Editing One China (section)

=== United States policy ===
[[File:Mao Zedong, Zhang Yufeng et Richard Nixon.jpg|thumb|[[Mao Zedong]] greets U.S. President [[Richard Nixon]] during his [[1972 Nixon visit to China|visit to China in 1972]].]]

{{See also|China–United States relations|Taiwan–United States relations}}

The United States' One-China policy was first stated in the [[Shanghai Communiqué]] of 1972: "the United States acknowledges that Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.<ref name="Wilson Center Digital Archive"/> The United States does not challenge that position." The United States has not expressed an explicitly immutable statement regarding whether it believes Taiwan is independent or not. Instead, Washington simply states that they understand the PRC's claims on Taiwan as its own. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker asserts that U.S. One-China policy was not intended to please the PRC government, but as a way for Washington to conduct international relations in the region, which Beijing fails to state.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Cabestan |first=Jean-Pierre |date=2010-06-01 |title=Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and The Crisis with China |url=https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/5293 |journal=China Perspectives |language=fr |volume=2010 |issue=2 |doi=10.4000/chinaperspectives.5293 |issn=2070-3449}}</ref>  A more recent study suggests that this wording reflected the Nixon administration's desire to shift responsibility for resolving the dispute to the "people most directly involved" – that is, China and Taiwan.  At the same time, the United States would avoid "prejudic[ing] the ultimate outcome" by refusing to explicitly support the claims of one side or the other.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Hilton|first=Brian|date=September 2018|title='Taiwan Expendable?' Reconsidered|url=https://brill.com/view/journals/jaer/25/3/article-p296_296.xml|journal=Journal of American-East Asian Relations|volume=25|issue=3|pages=296–322|doi=10.1163/18765610-02503004|s2cid=240280593|access-date=1 December 2019|archive-date=8 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308090232/https://brill.com/view/journals/jaer/25/3/article-p296_296.xml|url-status=live}}</ref>

At the height of the [[Sino-Soviet split]] and [[Sino-Vietnamese War|Sino-Vietnamese conflict]], and at the start of the [[reform and opening]] of the PRC, the United States strategically switched diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China (ROC) to the People's Republic of China (PRC) on 1 January 1979 under the administration of [[Jimmy Carter]].  Congress quickly responded by passing the [[Taiwan Relations Act]] that defined relations with the ROC, but stopped short of full recognition.  It also required the United States to provide Taiwan with arms sufficient to maintain its self-defense, but did not commit to defending Taiwan in the event of an invasion.

In 1982, President [[Ronald Reagan]] also saw that the [[Six Assurances]] were adopted, the fifth being that the United States would not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. Still, United States policy has remained ambiguous. In the [[U.S. House Committee on International Relations|House International Relations Committee]] on 21 April 2004, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, [[James A. Kelly]], was asked by Rep. [[Grace Napolitano]] (D-CA) whether the United States government's commitment to Taiwan's democracy conflicted with the so-called One-China policy.<ref>
{{cite web|url=http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm597.cfm|title=Secretary Powell Must Not Change U.S. Policy on Taiwan|work=heritage.org|access-date=16 January 2005|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20041215152550/http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm597.cfm|archive-date=15 December 2004|url-status=unfit}}</ref> He stated "In my testimony, I made the point "our One China," and I didn't really define it, and I'm not sure I very easily could define it. I can tell you what it is not. It is not the One-China policy or the One-China principle that Beijing suggests, and it may not be the definition that some would have in Taiwan. But it does convey a meaning of solidarity of a kind among the people on both sides of the straits that has been our policy for a very long time."<ref>{{cite web |last1=Gregson |first1=Chip |last2=Hsiao |first2=Russell |last3=Young |first3=Stephen M. |title=David and Goliath: Strengthening Taiwan's Deterrence and Resiliency |url=https://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/GTI-David-and-Goliath-Strengthening-Taiwan-Deterrence-and-Resiliency-Nov-2020-final.pdf |website=globaltaiwan.org |publisher=Global Taiwan Institute |access-date=27 April 2021 |archive-date=27 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210427203734/https://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/GTI-David-and-Goliath-Strengthening-Taiwan-Deterrence-and-Resiliency-Nov-2020-final.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>

