Editing Substance theory (section)

== Criticism of soul as substance ==
[[Kant]] observed that the assertion of a spiritual soul as substance could be a synthetic proposition which, however, was unproved and completely arbitrary.<ref>Kant. Immanuel. ''Critique of Pure Reason'', ed. Paul Guyer, Allen Wood. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge (UK), New York, Melbourne, 1998, p.422-425. {{ISBN|0-521-35402-1}}</ref> Introspection does not reveal any diachronic substrate remaining unchanged throughout life. The temporal structure of consciousness is retentive-perceptive-prognostic. The selfhood arises as result of several informative flows: (1) signals from our own body; (2) retrieved memories and forecasts; (3) the affective load: dispositions and aversions; (4) reflections in other minds.<ref>Seth, Anil K. ''The hard problem of consciousness is a distraction from the real one.'' Retrieved 14.01.2017 from https://aeon.co/essays/the-hard-problem-of-consciousness-is-a-distraction-from-the-real one</ref> Mental acts have the feature of appropriation: they are always attached to some pre-reflective consciousness.<ref>Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. Translated by Hazel E. Barnes. Routledge: London, [1996], p. XXVI-XXXII. {{ISBN|0-415-04029-9}}</ref> As visual perception is only possible from a definite point of view, so inner experience is given together with self-consciousness. The latter is not an autonomous mental act, but a formal way how the first person has their experience. From the pre-reflective consciousness, the person gains conviction of their existence. This conviction is immune to false reference.<ref>Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Blue and Brown Books. Blackwell: [Oxford], [1958], p. 67. {{ISBN|0-631-14660-1}}</ref> The concept of person is prior to the concepts of subject and body.<ref>Strawson P. Individuals. Methuen: London., 1959, p.98-103</ref> The reflective self-consciousness is a conceptual and elaborate cognition. Selfhood is a self-constituting effigy, a task to be accomplished.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Wisdo |first1=David |title=The Self: Kierkegaard and Buddhism in Dialogue |journal=Comparative Philosophy|date=28 July 2017 |volume=8 |issue=2 |doi=10.31979/2151-6014(2017).080209 |doi-access=free }}</ref> Humans are incapable of comprising all their experience within the current state of consciousness; overlapping memories are critical for personal integrity. Appropriated experience can be recollected. At stage B, we remember the experience of stage A; at stage C, we may be aware of the mental acts of stage B. The idea of self-identity is enforced by the relatively slow changes of our body and social situation.<ref>Ayer A.J. Language, Truth and Logic. Penguin Books: [s.l.], 1946, p. 166-168</ref> Personal identity may be explained without accepting a spiritual agent as subject of mental activity.<ref>Gallagher, Shaun and Zahavi, Dan, "Phenomenological Approaches in Self-Consciousness", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL= https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/self-consciousness-phenomenological/</ref> Associative connection between life episodes is necessary and sufficient for the maintenance of a united selfhood. Personal character and memories can persist after radical mutation of the body.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Quinton |first1=Anthony |title=The Soul |journal=The Journal of Philosophy |date=1962 |volume=59 |issue=15 |pages=393–409 |doi=10.2307/2022957 |jstor=2022957 }}</ref>