Editing Saul Kripke (section)

===''Naming and Necessity''===

{{main|Naming and Necessity}}
[[File:Naming and Necessity.jpg|thumb|Cover of ''[[Naming and Necessity]]'' ]]
The three lectures that form ''[[Naming and Necessity]]'' constitute an attack on the [[descriptivist theory of names]]. Kripke attributes variants of descriptivist theories to [[Gottlob Frege|Frege]], [[Bertrand Russell|Russell]], [[Ludwig Wittgenstein|Wittgenstein]], and [[John Searle]], among others. According to descriptivist theories, proper names either are synonymous with descriptions, or have their reference determined by virtue of the name's being associated with a description or cluster of descriptions that an object uniquely satisfies. Kripke rejects both these kinds of descriptivism. He gives several examples purporting to render [[Descriptivist theory of names|descriptivism]] implausible as a theory of how names get their references determined (e.g., surely [[Aristotle]] could have died at age two and so not satisfied any of the descriptions we associate with his name, but it would seem wrong to deny that he was still Aristotle).

As an alternative, Kripke outlined a [[Causal theory of names|causal theory of reference]], according to which a name refers to an object by virtue of a causal connection with the object as mediated through communities of speakers. He points out that proper names, in contrast to most descriptions, are [[rigid designation|rigid designators]]: that is, a proper name refers to the named object in every [[possible worlds|possible world]] in which the object exists, while most descriptions designate different objects in different possible worlds. For example, "Richard Nixon" refers to the same person in every possible world in which Nixon exists, while "the person who won the [[1968 United States presidential election|United States presidential election of 1968"]] could refer to [[Richard Nixon|Nixon]], Humphrey, or others in different possible worlds.

Kripke also raised the prospect of ''[[A Posteriori Necessity|a posteriori necessities]]''—facts that are [[necessarily true]], though they can be known only through empirical investigation. Examples include "[[Hesperus]] is [[Phosphorus (morning star)|Phosphorus]]", "[[Cicero]] is [[Cicero|Tully]]", "Water is H<sub>2</sub>O", and other identity claims where two names refer to the same object. According to Kripke, the Kantian distinctions between analytic and synthetic, ''a priori'' and ''a posteriori'', and contingent and necessary do not map onto one another. Rather, analytic/synthetic is a semantic distinction, ''a priori''/''a posteriori'' is an epistemic distinction, and contingent/necessary is a metaphysical distinction.

Finally, Kripke gave an argument against [[physicalism|identity materialism]] in the [[philosophy of mind]], the view that every mental particular is identical with some physical particular. Kripke argued that the only way to defend this identity is as an ''a posteriori'' necessary identity, but that such an identity—e.g., that pain is [[C fiber|C-fibers]] firing—could not be necessary, given the (clearly conceivable) possibility that pain could be separate from the firing of C-fibers, or the firing of C-fibers be separate from pain. (Similar arguments have since been made by [[David Chalmers]].<ref>Chalmers, David. 1996. ''The Conscious Mind.'' [[Oxford University Press]] pp. 146–9.</ref>) In any event, the psychophysical identity theorist, according to Kripke, incurs a dialectical obligation to explain the apparent logical possibility of these circumstances, since according to such theorists they should be impossible.

Kripke delivered the [[John Locke Lectures]] in philosophy at [[Oxford]] in 1973. Titled ''Reference and Existence'', they were in many respects a continuation of ''Naming and Necessity'', and deal with the subjects of fictional names and perceptual error. In 2013 Oxford University Press published the lectures as a book, also titled ''Reference and Existence''.

