Editing Politics of the Philippines (section)

==Culture and influences==
Despite the challenges faced by Filipino elections, and a sometimes pessimistic view about the potential of elections,<ref name="White"/>{{rp|214}} there is broad public support for democracy,<ref name="Teehankee2002"/>{{rp|179}}<ref name="Hermida">{{cite book |last1=Hermida |first1=Ranilo Balaguer |title=Imagining Modern Democracy: A Habermasian Assessment of the Philippine Experiment |date=19 November 2014 |publisher=State University of New York Press |isbn=978-1-4384-5388-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=exGXBQAAQBAJ}}</ref>{{rp|4}} coupled with a free press and an established legal system.<ref name="Bankoff">{{cite book |last1=Bankoff |first1=Greg |last2=Weekley |first2=Kathleen |title=Post-Colonial National Identity in the Philippines: Celebrating the Centennial of Independence |date=November 22, 2017 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-351-74209-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Se1HDwAAQBAJ}}</ref><ref name="White"/>{{rp|4}} Voter turnout in legislative and executive elections averages above 75 percent. However, other forms of political participation, such as membership in a political party, civil society organization, and labor unions, are rarely used.<ref name="Holmes">{{cite journal |last1=Holmes |first1=Ronald D. |title=The Dark Side of Electoralism: Opinion Polls and Voting in the 2016 Philippine Presidential Election |journal=Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs |date=December 1, 2016 |volume=35 |issue=3 |pages=15–38 |doi=10.1177/186810341603500302 |doi-access=free}}</ref> There are several examples of mass [[direct action]] throughout history, including the long-running [[communist rebellion in the Philippines]] and the multiple "People Power" events.<ref name="Abinales2017">{{cite book |last1=Abinales |first1=Patricio N. |last2=Amoroso |first2=Donna J. |title=State and Society in the Philippines |date=July 6, 2017 |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |isbn=978-1-5381-0395-1 |edition=Second |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TwglDwAAQBAJ}}</ref>{{rp|16}} A distrust of the state, and of state institutions such as the police, is a continuing legacy of martial law.<ref name="Abinales2005"/>{{rp|2}}

Political parties continue to be weak, often created to propel a single candidate before fading from relevancy. The power of the president within the political system may be one factor limiting the development of stable political parties, as the president is in a position to considerably support their allies.<ref name="Manacsa"/>{{rp|756–757}} Parties often serve to ally various political families,<ref name="McCoy"/>{{rp|8}} and it is common for politicians elected on losing party tickets to switch allegiance to the party of the president.<ref name="Teehankee2002"/>{{rp|177}} The power of traditional elites outside of the government has also inhibited the development of strong national institutions.<ref name="Banlaoi"/>{{rp|30–31}} Broad democratic political debate is linked with the concept of [[good governance]], rather than political movements related to class.<ref name="Rodan"/>{{rp|122}} The persistence of poverty is widely linked in political discourse to the presence of corruption.<ref name="Rodan"/>{{rp|124–125}} Campaigns focus on personal qualities and records, rather than party platforms.<ref name="You5">{{cite book |author1=Jong-sung You |title=Democracy, Inequality and Corruption |date=January 22, 2015 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-107-07840-6 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Rq4PBgAAQBAJ |chapter=Elections, clientelism and political corruption}}</ref>{{rp|102}}

There has been strong continuity in class structures from the Spanish period to the present.<ref name="Simbulan"/>{{rp|54–55}} One prominent [[Historiography|historical narrative]] sees Philippine history through the lens of an "unfinished revolution", tracing the takeover of the [[Philippine Revolution]] by elites from the masses to unfulfilled expectations of reform following the [[People Power Revolution]].<ref name="Bankoff"/> Electoral pressure is absorbed through elections, despite the winners of elections invariably coming from various factions of the elite, and political parties being differentiated more by patronage networks than by policies. The importance of election funding creates a cyclic effect as political positions provide access to state power which provides the ability to generate funds.<ref name="Hedman2005"/>{{rp|17–18}} This [[state capture]] means that reforms occur slowly, even if popular.<ref name="Abinales2005"/>{{rp|2}}

