Editing Rhodesia (section)

====Early militant activity====

As early as 1960, [[minority rule]] in Southern Rhodesia was already being challenged by a rising tide of [[political violence]] led by black African nationalists such as [[Joshua Nkomo]] and [[Ndabaningi Sithole]]. A sustained period of civil unrest between 1960 and 1965 further polarised relations between the government and the increasingly militant black nationalists.<ref name="blackfire"/> After their public campaigns were initially suppressed, many black nationalists believed that negotiation was completely incapable of meeting their aspirations. Petrol bombings by politicised radicals became increasingly common, with the ''Zimbabwe Review'' observing in 1961, "for the first time home-made petrol bombs were used by freedom fighters in Salisbury against settler establishments."<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.rhodesia.nl/wilkinson.html |title=Insurgency in Rhodesia, 1957–1973: An Account and Assessment |publisher=International Institute for Strategic Studies |year=1973 |access-date=13 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120525121502/http://www.rhodesia.nl/wilkinson.html |archive-date=25 May 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref> Between January and September 1962, nationalists detonated 33 bombs and were implicated in 28 acts of arson, and 27 acts of sabotage against communications infrastructure.<ref name="blackfire"/> The nationalists also murdered a number of black Rhodesians who were accused of collaboration with the security forces.<ref name="blackfire"/> Nkomo's party, the [[Zimbabwe African People's Union]] (ZAPU) announced that year that it had formed a military wing, the [[Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army]] (ZIPRA) and "the decision to start bringing in arms and ammunition and to send young men away for sabotage training" had already been implemented.<ref name="blackfire"/> As early as 1960, ZAPU's predecessor, the National Democratic Party (NDP), had established informal contacts with the [[Soviet Union]] and [[Czechoslovak Socialist Republic|Czechoslovakia]], and discussed the possibility of obtaining military training in Eastern Europe for its members.<ref name=Hot>{{cite book|last=Shubin|first=Vladimir Gennadyevich|title=The Hot "Cold War": The USSR in Southern Africa|date=2008|pages=92–93, 151–159, 249|publisher=Pluto Press|location=London|isbn=978-0-7453-2472-2}}</ref> In July 1962, Nkomo visited Moscow and discussed plans for a ZAPU-led armed uprising in Rhodesia.<ref name=Hot/> He made formal requests for Soviet funding and arms for ZIPRA, explaining that "for these purposes ZAPU needs arms, explosives, revolvers...the party also needs money to bribe persons who guard important installations, to carry out sabotage".<ref name=Hot/> The Soviets agreed to supply ZAPU with limited funds beginning in 1963, and increased its level of financial support after UDI.<ref name=Hot/> In 1963, ZIPRA also made its first formal request to the Soviet Union for military training.<ref name=Hot/> The Soviets began training ZIPRA militants in guerrilla warfare in early 1964.<ref name=Hot/>

Nkomo's public endorsement of a violent strategy confirmed white politicians' opposition to ZAPU and fed their negative attitudes towards black nationalists at large.<ref name="blackfire"/> In response to the formation of ZIPRA, the Rhodesian government [[Ban (law)|banned]] ZAPU, driving that party's supporters underground.<ref name="crisis">{{cite book|last=Shamuyarira|first=Nathan|title=Crisis in Rhodesia|pages=202–203}}</ref> It also passed draconian security legislation restricting the right to assembly and granting the security forces broad powers to crack down on suspected political subversives.<ref name="blackfire"/> For the first time, the [[capital punishment|death sentence]] was also introduced for any act of politically inspired terrorism which involved arson or the use of explosives.<ref name="areahandbook"/>

The emergence of guerrilla warfare and acts of urban insurrection by the black nationalist parties in Rhodesia allowed racial politics to be elevated into an issue of law and order in white Rhodesian public discourse. To Smith and his government, black nationalists were stateless dissidents whose primary motives were not political, but crime and perpetuating lawlessness; for example, Smith preferred to describe the insurgents as "gangsters" in his commentary.<ref name="SmithGB"/> The use of weapons and explosives sourced from communist states by the black nationalists also disguised the racial dynamics of the conflict, allowing white Rhodesians to claim that they were targets of Soviet-directed communist agitators rather than a domestic political movement.<ref name="frontiersmen"/> Smith and his supporters perceived themselves as collective defenders of the traditional values of the [[British Empire]] against the twin threats of international communism, manifested through the Soviet Union's support for black nationalist militants, and the social and political decadence of the West.<ref name="raft"/> Often repeated appeals to the Christian heritage of their pioneer ancestors in "defending the [[free world]]" and sustaining "Western civilisation" reflected these beliefs.<ref name="raft"/> This was hardly an unusual opinion among white minorities in Southern Africa at the time; a dossier compiled by United States intelligence officials on the topic found that:
{{blockquote|many [southern African] whites....believe that the current social and political ferment throughout the continent is communist inspired and managed; that it would be no problem without communist instigation. They point to materiel and training provided by communist countries to insurgency groups operating against white minority governments in southern Africa. They see foreign-based black liberation groups operating against the Portuguese, Rhodesians, and South Africans as the spearhead of a communist thrust into southern Africa.<ref name=Volk>{{cite book|last=Miller|first=Jamie|title=An African Volk: The Apartheid Regime and Its Search for Survival|year=2016|pages=100–117|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=Oxford|isbn=978-0190274832}}</ref>}}