In a 1995 paper, philosopher [[Quentin Smith]] argued that key concepts in Kripke's new theory of reference originated in the work of [[Ruth Barcan Marcus]] more than a decade earlier.<ref>{{cite journal | last=Smith | first=Quentin | date=2 August 2001 | title=Marcus, Kripke, and the Origin of the New Theory of Reference | journal=Synthese | volume=104 | issue=2 | pages=179–189 | url=http://www.qsmithwmu.com/marcus,_kripke,_and_the_origin_of_the_new_theory_of_reference.htm | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070610092511/http://www.qsmithwmu.com/marcus,_kripke,_and_the_origin_of_the_new_theory_of_reference.htm | url-status=dead | archive-date=10 June 2007 | access-date=2007-05-28 | doi=10.1007/BF01063869 | s2cid=44151212 }}</ref> Smith identified six significant ideas in the New Theory that he claimed Marcus had developed: (1) that proper names are direct references that do not consist of contained definitions; (2) that while one can single out a single thing by a description, this description is not equivalent to a proper name of this thing; (3) the modal argument that proper names are directly referential, and not disguised descriptions; (4) a formal modal logic proof of the [[necessity of identity]]; (5) the concept of a [[rigid designator]], though Kripke coined that term; and (6) ''a posteriori'' identity. Smith argued that Kripke failed to understand Marcus's theory at the time but later adopted many of its key conceptual themes in his New Theory of Reference.

Other scholars have subsequently offered detailed responses arguing that no plagiarism occurred.<ref>{{cite journal |url=http://web.gc.cuny.edu/Philosophy/faculty/neale/papers/NealeKripke.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100714235537/http://web.gc.cuny.edu/Philosophy/faculty/neale/papers/NealeKripke.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=14 July 2010 | author=Stephen Neale | author-link=Stephen Neale |title=No Plagiarism Here | journal=[[Times Literary Supplement]] | pages=12–13 | date = 9 February 2001 | access-date = 2009-11-13 |format =.PDF |doi=10.1007/BF01063869 |volume=104 |issue=2|s2cid=44151212 }}</ref><ref>John Burgess, "Marcus, Kripke, and Names" ''Philosophical Studies'', 84: 1, pp. 1–47.</ref>

===="A Puzzle about Belief"====
{{further|disquotational theory of truth}}
In ''Naming and Necessity'', Kripke argues for [[direct reference theory]] (that the meaning of a name is simply the object it refers to). Nevertheless, he acknowledges the possibility that propositions containing names may have some additional semantic properties,<ref>Kripke, 1980, p. 20</ref> properties that could explain why two names referring to the same person may give different [[truth value]]s in propositions about beliefs. For example, Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly, although she does not believe that Clark Kent can fly. According to the [[mediated reference theory]] of names, this is explained by the fact that the names "Superman" and "Clark Kent", though referring to the same person, have distinct semantic properties.

But in his article "A Puzzle about Belief" (1988) Kripke seems to oppose even this possibility. His argument can be reconstructed as follows: The idea that two names referring to the same object may have different semantic properties is supposed to explain the fact that the intersubstitution of [[Coreference|coreferring]] names in propositions about beliefs can alter truth value (as in Lois Lane's case). But the same phenomenon occurs even without the intersubstitution of coreferring names: Kripke invites us to imagine a French, monolingual boy, Pierre, who believes the proposition expressed by "''Londres est jolie''" ("London is beautiful"). Pierre moves to London without realizing that London = Londres. He then learns English the same way a child would learn the language, that is, not by translating words from French to English. Pierre learns the name "London" from the unattractive part of the city where he lives, and so comes to believe that London is not beautiful. Pierre will now assent to the sentences "Londres est jolie" and "London is not beautiful". With only translation and disquotation, the puzzle can be generated: Pierre both believes that London is pretty and doesn't believe that London is pretty. This paradox arises without making use of intersubstitution of coreferring names. Kripke shows later in the article how this puzzle can be generated ''within a single language'', using only disquotation. The upshot of this, according to Kripke, is that intersubstitution of coreferring names cannot be blamed for the difficulty created by belief contexts. If this is right, contra proponents of mediated reference theory, the inconsistency of belief contexts involving coreferring names cannot be taken as evidence against his direct reference theory of names.