While [[Land reform in the Philippines|questions over land reform]] have persisted since the colonial era, and have been considered by multiple administrations faced with peasant and communist-related political instability, the links between legislators and landlords mean progress has been limited and the vast majority of farmers continue to work on land owned by others.<ref name="Hermida"/>{{rp|125}}<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Overholt |first1=William H. |title=Land Reform in the Philippines |journal=Asian Survey |date=May 1976 |volume=16 |issue=5 |pages=428, 433–436, 445–448 |doi=10.2307/2643192 |jstor=2643192 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2643192}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.esquiremag.ph/politics/opinion/land-reform-in-the-philippines-a2212-20191028-lfrm
|title=Of Rice and Bullets: The Story of Land Reform in the Philippines |last=Umali |first=Justin |date=October 28, 2019 |access-date=May 22, 2021}}</ref> This failure to achieve significant land reform is thought to have restricted the growth of the Philippine economy, and is linked to continuing political inequality.<ref name="You4">{{cite book |author1=Jong-sung You |title=Democracy, Inequality and Corruption |date=January 22, 2015 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-107-07840-6 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Rq4PBgAAQBAJ |chapter=The genesis of inequality, land reforms and path dependence}}</ref>{{rp|69–70}} Despite such inequality, the strength of the left movement has declined since the restoration of democracy.<ref name="RoutledgeIntroduction">{{cite book |last1=Thompson |first1=Mark R. |last2=Batalla |first2=Eric Vincent C. |title=Routledge Handbook of the Contemporary Philippines |date=February 19, 2018 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-317-48526-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DmkPEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |chapter=Introduction}}</ref>{{rp|12}}

A small professional and technical middle class, mostly concentrated in urban areas such as Metro Manila, are relatively trusted within the civil service and play a significant role in civil society organization. Such organizations are examples of cause-based politics, an exception to the usual model of Philippine political parties and political organization. While too small to change the overall political structure, civil society organizations are sometimes able to influence policy on specific issues.<ref name="Kimura2003">{{cite journal |last1=Kimura |first1=Masataka |title=The Emergence of the Middle Classes and Political Change in the Philippines |journal=The Developing Economies |date=June 2003 |volume=XLI |issue=2 |pages=264–284 |doi=10.1111/j.1746-1049.2003.tb00941.x |url=https://www.ide.go.jp/library/English/Publish/Periodicals/De/pdf/03_02_08.pdf|hdl=10.1111/j.1746-1049.2003.tb00941.x |hdl-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |editor-last1=Thompson |editor-first1=Mark R. |editor-last2=Batalla |editor-first2=Eric Vincent C. |title=Routledge Handbook of the Contemporary Philippines |date=February 19, 2018 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-317-48526-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DmkPEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA262 |pages=262, 367}}</ref> Notably, the role they played in the People Power Revolution led to a brief political consensus towards a more technocratic and relatively economically liberal state.<ref name="Magno">{{cite journal |last1=Magno |first1=Alexander R. |title=PHILIPPINES: Trauma of a Failed Presidency |journal=Southeast Asian Affairs |date=2001 |volume=2001 |pages=251–262 |jstor=27912279 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/27912279}}</ref>{{rp|252–253}}

Some tension exists between this middle class with the larger but less active poorer class,<ref name="Wataru">{{cite book |author=Wataru Kusaka |title=Moral Politics in the Philippines: Inequality, Democracy and the Urban Poor |date=2017 |publisher=National University of Singapore Press |isbn=978-981-4722-38-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hb7WDgAAQBAJ}}</ref>{{rp|42–44}} most clearly expressed in the different outcomes and opinions regarding the entwined [[Second EDSA Revolution|EDSA II]] and [[EDSA III]] protests. Unlike in the first People Power Revolution, which saw joint participation from both classes, these following mass protests are generally considered to have predominantly middle and lower class movements respectively, with EDSA III failing to overturn the success of EDSA II.<ref name="Wataru"/>{{rp|81–83}}

