader appoints the heads of many powerful governmental positions: the commanders of [[Military of Iran|the armed forces]], the director of the [[Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting|national radio and television network]], the heads of powerful [[Bonyad|major religious and economic foundations]], the [[Chief Justice of Iran|chief justice of Iran]], the attorney general (indirectly through the chief justice), special tribunals, and members of [[Supreme National Security Council|the supreme national security council]] who are dealing with defense and foreign affairs. He also co-appoints the 12 jurists of the [[Guardian Council]].<ref name="who">"Who's in Charge?" by Ervand Abrahamian ''London Review of Books'', 6 November 2008</ref>

The Leader is elected by the [[Assembly of Experts]]<ref name="wfbiran"/><ref>[[Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran]], [http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/government/constitution-8.html ''Articles 107–112''] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101123063337/http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/Government/constitution-8.html |date=2010-11-23 }}.</ref> which is made up of [[Ijtihad|mujtahids]],<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/iranian.studies/Policy%20Brief%201.pdf |archive-url=https://wayback.archive-it.org/all/20070630133328/http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/iranian.studies/Policy%20Brief%201.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=2007-06-30 |title=Understanding Iran's Assembly of Experts |access-date=2012-07-28 }}</ref> who are Islamic scholars competent in interpreting ''[[Sharia]]''. The [[Guardian Council]], has the power to reject bills passed by [[Islamic Consultative Assembly|the Parliament]]. It can also approve or reject candidates who want to run for the Presidency, Parliament, and the Assembly of Experts. The council supervises elections, and can allow or ban investigations into elections.<ref name="wfbiran"/> Six of the twelve council members are [[Faqīh|faqih]] and have the power to approve or reject all bills passed by [[Islamic Consultative Assembly|the Parliament]], whether the faqih believes that the bill is in accordance with Islamic laws and customs (''Sharia'') or not. The other six members are lawyers appointed by the chief justice, who is a cleric and appointed by the Leader.<ref>[http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/government/constitution-11.html Constitution of Iran] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080410013835/http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/Government/constitution-11.html |date=2008-04-10 }}, Article 157:
''In order to fulfill the responsibilities of the judiciary power in all the matters concerning judiciary, administrative and executive areas, the Leader shall appoint a just Mujtahid well versed in judiciary affairs and possessing prudence, and administrative abilities''</ref>

==== Saudi Arabia ====

In the [[Basic Law of Saudi Arabia]], [[Saudi Arabia]] defines itself as a sovereign Arab [[Islamic state]] with Islam as its official religion. However, some critiques describe Saudi Arabia as an Islamic theocracy. Religious minorities do not have the right to practice their religion openly. Conversion from Islam to another religion is punishable by death as [[apostasy]].<ref>{{cite book|quote=Saudi Arabia is a leading Islamic theocracy in the world today|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=v-GEDwAAQBAJ&q=Saudi+Arabia+is+an+Islamic+theocracy&pg=PT172|title=Dispute Resolution in Islamic Finance: Alternatives to Litigation?|year=2019|publisher=[[Routledge]]|isbn=9781351188890|first1=Adnan|last1=Trakic|first2=John|last2=Benson|first3=Pervaiz K|last3=Ahmed|access-date=2022-11-21|archive-date=2023-01-19|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230119145156/https://books.google.com/books?id=v-GEDwAAQBAJ&q=Saudi+Arabia+is+an+Islamic+theocracy&pg=PT172|url-status=live}}</ref> Muhammad Al-Atawneh describes the current Saudi regime as a 'theo-monarchy, that draws power from long-standing religio-cultural norms.'<ref>{{cite journal |quote= Is Saudi Arabia a Theocracy? Religion and Governance in Contemporary Saudi Arabia |url= https://www.jstor.org/stable/40647150 |title= Is Saudi Arabia a Theocracy? Religion and Governance in Contemporary Saudi Arabia |year= 2009 |publisher= [[Routledge]] |issn= 0026-3206 |first= Muhammad |last= Al-Atawneh |journal= Middle Eastern Studies |volume= 45 |issue= 5 |pages= 721–737 |doi= 10.1080/00263200802586105 |jstor= 40647150 |s2cid= 144381914 |access-date= 2022-11-21 |archive-date= 2022-10-20 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20221020111031/https://www.jstor.org/stable/40647150 |url-status= live }}</ref>