Editing Operation Anaconda (section)

====TF Hammer/TF Anvil====
[[File:Cia-mi17.jpg|thumb|right|200px|U.S. special forces help Afghan troops away from a CIA-operated [[Mil Mi-17]] Hip helicopter at [[Bagram Airbase]]]]

Around midnight, the units of TF Hammer loaded into their vehicles and left their base in Gardez at {{Coord|33|35|58|N|69|13|44|E|type:city|name=Gardez}} for the Shah-i-Kot Valley in a convoy of 39 trucks, buses, and other vehicles. TF Hammer consisted of a large force of Afghan militia led by Zia Lodin and the Special Forces A-teams Texas 14/ODA 594 and Cobra 72/ODA 372. The road conditions were terrible due to a recent snowstorm that had turned the dirt roads into muddy and slippery terrain. This made progress challenging, especially in the difficult terrain.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Wright |first1=Donald P. |last2=Dempsey |first2=Martin E. |title=A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001 - September 2005 |url=https://history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/resmat/gwot/DifferentKindofWar.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161230133024/https://www.history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/resmat/GWOT/DifferentKindofWar.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=December 30, 2016 |publisher=Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS |language=en |date=July 2010}}</ref>

As they moved, some trucks got stuck, and there was even an accident where a large bus turned over, injuring several fighters.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Wright |first1=Donald P. |last2=Dempsey |first2=Martin E. |title=A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001 - September 2005 |url=https://history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/resmat/gwot/DifferentKindofWar.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161230133024/https://www.history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/resmat/GWOT/DifferentKindofWar.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=December 30, 2016 |publisher=Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS |language=en |date=July 2010}}</ref> The commanders ordered the trucks to use their headlights, destroying any element of surprise. As TF Hammer continued, it suffered from a lack of unit cohesion because of the transportation difficulties. A convoy led by Army Chief Warrant Officer Stanley L. Harriman of the Third Special Forces Group split off from the main TF Hammer force to reach the assigned observation point. Grim 31, an [[Lockheed AC-130|AC-130]] aircraft providing fire support and reconnaissance for the assault, spotted Harriman's convoy and, due to a failure in its [[inertial navigation system]], believed it was in a position away from friendly forces (this was due to a problem with the "glint" panels which should have identified the convoy as American.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Naylor |first1=Sean |title=Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda |date=7 March 2006 |publisher=Dutton Caliber |isbn=978-0-425-20787-1 |pages=199–201 |edition=Reprint |language=English}}</ref>) Grim 31 engaged the column, resulting in the [[friendly fire]] death of Harriman and the wounding of several Afghan militias and U.S. special forces.<ref>{{cite web |title=CNN - Report: Friendly fire killed U.S. soldier - Oct. 29, 2002 |url=http://edition.cnn.com/2002/US/10/29/afghan.friendly.fire/ |work=CNN |access-date=2023-07-29 |archive-date=2023-07-29 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230729003801/http://edition.cnn.com/2002/US/10/29/afghan.friendly.fire/ |url-status=dead }}</ref>

The main body of TF Hammer reached its pre-assault point around 06:15 and waited for the expected "55 minute" aerial bombardment of enemy positions.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> Miscommunication between Texas 14 and higher command meant the bombardment was not that extensive and consisted of six bombs. This was due to a bomb getting stuck in the launch bay of the [[B-1 Lancer|B-1B]] that was on its bomb run. The next aircraft in line waited for the B-1B to receive permission to jettison the bomb and go round again. During this time, both bombers plus the additional two [[F-15E Strike Eagle|F-15Es]] claimed to have received a "knock off" call directing them to cease the bombardment. One of the F-15E pilots later acknowledged that this may have been a communication directing Grim-31 to cease fire. This lack of air support demoralized the Afghans and frustrated the special forces. The Afghan fighters, in trucks, were devastated by [[mortar (weapon)|mortar]] fire registered in advance to strike fixed points on the road. The Afghans suffered forty or more deaths and injuries.

At this point, it became clear that the Al Qaeda fighters had been expecting an attack. The intense small arms and mortar fire, combined with the absence of close air support, caused the Afghan forces of TF Hammer to scatter and refuse to advance any further. This situation was reminiscent of the challenges faced during the earlier [[Battle of Tora Bora|Tora Bora operation]], in which the Afghan militias had similarly refused to advance in the face of enemy resistance. With no opportunity to alter the operation that had already been set in motion, the task of assaulting the Shah-i-Kot Valley had to be carried out by the troops of TF Anvil instead.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Neville |first1=Leigh |title=Special Forces in the War on Terror |date=19 May 2015 |publisher=Osprey Publishing |isbn=978-1-4728-0790-8 |page=89 |language=English}}</ref>