Politicians at local and national levels are usually either [[List of political families in the Philippines|dynastic candidates]] or popular celebrities. [[Political dynasties in the Philippines|Dynastic politics]] is very common.<ref name="David"/>{{rp|83}} Members of the House and local government officials can be elected for a maximum of three terms, although positions often pass to family members.<ref name="Atienza"/> In 1992, 32% of the representatives in the restored Congress were children of politicians, and 15% represented a third or fourth generation.<ref name="McCoy">{{cite book |last1=McCoy |first1=Alfred W. |title=An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines |date=2009 |publisher=University of Wisconsin Press |isbn=978-0-299-22984-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fawaNZu-yqUC}}</ref>{{rp|xviii}} In 2010, over half of the members of the House of Representatives and over half of all Governors were related to someone who had been in Congress over the previous 20 years. Over 60% of high-level local elective offices were held by a dynastic candidate. For both dynastic candidates and celebrities, voter familiarity with their names is thought to drive their electoral success.<ref name="David"/>{{rp|84}}

Levels of education correlate with voting for each of the types of candidates, with those with less education more likely to vote for celebrity candidates and those with more education more likely to vote for dynastic candidates. Less wealthy voters are more likely to vote for celebrity candidates, although it has little impact on votes for dynastic candidates. Older voters are more likely to vote for celebrity candidates, and voters in Luzon are more likely to vote for celebrity candidates than voters in the Visayas or Mindanao.<ref name="David"/>{{rp|91–92}} While the constitution bans political dynasties, no legislation has been passed to define what this means.<ref name="Querubin"/> Term limits have had a limited effect on such dynasties.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://correctphilippines.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Kasuya-Clan-Politics-and-Term-Limits-in-the-Philippines-1.pdf |title=Much Ado about Nothing?: Clan Politics and Term Limit in the Philippines |last=Kasuya |first=Yuko |publisher=Correct Movement |access-date=December 24, 2020 |page=26}}</ref>

In addition to strong divisions in class identity, the Philippines has a diversity of regional identities, driven by its archipelagic nature and varied history.<ref name="Bankoff"/> Regional and ethnic identities are sometimes stronger than national identity,<ref name="Banlaoi"/>{{rp|30}} with national identity often being driven by Christians, and more specifically Tagalogs.<ref name="Bankoff"/> Contrasted with the broad Christian Filipino identity is that of the Muslims, and that of often-marginalized [[Indigenous peoples of the Philippines|indigenous peoples]].<ref name="Banlaoi"/>{{rp|9}} Winning a presidential election usually comes with winning the highly populous Tagalog areas of Southern Luzon. Most winning candidates have done well throughout the Philippines, winning pluralities in Luzon, the Visayas, and Mindanao. However, some elections have been won without the Visayas or Mindanao, and in a single case, the [[2004 Philippine presidential election|2004 election]], the Presidency was won without a plurality in Luzon. However, the importance of national image has been increasing in presidential contests.<ref name="White"/>{{rp|156}}

Despite the centralization of national power, politics itself is very decentralized.<ref name="Hedman2005"/>{{rp|18}} Political patronage relationships extend vertically through the various levels of political administration.<ref name="RoutledgeKimura">{{cite book |last1=Kimura |first1=Masataka |editor1-last=Thompson |editor1-first=Mark R. |editor2-last=Batalla |editor2-first=Eric Vincent C. |title=Routledge Handbook of the Contemporary Philippines |date=February 19, 2018 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-317-48526-1 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DmkPEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA17 |chapter=Clientelism revisited}}</ref>{{rp|20}}<ref name="RoutledgeSidel">{{cite book |last1=Sidel |first1=John T. |editor1-last=Thompson |editor1-first=Mark R. |editor2-last=Batalla |editor2-first=Eric Vincent C. |title=Routledge Handbook of the Contemporary Philippines |date=February 19, 2018 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-317-48526-1 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DmkPEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA26 |chapter=Patrons, Bosses, Dynasties, and Reformers in Local Politics}}</ref>{{rp|26}} National politicians then relied on local politicians to drive turnout within the constituency of the local politician, incentivizing government funding of local projects rather than national ones to shore up support, and causing national political parties to function more as an alliance of local politicians rather than centralized platforms.<ref name="Shin"/>

