Editing Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (section)

====Lifting the moratorium: 1961–1962====
Following setbacks at the [[Vienna Summit]] and the escalation of the [[Berlin Crisis of 1961]], as well as the [[Soviet Union]]'s decision to resume nuclear testing in August attributed by Moscow to a shifting international situation and France's nuclear tests, Kennedy faced increasing pressure from the Department of Defense and nuclear laboratories to abandon hopes of a test ban. In June 1961, after talks in Geneva had stalled, Kennedy voiced concerns that Soviet negotiating behavior posed "a serious question about how long we can safely continue on a voluntary basis a refusal to undertake tests in this country without any assurance that the Russians are not testing." Whether the Soviets had actually conducted secret tests remained a point of debate within the Kennedy administration.

A team led by physicist [[Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky]] investigated the possibility that the [[Soviet Union]] had secretly tested nuclear weapons, concluding that while such tests were possible, no evidence suggested they had occurred. Despite these findings, the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] dismissed Panofsky's report as "assertive, ambiguous, semiliterate, and generally unimpressive," reflecting the deep skepticism and tension within the U.S. government over Soviet activities and the broader test-ban negotiations.
"{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|p=307}}{{sfn|Schlesinger|2002|pp=455–456}}

Two weeks after the lifting of the Soviet moratorium in August 1961, and after another failed Anglo-American attempt to have the Soviet Union agree to an atmospheric-test ban, the US restarted testing on 15 September 1961. Kennedy specifically limited such testing to underground and laboratory tests, but under mounting pressure as Soviet tests continued—during the time period of the Soviet ''[[Tsar Bomba]]'' 50 Mt+ test detonation on 30 October over [[Novaya Zemlya]]—Kennedy announced and dedicated funds to a renewed atmospheric testing program in November 1961.{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|p=307}}{{sfn|Jacobson|Stein|1966|pp=343–344}}

A report on the 1961 [[Soviet]] test, published by a group of American scientists led by Hans Bethe, concluded that Soviet laboratories had likely been operating at full capacity throughout the moratorium, anticipating a resumption of testing. The report suggested that preparations for testing probably began even before the talks resumed in Geneva in March 1961. By January 1962, [[Bethe]], who had previously supported a test ban, publicly declared that a ban was "no longer a desirable goal" and advocated for the United States to conduct tests on weapons developed by its laboratories. In contrast, U.S. laboratories had been relatively inactive regarding nuclear weapons during the moratorium, highlighting a significant disparity in activity between the two nations.{{sfn|Jacobson|Stein|1966|pp=342–343}}

[[File:Hatless Jack.jpg|thumb|[[Harold Macmillan|Macmillan]] and [[John F. Kennedy|Kennedy]] in Bermuda]]
In December 1961, Macmillan met with Kennedy in [[Bermuda]], appealing for a final and permanent halt to tests. Kennedy, conversely, used the meeting to request permission to test on [[Kiritimati|Christmas Island]], with US testing grounds in the Pacific having largely been exhausted. Macmillan agreed to seek to give US permission "if the situation did not change." Christmas Island was ultimately opened to US use by February 1962.{{sfn|Jacobson|Stein|1966|pp=344–345, 347}}

On this matter of resumed atmospheric tests, Kennedy lacked the full backing of his administration and allies. In particularly, Macmillan, Adlai Stevenson (then the [[United States Ambassador to the United Nations|UN ambassador]]), the [[United States Department of State|State Department]], the [[United States Information Agency]], and [[Jerome Wiesner]], the PSAC chairman, opposed resuming atmospheric tests. On the side advocating resumption were the AEC, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Joint Chiefs of Staff (which had called for renewed atmospheric tests in October 1961), and Department of Defense, though then-Secretary of Defense [[Robert McNamara]] privately acknowledged that such tests were "not really necessary." Teller continued to advocate for atmospheric tests, as well, arguing in early 1962 that nuclear fallout was nothing be concerned about. Teller also argued that testing was necessary to continued advancement of US nuclear capabilities, particularly in terms of the mobility of its weapons and, accordingly, its [[second strike|second-strike capability]].{{sfn|Jacobson|Stein|1966|pp=345–346}}

Despite Teller's reassurances, Kennedy himself "hated the idea of reopening the race" and was uneasy with continued production of fallout,{{sfn|Schlesinger|2002|p=455}} a negative consequence of resumed testing that its opponents within the administration stressed. Opponents of the tests also argued that renewed atmospheric tests would come at a significant moral cost to the US, given broad public opposition to the plan, and claimed that further tests were largely unnecessary, with the US already having an adequate nuclear arsenal.{{sfn|Jacobson|Stein|1966|pp=346–347}} Arthur Dean believed that public opposition to atmospheric testing was so great that the US would have to halt such tests within four years even without an agreement.{{sfn|Strode|1990|p=33}} [[John Kenneth Galbraith]], then the [[United States Ambassador to India|ambassador to India]], had advised Kennedy in June 1961 that resumed testing "would cause us the gravest difficulties in Asia, Africa and elsewhere." Similarly, Hubert Humphrey described the moratorium as "a ray of hope to millions of worried people." Its termination, Humphrey warned, "might very well turn the political tides in the world in behalf of the Soviets."{{sfn|Schlesinger|2002|p=455}}

Ultimately, Kennedy sided with those arguing for resumed testing. In particular, an argument by William C. Foster, the head of the [[Arms Control and Disarmament Agency]], swayed Kennedy. Foster argued that if the US failed to respond to the Soviet test series, Moscow could order a second test series, which could give the Soviet Union a significant advantage. Furthermore, a second test series, without US reciprocation, could damage the push for a test ban and make [[United States Senate|Senate]] ratification of any agreement less likely.{{sfn|Jacobson|Stein|1966|pp=347–348}} On 2 March 1962, building on the November 1961 announcement, Kennedy promised to resume atmospheric testing by the end of April 1962 if Moscow continued to resist the Anglo-American test-ban proposal.<ref name=faschron/> To an extent, the announcement was a compromise, as Kennedy restricted atmospheric tests to those tests which were "absolutely necessary," not feasible underground, and minimized fallout. The condition that testing would resume only if the Soviet Union continued to oppose the Anglo-American proposal also served as a concession to dissenting voices within his administration and to Macmillan.{{sfn|Jacobson|Stein|1966|pp=347–348}}

Kennedy portrayed resumed testing as a necessary for the image of US resolve. If the US failed to respond to the Soviet test series, Kennedy explained, Moscow would "chalk it up, not to goodwill, but to a failure of will—not to our confidence in Western superiority, but to our fear of world opinion." Keeping the US in a position of strength, Kennedy argued, would be necessary for a test ban to ever come about.{{sfn|Jacobson|Stein|1966|p=349}}

The US suspension of atmospheric tests was lifted on 25 April 1962.<ref name=faschron/><ref name=cq/>

By March 1962, the trilateral talks in Geneva had shifted to 18-party talks at the UN Disarmament Conference.{{sfn|Strode|1990|pp=19–20}} On 27 August 1962, within that conference, the US and UK offered two draft treaties to the Soviet Union. The primary proposal included a comprehensive ban verified by control posts under national command, but international supervision, and required on-site inspections. This was rejected by the Soviet Union due to the inspection requirement. The alternative proposal included a partial test ban—underground tests would be excluded—to be verified by national detection mechanisms, without supervision by a supranational body.<ref name=faschron/>{{sfn|Polsby|1984|p=71}}