ZAPU's attempts to implement its armed struggle were hamstrung by a factional split within the party between 1962 and 1963. A number of ZAPU dissidents rejected Nkomo's authority and formed their own organisation, the [[Zimbabwe African National Union]] (ZANU), with Ndabaningi Sithole as its president and [[Robert Mugabe]] as its general secretary.<ref name=Hot/> By August 1964, ZANU was banned by the Rhodesian government as well, which cited widespread acts of violent intimidation attributed to its members.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.rhodesia.nl/wilkinson.html |title=The Rhodesian Agreement: Aspects and Prospects |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |year=1978 |access-date=13 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120525121502/http://www.rhodesia.nl/wilkinson.html |archive-date=25 May 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref> ZANU's agenda was left-wing and [[Pan-Africanism|pan-Africanist]]; it demanded a one-party state with majority rule and the abolition of private property.<ref name="areahandbook"/> Ethnic tensions also exacerbated the split: ZANU recruited almost solely from the [[Shona people|Shona-speaking peoples]] of Rhodesia.<ref name=Hot/> Its chief support base was the rural peasantry in the [[Mashonaland]] countryside.<ref name="areahandbook"/> ZAPU did retain Shona members, even among its senior leadership following the split.<ref name=Hot/> However, thereafter it recruited predominantly from the [[Northern Ndebele people|Ndebele]] ethnic group.<ref name="frontiersmen"/> Due to ZAPU's close relationship with the Soviet Union, ZANU found itself ostracised by the Soviet bloc but soon found a new ally in the [[People's Republic of China]].<ref name=Hot/> Its political ideology was somewhat more influenced by the principles of [[Maoism]] than ZAPU, and a sympathetic Chinese government soon agreed to furnish weapons and training for ZANU's own war effort.<ref name=MWM>{{cite book|last1=Moorcraft|first1=Paul|last2=Chitiyo|first2=Knox|title=Mugabe's War Machine: Saving or Savaging Zimbabwe?|date=2011|pages=46–59|publisher=Pen & Sword Books Ltd|location=South Yorkshire|isbn=978-1848844100}}</ref>

After UDI, ZANU formed its own military wing, the [[Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army]] (ZANLA).<ref name="frontiersmen"/> While ZANLA and ZIPRA both planned for an armed struggle against the Rhodesian government, their respective leadership disagreed on the means of conducting the insurgency. ZIPRA favoured Soviet thinking, placing an emphasis on acquiring sophisticated weaponry in the hopes of winning a conventional battle like the [[Viet Minh]] at [[Battle of Dien Bien Phu|Dien Bien Phu]].<ref name="frontiersmen"/> ZANLA placed greater emphasis on the politicisation of the local populace in the areas it operated, and favoured a more irregular style of warfare.<ref name="frontiersmen"/>

[[File:Scoutwithgun.jpg|thumb|Rhodesian soldier interrogating villagers in late 1977 at gunpoint. This photograph would become one of the most enduring images of the [[Rhodesian Bush War|Bush War]].]]

In early April 1966, two groups of ZANLA insurgents recently trained at a Chinese military facility in [[Nanjing]] crossed into Rhodesia from Zambia, having been issued vague instructions to sabotage important installations and kill white farmers.<ref name="blackfire"/> Five were arrested by the Rhodesian security forces almost immediately.<ref name="blackfire"/> Another seven initially evaded capture and planned to destroy an [[Electricity pylon|electric pylon]] near [[Chinhoyi|Sinoia]].<ref name="blackfire"/> Their explosive charges failed to detonate and were discovered by the [[Rhodesian Security Forces]], who tracked the insurgents to a nearby ranch on April 28.<ref name="blackfire"/> All seven were cornered and killed after a brief firefight; this event is considered to be the first engagement of the [[Rhodesian Bush War]].<ref name="military">{{cite book|last=Moorcraft and McLaughlin, Peter|first=Paul|year=2008|title=The Rhodesian War: A Military History|pages=1–200}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.rhodesianforces.org/AntiTerroristOps.htm |title=Rhodesian Air Force Anti Terrorist Operations (COINOPS) |publisher=rhodesianforces.org |year=2012 |access-date=13 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120304022746/http://www.rhodesianforces.org/AntiTerroristOps.htm |archive-date=4 March 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref> The action at Sinoia has been commemorated by supporters of the guerrillas since as "''Chimurenga Day''", and occupies a place of pride in ZANU hagiography.<ref name=MWM/>

In August 1967, a large and better-equipped column of almost seventy ZIPRA insurgents infiltrated Rhodesia from Zambia, bolstered by recruits from an allied South African militant organisation, [[uMkhonto we Sizwe]] (MK).<ref name=MWM/> The insurgents failed to cultivate prior contacts with the local populace, which immediately informed on their presence to Rhodesian officials. Within the month, the [[British South Africa Police|Rhodesian police]] and army had launched a counteroffensive codenamed [[Operation Nickel]], killing forty-seven insurgents, capturing another twenty, and driving the survivors across the border into Botswana. An even larger ZIPRA column of over a hundred insurgents was intercepted in early 1968 and annihilated by the security forces.<ref name="frontiersmen"/> A third ZIPRA incursion attempt in July 1969 met with similarly catastrophic results.<ref name="frontiersmen"/> Thereafter, ZIPRA abandoned the notion of attempting to infiltrate the country with large groups of insurgents equipped only with small arms; it limited itself to more irregular forms of warfare until it could stockpile enough heavy weaponry to mount a major conventional invasion.<ref name=MWM/> For its part, the ZANLA leadership criticised ZIPRA's continued fixation with winning a major conventional engagement, arguing that the failed incursions demonstrated the futility of engaging the Rhodesian military in the type of pitched battles in which it held an indisputable advantage.<ref name=MWM/> ZIPRA's failure to obtain support from the locals was also noted, and ZANLA began implementing a long-term covert politicisation programme to cultivate civilian support throughout its future area of operations.<ref name=MWM/>