Decentralization of power to local governments and widespread poverty have reinforced the presence of [[clientelism]] within politics.<ref name="Hedman2010"/><ref name="Hedman2005"/>{{rp|18}} Such an effect is particularly strong in the geographically defined House of Representative seats.<ref name="Abinales2005"/>{{rp|15}} The importance of [[Epal (politics)|name recognition]] in politics (especially under the open ballot system) and the use of [[single-member district]] entrenchs local politicians.<ref name="Shin"/> Politics is defined by clans and personalities rather than political parties, and politicians receive support from members of their linguistic group or from a geographical area that identifies with them.<ref name="Holmes"/> Political, cultural, and geographical borders are mutually reinforcing.<ref name="Bankoff"/>

Factional rivalries have dominated local politics since the late 19th century. As democracy expanded under American rule, these rivalries influenced provincial and national politics.<ref>{{cite book |last1=McCoy |first1=Alfred W. |editor1-last=Paredes |editor1-first=Ruby R. |title=Philippine Colonial Democracy |date=1989 |publisher=Ateneo de Manila University Press |isbn=978-971-11-3072-5 |page=121 |chapter=Quezon's Commonwealth: The Emergence of Philippine Authoritarianism}}</ref> Local politics is thus often more personal and potentially violent than national politics.<ref name="Manacsa"/>{{rp|755}} It can also grow more authoritarian, even as national politics becomes more democratic.<ref name="RoutledgeSidel"/>{{rp|28}} The competitiveness of different localities varies greatly, from having a long-entrenched dynasty, to having regular electoral turnover.<ref name="RoutledgeSidel"/>{{rp|30}}

Furthermore, a strong emphasis on family, so entrenched it is enshrined in the civil code, makes local familial links more important than state support,<ref name="McCoy"/>{{rp|7}} and personal links more important than ideological interests.<ref name="RoutledgeKimura"/>{{rp|18}}{{efn|Families in Filipino culture refer not just to the nuclear family, but to a wide network of both blood and marriage ties.<ref name="McCoy"/>{{rp|9–10}}}} Particular families are associated with certain areas, and a seat passing within a family is often seen as political continuity, with competition provided instead by seats passing to another family.<ref name="McCoy"/>{{rp|41}} A paternalistic landlord-tenant relationship typifies politician voter relationships in rural areas.<ref name="RoutledgeKimura"/>{{rp|20}}

Local politicians attend events such as baptisms, funerals, and weddings within their constituency, often providing a direct financial donation.<ref name="You5"/>{{rp|102}} In urban areas, where established patron-client links are weaker, patronage takes the form of [[Political machine|machine politics]], being more specific and short-term.<ref name="RoutledgeKimura"/>{{rp|20–21}} In such situations, electoral fraud and physical coercion is more common.<ref name="RoutledgeSidel"/>{{rp|28–30}} Vote buying is extremely prevalent, including "negative vote buying", where voters are taken out of their constituency on voting day or have their [[Election ink|fingers inked]] without having cast a ballot.<ref name="Schaffer">{{cite journal |last1=Schaffer |first1=Charles |title=Might Cleaning Up Elections Keep People Away from the Polls? Historical and Comparative Perspectives |journal=International Political Science Review |date=2002 |volume=23 |issue=1 |pages=76–78 |doi=10.1177/0192512102023001004 |s2cid=154673192 |url=https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/gov2126/files/schaffer_2002_0.pdf#page=9 |access-date=August 26, 2020 |archive-date=February 24, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210224200524/https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/gov2126/files/schaffer_2002_0.pdf#page=9 |url-status=dead }}</ref> Over time, this model of control, supported through the economic benefits of state capture, has become more prominent compared to the older paternalistic model.<ref name="RoutledgeSidel"/>{{rp|28–30}}

