Editing Rational choice model (section)

===Rational choice theory in political science===
Rational choice theory provides a framework to explain why groups of rational individuals can come to collectively irrational decisions. For example, while at the individual level a group of people may have common interests, applying a rational choice framework to their individually rational preferences can explain group-level outcomes that fail to accomplish any one individual's preferred objectives. Rational choice theory provides a framework to describe outcomes like this as the product of rational agents performing their own cost–benefit analysis to maximize their self-interests, a process that doesn't always align with the group's preferences.<ref>Rakner, L (1996) Rational choice and the problem of institutions. A discussion of rational choice institutionalism and its application by Robert Bates Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI Working Paper WP 1996:6)</ref>

==== Rational choice in voting behavior ====
Voter behaviour shifts significantly thanks to rational theory, which is ingrained in human nature, the most significant of which occurs when there are times of economic trouble. An example in economic policy, economist [[Anthony Downs]] concluded that a high income voter ‘votes for whatever party he believes would provide him with the highest utility income from government action’,<ref>Anthony Downs (1957). "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy", ''Journal of Political Economy'', Vol. 65, No. 2, pp. 135–150</ref> using rational choice theory to explain people's income as their justification for their preferred tax rate.

Downs' work provides a framework for analyzing tax-rate preference in a rational choice framework. He argues that an individual votes if it is in their rational interest to do so. Downs models this utility function as B + D > C, where B is the benefit of the voter winning, D is the satisfaction derived from voting and C is the cost of voting.<ref>Downs, A (1957) "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy", ''Journal of Political Economy'', vol. 65, No. 2, pp. 135–150</ref> It is from this that we can determine that parties have moved their policy outlook to be more centric in order to maximise the number of voters they have for support. It is from this very simple framework that more complex adjustments can be made to describe the success of politicians as an outcome of their ability or failure to satisfy the utility function of individual voters.

==== Rational choice theory in international relations ====
Rational choice theory has become one of the major tools used to study international relations. Proponents of its use in this field typically assume that states and the policies crafted at the national outcome are the outcome of self-interested, politically shrewd actors including, but not limited to, politicians, lobbyists, businesspeople, activists, regular voters and any other individual in the national audience. The use of rational choice theory as a framework to predict political behavior has led to a rich literature that describes the trajectory of policy to varying degrees of success. For example, some scholars have examined how states can make credible threats to deter other states from a (nuclear) attack.<ref>T.C. Schelling (1960). ''The Strategy of Conflict''. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; G. H. Snyder and P. Diesing (1977). ''Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises''. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; R. Powell (1990). ''Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility''. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref> Others have explored under what conditions states wage war against each other.<ref>Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1981). "Risk, Power Distributions, and the Likelihood of War," ''International Studies Quarterly'', 25(4), pp. 541–568; J.D. Fearon (1995). "Rationalist Explanations for War," ''International Organization'', 49(3), pp. 379–414.</ref> Yet others have investigated under what circumstances the threat and imposition of international economic sanctions tend to succeed and when they are likely to fail.<ref>Jaleh Dashti-Gibson, Patricia Davis, and Benjamin Radcliff (1997). "On the Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis," ''American Journal of Political Science'', 41(2), pp. 608–618; Daniel W. Drezner (1999). ''The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations''. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Lisa L. Martin (1992). ''Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions''. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Claas Mertens, [[doi:10.1093/isq/sqae016|Carrots as Sticks: How Effective Are Foreign Aid Suspensions and Economic Sanctions?, ''International Studies Quarterly'', Vol. 68, Iss. 2, June 2024]]</ref>