Editing Richard Mentor Johnson (section)

====Initial service====
Within a week of the declaration of war, Johnson urged the [[United States House of Representatives|House of Representatives]] to recommend the raising of troops in the western states, lest disaster befall settlers on the frontier.<ref>Petriello, p. 32</ref> After the adjournment, Johnson returned to Kentucky to recruit volunteers. So many men responded that he chose only those with horses, and raised a body of mounted rifles.<ref>Langworthy, pp. 13–14</ref> The War of 1812 was extraordinarily popular in Kentucky; Kentuckians depended on sea trade through the port of [[New Orleans]] and feared that the British would stir up another Indian war.<ref>Carr, pp. 299–300</ref>{{efn|Carr also sees, as background motives, the British hostility to slavery, and a consequent wish to disentangle Britain from the United States.}} The land war fought in the Northern United States pitted American troops against British forces and their Indian allies.<ref>Jones, p. 28.</ref> Johnson recruited 300 men, divided into three [[company (military unit)|companies]], who elected him [[Major (rank)|major]]. They merged with another [[battalion]], forming a [[regiment]] of 500 men, with Johnson as [[colonel]], with the merged volunteer forces becoming a [[brigade]] commanded by General [[Edward W. Tupper]] of Ohio.<ref>Petriello, p. 32.</ref> The Kentucky militia was under the command of General [[William Henry Harrison]], the [[Governor of Indiana|Governor of the Indiana Territory]].<ref>Meyer, p. 90.</ref>

Johnson's force was originally intended to join General [[William Hull]] at Detroit, but Hull [[Siege of Detroit|surrendered Detroit]] on August 16 and his army was captured. Harrison by then was in command of the entire Northwest frontier and ordered Johnson to relieve [[Forts of Fort Wayne, Indiana|Fort Wayne]] in the northeast of the Territory, which was already being attacked by the Indians. On September 18, 1812, Johnson's men reached Fort Wayne in time to save it, and turned back an Indian ambush. They returned to Kentucky and disbanded, going out of their way to burn [[Potawatomi]] villages along the [[Elkhart River]] en route.<ref>Meyer, p. 92; Pratt, p. 89</ref>

Johnson returned to his seat in Congress in the late fall of 1812. Based on his experience, he proposed a plan to defeat the mobile, [[guerrilla warfare]] of the Indians. American troops moved slowly, dependent on a supply line. Indians would evade battle and raid supplies until the American forces withdrew or were overrun. Mounted riflemen could move quickly, carry their own supplies, and live off the woods. If they attacked Indian villages in winter, the Indians would be compelled to stand and fight for the supplies they used to wage war and could be decisively defeated. Johnson submitted this plan to President [[James Madison]] and [[United States Secretary of War|Secretary of War]] [[John Armstrong, Jr.|John Armstrong]], who approved it in principle. They referred the plan to Harrison, who found winter operations impracticable. Johnson was permitted to try the tactics in the summer of 1813; later, the US conducted Indian wars in winter with his strategy.<ref>Pratt, pp. 90–91; cf. Langworthy, p. 15, Emmons, p. 22.</ref>

Johnson left Washington, D.C., just before Congress adjourned. He raised one thousand men, nominally part of the Kentucky militia under [[Governor of Kentucky|Governor]] [[Isaac Shelby]], but largely operating independently. He disciplined his men, required that every man have arms in prime condition and ready to hand, and hired [[gunsmith]]s, [[blacksmith]]s, and [[Physician|doctors]] at his own expense. He devised a new tactical system: when any group of men encountered the enemy, they were to dismount, take cover, and hold the enemy in place. All groups not in contact were to ride to the sound of firing, and dismount, surrounding the enemy when they got there. Between May and September, Johnson raided throughout the Northwest, burning the war supply centers of Indian villages, surrounding their fighting units and scattering them, killing some  warriors each time.<ref>Pratt, pp. 92–94</ref>