===Catholic Church===
{{See also|Catholic Church in the Philippines}}
[[File:Protests against RH Bill at EDSA 20120804 (06) - Flickr.jpg|thumb|Protests against the [[Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012|Reproductive Health Act of 2012]] (RH Bill)]]

The influence of the Church in civil society dates back to the Spanish era, when the Church exercised considerable secular power.<ref name="Hedman2005"/>{{rp|16, 25}} Despite the [[separation of Church and State]] that was [[Freedom of religion in the Philippines|established]] under American rule, the Church retained social influence among both elites and the wider population and a desire to promote its global values within the country.<ref name="Hedman2005"/>{{rp|32–34}} The Church provides a unifying moral framework that transcends class lines, linking the rich with the poor.<ref name="Rodan">{{cite book |last1=Rodan |first1=Garry |last2=Hughes |first2=Caroline |title=The Politics of Accountability in Southeast Asia: The Dominance of Moral Ideologies |date=2014 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-870353-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=v34fAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA117}}</ref>{{rp|118}}<ref name="Wataru"/>{{rp|42, 87}}

National structures were established shortly after independence,<ref name="Hedman2005"/>{{rp|50}} and the Church became directly involved in elections, both through its administrative hierarchy and through the actions of individual clergy.<ref name="Hedman2005"/>{{rp|50–51}} The politicization of the Church increased after the [[Second Vatican Council]], in great part due to the activism of Catholic youth.<ref name="Hedman2005"/>{{rp|75–77}} Another factor was the increasing filipinization of the Church following independence.<ref name="Hedman2005"/>{{rp|85}} The Church did not initially strongly oppose Marcos<ref name="Hedman2005"/>{{rp|87}} and agreed with his anti-communist stance. However, internal opposition grew over the course of the martial law era.<ref name="Abinales2005"/>{{rp|220}}

Public political opposition from individual clergy members eventually shifted the opinion of the Church hierarchy, who supported the candidacy of [[Corazon Aquino]] and the subsequent [[People Power Revolution]].<ref name="Abinales2005"/>{{rp|223–224}} Due to these events, the Church began to see itself as a "guardian of democracy".<ref name="DeinlaThompson"/>{{rp|45}} Later, the Church was one of the institutions that became opposed to the Presidency of Joseph Estrada.<ref name="Abinales2005"/>{{rp|275}}

[[Religious order (Catholic)|Religious order]]s, such as the [[Society of Jesus]] and [[Opus Dei]], run private educational establishments for law, medicine, and business.<ref name="Hedman2005"/>{{rp|34}} The Church is active in social and economic development, in ways not always in alignment with the desire of state authorities.<ref name="Hedman2005"/>{{rp|75}} It has organized to assist in anti-corruption efforts.<ref name="Rodan"/>{{rp|125, 145}} The Church maintains strong influence on the topic of family, notably through its support of large family size and its opposition to [[birth control]].<ref name="Abinales2005"/>{{rp|295–296}} Catholic influence led to the removal of [[Divorce law by country#Philippines|divorce laws]] following independence.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Reyes |first1=Deogracias T. |title=History of Divorce Legislation in the Philippines since 1900 |journal=Philippine Studies |date=June 1953 |volume=1 |issue=1 |pages=50–52 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/42718998 |publisher=Ateneo de Manila University|jstor=42718998 }}</ref>

