Editing Public choice (section)

=="Expressive interests" and democratic irrationality==
According to [[Geoffrey Brennan]] and [[Loren Lomasky]], democratic policy is biased to favor "expressive interests" and neglect practical and [[utilitarianism|utilitarian]] considerations. Brennan and Lomasky distinguish between instrumental interests (any kind of practical benefit, monetary or non-monetary) and expressive interests (forms of expression like applause). According to them, the [[paradox of voting]] can be resolved by distinguishing between expressive and instrumental interests.

This argument has led some public choice scholars to claim that politics is plagued by irrationality. In articles in ''[[Econ Journal Watch]]'', economist [[Bryan Caplan]] contended that voter choices and government economic decisions are inherently irrational.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Caplan |first=Bryan |title=From Friedman to Wittman: The transformation of Chicago political economy |journal=Econ Journal Watch |volume=2 |issue=1 |year=2005 |url=https://econjwatch.org/File+download/63/2005-04-caplan-com.pdf}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |url=https://econjwatch.org/File+download/81/2005-08-caplan-com.pdf |last=Caplan |first=Bryan |title=Rejoinder to Wittman: True Myths |journal=Econ Journal Watch |volume=2 |issue=2 |year=2005}}</ref> Caplan's ideas are more fully developed in his 2007 book ''[[The Myth of the Rational Voter]]''. Countering [[Donald Wittman]]'s arguments in ''The Myth of Democratic Failure'', Caplan claims that politics is biased in favor of irrational beliefs.

According to Caplan, democracy effectively subsidizes irrational beliefs. Anyone who derives utility from potentially irrational policies like [[protectionism]] can receive private benefits while imposing the costs of such beliefs on the general public. If people bore the full costs of their "irrational beliefs" they would lobby for them optimally, taking into account both their instrumental consequences and their expressive appeal. Instead, democracy oversupplies policies based on irrational beliefs. Caplan defines rationality mainly in terms of mainstream price theory, arguing that mainstream economists oppose protectionism and government regulation more than the general population, and that more educated people are closer to economists on this score, even after controlling for confounding factors such as income, wealth or political affiliation. One criticism is that many economists do not share Caplan's views on the nature of public choice. But Caplan has data to support his position. Economists have in fact often been frustrated by public opposition to economic reasoning. As [[Sam Peltzman]] puts it: <blockquote>Economists know what steps would improve the efficiency of HSE [health, safety, and environmental] regulation, and they have not been bashful advocates of them. These steps include substituting markets in property rights, such as emission rights, for command and control&nbsp;... The real problem lies deeper than any lack of reform proposals or failure to press them. It is our inability to understand their lack of political appeal.<ref>"George Stigler's Contribution to the Economic Analysis of Regulation" 101 J. Pol. Econ. 818, 830 (October 1993)</ref></blockquote>Public choice's application to government regulation was developed by [[George Stigler]] (1971) and Sam Peltzman (1976).