Editing Pan-Blue Coalition (section)

=== In opposition during Lai Ching-te presidency: 2024–present ===
Although [[Taiwan People's Party|Taiwan People's Party]] (TPP) (known as the "white camp") positions itself as a [[centrism|centrist party]], its cooperative relationship with the KMT has prompted belief that it aligns more closely with the Pan-Blue camp.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Hioe |first1=Brian |title=Trends in Political Identity: Where Does Taiwan Go from Here? |journal=Asia Policy |date=2024 |volume=19 |issue=2 |pages=81–89 |url=https://muse.jhu.edu/article/927091/summary |access-date=25 November 2024 |issn=1559-2960}}</ref> Prior to the [[2024 Taiwanese presidential election|2024 presidential election]], prospects for ‘blue-white cooperation’ had been met with optimism from both parties, as they sought to jointly minimise the DPP's chances of procuring a third consecutive term of presidency. The two opposition parties then engaged in negotiations to form a joint presidential ticket in November 2023, with the proposal that either the KMT's [[Hou Yu-ih]] or the TPP's [[Ko Wen-je]] would be selected as the presidential candidate and the other the vice-presidential candidate.

During this period, polls from Mirror Media indicated that support rates for both Ko-Hou ticket and Hou-Ko ticket would outperform their Lai-Hsiao counterpart, standing at 46.6% and 46.5% respectively.<ref>{{cite news |title=【鏡新聞政經情勢民調6】藍白怎合？「柯侯」46.6%vs.賴蕭33.1% 「侯柯」46.5%vs.賴蕭34.9% |url=https://www.mnews.tw/story/20231117nm002 |access-date=25 November 2024 |work=鏡新聞 |date=17 November 2023 |language=zh-Hant}}</ref> However, the alliance subsequently collapsed on 18 November following the disagreement over the selection method for the presidential and vice-presidential candidates, resulting in both Hou and Ko entering the race as separate presidential candidates.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Dotson |first1=John |last2=Levine |first2=Ben |title=The Outcomes of Taiwan’s 2024 Legislative Elections |journal=Global Taiwan Institute |date=24 January 2024 |volume=9 |issue=2 |pages=6–9 |url=https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/01/the-outcomes-of-taiwans-2024-legislative-elections/ |access-date=25 November 2024}}</ref> The division among Hou and Ko's overlapping support bases eventually led to [[vote-splitting]], culminating in their defeat and the victory of DPP's [[Lai Ching-te]], who holds dissimilar ideology with the other two candidates in major issues such as national defence and the view on the [[Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Mahdi |first1=Maya |title=The Complexity of Ranked Choice Voting and How It Can Improve the U.S. Election System |journal=The Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Review |date=2024 |volume=3 |pages=5–14 |url=https://pressbooks.lib.vt.edu/pper/chapter/the-complexity-of-ranked-choice-voting-and-how-it-can-improve-the-u-s-election-system/ |access-date=25 November 2024 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Arvidsson |first1=Lina |title=Taiwan’s 2024 presidential election and cross-Strait relations: Consequences for the European Union |journal=Swedish National China Centre |date=2023 |url=https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/other-publications/taiwans-2024-presidential-election-and-cross-strait-relations-consequences-for-the-european-union.pdf |access-date=25 November 2024}}</ref> But since Ko and Hou together secured 60% of the votes, Lai would likely not have won had the deal succeeded.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Copper |first1=John F |title=The Outlook for Taiwan’s New President, Lai Ching-te |journal=East Asian Policy |date=2024 |volume=16 |issue=3 |pages=69–83 |url=https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S1793930524000217?srsltid=AfmBOoq8ZKhFVBwswStgFlqcc7_y2qyV6AbI91rzc4UbvwH1zNSxsTNS |access-date=25 November 2024}}</ref>

Despite this setback, an opposition coalition has still been established between the two parties in the Legislative Yuan since February 2024, forming a majority against the DPP's minority government. The two parties have since cooperated in numerous bill amendments, including the Act Governing the Legislative Yuan's Power,<ref>{{cite news |last1=Tshua |first1=Siu-ui |title=Cross-party dialogue is crucial to restore trust - Taipei Times |url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2024/05/25/2003818354 |access-date=25 November 2024 |work=Taipei Times |date=25 May 2024}}</ref> Act Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures,<ref>{{cite news |last1=Thompson |first1=James |last2=Pan |first2=Tzu-yu |title=Continued disagreement over funding allocation bill leads to impasse - Focus Taiwan |url=https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202411110018 |access-date=25 November 2024 |work=Focus Taiwan |date=11 November 2024}}</ref> and others.