The political influence of the Church has decreased in the 21st century, following [[Catholic Church sexual abuse cases by country#Philippines|sexual abuse revelations]] and the death of the prominent Cardinal [[Jaime Sin]].<ref name="DeinlaThompson"/>{{rp|45–46}} A symbolic moment for Church influence was the passing of the [[Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012|Reproductive Health Act of 2012]] by the [[Presidency of Benigno Aquino III|Benigno Aquino administration]]. This law aimed to make contraception and family planning more accessible, a topic which had faced long-standing Church opposition. Public opinion was thought to be in favor of the law.<ref>{{cite news |title=Power of the Catholic Church slipping in Philippines |url=https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2013/0306/Power-of-the-Catholic-Church-slipping-in-Philippines |access-date=13 May 2021 |work=[[The Christian Science Monitor]] |date=6 March 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130307075323/https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2013/0306/Power-of-the-Catholic-Church-slipping-in-Philippines |archive-date=7 March 2013}}</ref> The [[Presidency of Rodrigo Duterte|Rodrigo Duterte administration]] has also clashed with the Church,<ref>{{Cite news |first=Thomas |last=Maresca |title=Catholic Church dissents on Duterte's drug war |url= https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/04/25/duterte-roman-catholic-church-philippines/100461312/ |work= USA Today |pages= 4B |date= 29 April 2017 |access-date= 13 May 2017 |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20170425200229/https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/04/25/duterte-roman-catholic-church-philippines/100461312/ |archivedate=25 April 2017 |quote=}}</ref> with Duterte at times directly positioning himself against the Church.<ref name="DeinlaIntroduction"/>{{rp|26}}<ref name="DeinlaThompson"/>{{rp|46}} While Duterte himself is not in favor of a divorce law, proposals to legalize divorce gained significant support in Congress [[17th Congress of the Philippines|following his election]],<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/03/20/1798661/legalizing-divorce-philippines-what-you-need-know |title=Legalizing divorce in the Philippines: What you need to know |last=Patag |first=Kristine Joy |work=PhilStar |date=March 20, 2018 |access-date=May 13, 2021}}</ref> with one bill being passed by the House of Representatives before rejection by the Senate.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/2/5/House-panel-OKs-divorce.html |title=House panel OKs bills legalizing divorce |last1=Dimatulac |first1=Crissy |last2=Jalea |first2=Glee |work=CNN Philippines |date=February 5, 2020 |access-date=May 13, 2021 |archive-date=May 13, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210513150753/https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/2/5/House-panel-OKs-divorce.html |url-status=dead }}</ref> The measure was reintroduced in the [[18th Congress of the Philippines|next session of Congress]].<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2020/02/09/1991591/proposed-divorce-law-wont-be-easy-way-out-marriage |title='Proposed divorce law won't be easy way out of marriage' |last=Punay |first=Edu |work=PhilStar |date=February 9, 2020 |access-date=May 13, 2021}}</ref> During the [[2022 Philippine presidential election|2022 presidential elections campaign]], the Church endorsed the candidacy of vice president [[Leni Robredo]] to prevent [[Bongbong Marcos]], son of dictator [[Ferdinand Marcos]], from winning the election. Robredo, who won in 18 of the 86 dioceses in the country,<ref>{{cite news |last1=Saludes |first1=Mark |title=Catholic nation? The Filipino Church rethinks its role in politics. |url=https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2022/0629/Catholic-nation-The-Filipino-Church-rethinks-its-role-in-politics |work=[[Christian Science Monitor]] |date=29 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220629165724/https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2022/0629/Catholic-nation-The-Filipino-Church-rethinks-its-role-in-politics |archive-date=29 June 2022}}</ref> lost the presidential race in a landslide.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Buan |first1=Lian |title=36 years after ousting Marcos, Filipinos elect son as president |url=https://www.rappler.com/nation/elections/ferdinand-bongbong-marcos-jr-wins-president-philippines-may-2022/ |access-date=December 27, 2023 |work=[[Rappler]] |date=May 9, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220509211847/https://www.rappler.com/nation/elections/ferdinand-bongbong-marcos-jr-wins-president-philippines-may-2022/ |archive-date=May 9, 2022}}</ref>

===Military===
{{See also|Armed Forces of the Philippines}}
[[File:2007ManilaPenSiegeMap.jpg|thumb|The 2003 [[Oakwood mutiny]] and 2007 [[Manila Peninsula siege]] saw prominent buildings in [[Makati]] occupied by military forces in opposition to the [[Gloria Macapagal Arroyo]] administration.]]

