Editing Regress argument (epistemology) (section)

== Synthesized approaches ==

===Common sense===

The method of common sense espoused by such philosophers as [[Thomas Reid]] and [[G. E. Moore]] points out that whenever we investigate anything at all, whenever we start thinking about some subject, we have to make assumptions.  When one tries to support one's assumptions with reasons, one must make yet more assumptions.  Since it is inevitable that we will make some assumptions, why not assume those things that are most obvious: the matters of common sense that no one ever seriously doubts.

"Common sense" here does not mean old adages like "Chicken soup is good for colds" but statements about the background in which our experiences occur.  Examples would be "Human beings typically have two eyes, two ears, two hands, two feet", or "The world has a ground and a sky" or "Plants and animals come in a wide variety of sizes and colors" or  "I am [[Consciousness|conscious]] and alive right now".  These are all the absolutely most obvious sorts of claims that one could possibly make; and, said Reid and Moore, these are the claims that make up ''common sense''.

This view can be seen as either a version of foundationalism, with common sense statements taking the role of basic statements, or as a version of Coherentism.  In this case, commonsense statements are statements that are so crucial to keeping the account coherent that they are all but impossible to deny.

If the method of common sense is correct, then philosophers may take the principles of common sense for granted.  They do not need criteria in order to judge whether a proposition is true or not. They can also take some justifications for granted, according to common sense.  They can get around Sextus' problem of the criterion because there is no [[infinite regress]] or circle of reasoning, because the principles of common sense ground the entire chain of reasoning.

===Critical philosophy===

Another escape from the diallelus is [[critical philosophy]], which denies that beliefs should ever be ''justified'' at all.  Rather, the job of philosophers is to subject all beliefs (including beliefs about truth criteria) to ''criticism'', attempting to discredit them rather than justifying them.  Then, these philosophers say, it is rational to act on those beliefs that have best withstood criticism, whether or not they meet any specific criterion of truth.  [[Karl Popper]] expanded on this idea to include a ''quantitative'' measurement he called '''verisimilitude''', or truth-likeness.  He showed that even if one could never justify a particular claim, one ''can'' compare the verisimilitude of two competing claims by criticism to judge which is superior to the other.

===Pragmatism===

The [[pragmatism|pragmatist]] philosopher [[William James]] suggests that, ultimately, everyone settles at some level of explanation based on one's personal preferences that fit the particular individual's psychological needs.  People select whatever level of explanation fits their needs, and things other than logic and reason determine those needs.  In ''The Sentiment of Rationality'', James compares the philosopher, who insists on a high degree of justification, and the boor, who accepts or rejects ideals without much thought:

{{blockquote|The philosopher's logical tranquillity is thus in essence no other than the boor's.  They differ only as to the point at which each refuses to let further considerations upset the absoluteness of the data he assumes.}}