The Philippine military became officially involved in socioeconomic issues during the [[Hukbalahap Rebellion]].<ref name="Whither"/>{{rp|81}}<ref name="Abinales2005"/>{{rp|179}} Its involvement was expanded further by Ferdinand Marcos, who actively used the military for civil work.<ref name="Selochan2004">{{cite book |last1=Selochan |first1=Viberto |editor1-last=May |editor1-first=Ron |editor2-last=Selochan |editor2-first=Viberto |title=The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific |date=March 2004 |publisher=ANU Press |isbn=9781920942007 |url=https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/military-and-democracy-asia-and-pacific |chapter=The Military and the Fragile Democracy of the Philippines |chapter-url=https://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p33231/pdf/ch0434.pdf |page=59}}</ref> While the 1935 constitution designated the president the Commander in Chief, the 1973 constitution was the first to explicitly include the principle of civilian control of the military.<ref name="Bernas"/>{{rp|8}} Despite this change, during [[martial law under Ferdinand Marcos|martial law under Marcos]], military leaders took over aspects of local government and became directly involved in the economy,<ref name="Whither"/>{{rp|80–81}} and the military itself expanded threefold.<ref name="Hedman2005"/>{{rp|88–89}} During this period, the [[Communist rebellion in the Philippines|communist]] and [[Moro National Liberation Front|Islamist rebellions in the Philippines]] led to further involvement by the military in politics.<ref name="Whither"/>{{rp|82}} Internal opposition to Marcos developed as corruption became more apparent, and following the 1986 elections an apparently failed coup by a military faction sparked what became the [[People Power Revolution]]<ref name="Abinales2005"/>{{rp|223–224}} The military's perceived role in this overthrowing of President Marcos<ref name="Whither"/>{{rp|82}} created a precedent for direct intervention into politics.<ref name="Bernas"/>{{rp|11}}

The 1987 constitution kept the 1973 text on civilian rule over the military, although it added that the armed forces were the "protector of the people and the state".<ref name="Whither"/>{{rp|83}}<ref name="Bernas"/>{{rp|8}} It also separated the [[Philippine Constabulary]] from the military, while shifting response for internal security from the military to the police.<ref name="Whither"/>{{rp|86–87}} However, the military has remained more involved in politics than it was before martial law, playing a role in the 2001 [[Second EDSA Revolution]] which overthrew [[Joseph Estrada|President Estrada]].<ref name="Whither"/>{{rp|82}} Failed or suspected coups took place in [[1986–90 Philippine coup attempts|the late 1980s]], [[Oakwood mutiny|2003]], [[2006 state of emergency in the Philippines|2006]],<ref name="Whither"/>{{rp|83–84}} and [[Manila Peninsula siege|2007]].<ref name="ChasingtheWind"/>{{rp|98}}

Civilian oversight of the military includes a dedicated deputy ombudsman for the military, investigation by the [[Commission on Human Rights (Philippines)|Commission on Human Rights]], and the jurisdiction of civilian courts. The [[1989 Philippine coup d'état attempt]] led to rebellion and mutiny becoming crimes.<ref name="Whither"/>{{rp|80}} As an institution the military is supportive of democracy, with many factions often coming out in opposition to attempted coups.<ref name="ChasingtheWind"/>{{rp|110}} However, weak civilian institutions continue to provide openings for military influence.<ref name="Whither"/>{{rp|85, 93}} Amnesty was granted to those involved in past coup attempts in 1992.<ref name="Whither"/>{{rp|86}}

The practice of recruiting retired military officers for some executive branch roles, such as ambassadorships, or within cabinet, was started by Marcos and continued after the restoration of democracy.<ref name="Whither"/>{{rp|81, 93}} The separation between the police and the military was impeded by the continuing communist and Islamic rebellions.<ref name="Whither"/>{{rp|91}} The president remains able to use the military to rule by decree.<ref name="ChasingtheWind"/>{{rp|102}} Localized instances of martial law have been declared in [[Maguindanao massacre#Declaration of martial law|2009]]<ref>{{cite news |title=Arroyo proclaims martial law in Maguindanao |url=https://news.abs-cbn.com/nation/12/04/09/arroyo-orders-martial-law-maguindanao |access-date=30 May 2021 |work=ABS-CBN News |date=4 December 2009 |language=en}}</ref> and [[Proclamation No. 216|2017]], both in Mindanao.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Morales |first1=Yvette |title=Duterte declares martial law in Mindanao |url=https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/05/24/Duterte-declares-martial-law-in-Mindanao.html |access-date=30 May 2021 |work=CNN Philippines |date=24 May 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170524090145/https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/05/24/Duterte-declares-martial-law-in-Mindanao.html |archive-date=24 May 2017 |url-status=dead |language=en }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/martial-law-declaration-philippines |title=Martial Law 101: Things you should know |last=Gavilan |first=Jodesz |work=Rappler |date=August 15, 2017 |access-date=December 22, 2020}}</ref>

===United States===
{{See also|Philippines-United States relations}}
[[File:President Ronald Reagan with President of the Philippines Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Marcos.jpg|thumb|Philippine President [[Ferdinand Marcos]], American President [[Ronald Reagan]], and [[Imelda Marcos]] during a Philippine state visit to the United States]]

Even after Philippine independence, the United States remained entwined within Philippine politics and the Philippine economy.<ref name="Hedman2005"/>{{rp|23}}<ref name="Politico-Diplomatic">{{cite web |url=http://ncca.gov.ph/subcommissions/subcommission-on-cultural-heritagesch/historical-research/politico-diplomatic-history-of-the-philippines/ |title=Politico-Diplomatic History of the Philippines |last=Tan |first=Samuel K. |publisher=National Commission for Culture and the Arts |date=April 16, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180818140153/http://ncca.gov.ph:80/subcommissions/subcommission-on-cultural-heritagesch/historical-research/politico-diplomatic-history-of-the-philippines/ |archive-date=August 18, 2018 |url-status=dead |access-date=April 9, 2021 }}</ref> Influence also remains in social and civil institutions.<ref name="Hedman2005"/>{{rp|24–25}} In the context of the [[Cold War]], direct and indirect influence was leveraged in the early days of independence to reinforce democratic institutions.<ref name="Hedman2005"/>{{rp|49–50}} Early civil influence was particularly strong among veterans' networks, and the American military maintained support for Philippine military campaigns against the Hukbalahap.<ref name="Hedman2005"/>{{rp|59–60}} During the Hukbalahap rebellion the United States also supported land reforms to reduce potential attraction to communism, although this pressure subsided as the rebellion ceased.<ref name="You4"/>{{rp|87}}

When Marcos declared martial law, to muted American response and with general acquiescence,<ref name="Abinales2005" />{{rp|205}} the strategic value of the Philippines and its American military bases led to continued official support.<ref name="Abinales2005" />{{rp|211}} While the United States eventually pressured Marcos to bring back elections,<ref name="You5"/>{{rp|100}} such support enabled Marcos to stay in power even as civil society and the military began to turn against him.<ref name="Abinales2005" />{{rp|224}} Eventually, the United States supported the development of an anti-Marcos coalition,<ref name="Franco"/>{{rp|109}} and in 1989 intervened to halt a coup against the new Aquino government.<ref name="Gross"/>{{rp|200}}

The influence of the United States decreased in the 1990s, when agreements to host American military bases ended and the country increased the regional aspects of its foreign policy.<ref name="Abinales2005"/>{{rp|11}} Following the [[September 11 attacks]] in the United States, security ties deepened once more, as the Moro insurgency became linked with the global [[War on Terror]]. This growing cooperation included the limited return of some US forces to Philippine soil.<ref name="Gross"/>{{rp|221}}