When President [[Bill Clinton]] visited Shanghai during his June 1998 visit to China, Clinton articulated the "three nos" for United States foreign policy towards China: (1) not recognizing [[two Chinas]], (2) not supporting Taiwanese independence, and (3) not supporting Taiwanese efforts to join international organizations for which sovereignty is a membership requirement.<ref name=":9">{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1332788951 |title=The dragon roars back : transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy |date=2023 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3415-2 |location=Stanford, California |pages=63 |oclc=1332788951}}</ref>
[[File:President Barack Obama offers a toast to President Xi Jinping of China during a State Banquet at the Great Hall of People in Beijing, China, November 12, 2014 (cropped).jpg|thumb|U.S. President [[Barack Obama]] and Chinese leader [[Xi Jinping]]. Obama supported the "One-China" policy during his administration.<ref>
"[https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-taiwan-obama-idUSKBN13S013?il=0 White House: no change to 'one China' policy after Trump call with Taiwan] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170602193633/http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-taiwan-obama-idUSKBN13S013?il=0 |date=2017-06-02 }}". Reuters. 2 December 2016.
</ref>]]
The position of the United States, as clarified in the ''China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy'' report of the Congressional Research Service (date: 9 July 2007) is summed up in five points:
# The United States did not explicitly state the sovereign status of Taiwan in the three US-PRC Joint Communiqués of 1972, 1979, and 1982.
# The United States "acknowledged" the "One China" position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
# U.S. policy has not recognized the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan;
# U.S. policy has not recognized Taiwan as a sovereign country; and
# U.S. policy has considered Taiwan's status as unsettled.
These positions remained unchanged in a 2013 report of the Congressional Research Service.<ref>
{{cite web | title=U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues | author1=Shirley A. Kan | author2=Wayne M. Morrison | page=4 | url=https://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/202880.pdf | date=4 January 2013 | publisher=Congressional Research Service | access-date=25 June 2017 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171231211949/https://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/202880.pdf | archive-date=31 December 2017 | url-status=live }}
</ref>

On 2 December 2016, US President-elect Donald Trump and ROC President Tsai Ing-wen conducted a short phone call regarding "the close economic, political and security ties between Taiwan and the US".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://asiatimes.com/trumps-taiwan-call-tempest-teapot/|title=Trump's Taiwan call: Tempest in a teapot?|last=Metzler|first=John J.|date=7 December 2016|website=www.atimes.com|access-date=14 December 2016|archive-date=14 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210314013524/https://asiatimes.com/2016/12/trumps-taiwan-call-tempest-teapot/|url-status=live}}</ref> On 6 December, a few days after the call, Trump said that the US is not necessarily bound by its "one China" policy.<ref>
{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-china-idUSKBN1400TY|title=Trump says U.S. not necessarily bound by 'one China' policy|date=12 December 2016|newspaper=Reuters|access-date=2 July 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170619151118/http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-china-idUSKBN1400TY|archive-date=19 June 2017|url-status=live}}
</ref><ref>
{{cite web|url=http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/donald-trump-china-policy-161212035714312.html|title=Donald Trump questions 'one China' policy|work=aljazeera.com|access-date=12 December 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161212065809/http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/donald-trump-china-policy-161212035714312.html|archive-date=12 December 2016|url-status=live}}
</ref><ref>
{{cite web|url=https://www.foxnews.com/politics/china-official-says-trumps-taiwan-comments-cause-serious-concern/|title=China official says Trump's Taiwan comments cause 'serious concern'|date=12 December 2016|work=[[Fox News]]|access-date=12 December 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161212143405/http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/12/12/chinese-media-calls-trump-ignorant-after-taiwan-comments.html|archive-date=12 December 2016|url-status=live}}
</ref>  On 9 February 2017, in a lengthy phone call, US [[President of the United States|President]] [[Donald Trump]] and PRC [[Paramount leader]] Xi Jinping discussed numerous topics and President Trump agreed, at the request of Xi Jinping, to honor the "one China" policy.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/09/readout-presidents-call-president-xi-jinping-china|title=Readout of the President's Call with President Xi Jinping of China|date=9 February 2017|via=[[NARA|National Archives]]|work=[[whitehouse.gov]]|access-date=17 February 2017|archive-date=13 April 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230413153246/https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/readout-presidents-call-president-xi-jinping-china/|url-status=live}}</ref>

On May 23, 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden announced the United States would intervene militarily if China were to unilaterally invade Taiwan. Speaking in Japan, President Biden stated, "That’s the commitment we made," an apparent reference to the Taiwan Relations Act, which ensures military support for Taiwan, although the Act does not specifically guarantee direct military action by the United States in Taiwan. President Biden emphasized that Russia's military invasion of Ukraine created an "even stronger" burden to protect Taiwan.<ref name="Boak 2022">{{cite web |last1=Boak |first1=Josh |last2=Madhani |first2=Aamer |last3=Miller |first3=Zeke |title=Biden: US would intervene with military to defend Taiwan |website=AP NEWS |date=23 May 2022 |url=https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-biden-taiwan-china-4fb0ad0567ed5bbe46c01dd758e6c62b |access-date=23 May 2022 |archive-date=23 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220523072140/https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-biden-taiwan-china-4fb0ad0567ed5bbe46c01dd758e6c62b |url-status=live }}</ref> China criticized Biden's statement as part of a "hypocritical and futile" pattern of encouragement to {{"'}}Taiwan independence' forces."<ref>{{Cite news |date=2022-05-25 |title=China Follows Biden Remarks by Announcing Taiwan Military Drills |language=en |work=Bloomberg.com |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-25/china-follows-biden-remarks-by-announcing-taiwan-military-drills |access-date=2022-07-05 |archive-date=13 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230413153306/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-25/china-follows-biden-remarks-by-announcing-taiwan-military-drills |url-status=live }}</ref>  Biden later stated that his remarks did not represent a change from the status quo and the U.S. position of [[Policy of deliberate ambiguity|strategic ambiguity]].<ref>{{Cite news |date=2022-07-05 |title=Biden's Words on Taiwan Leave Allies in an Awkward Spot - The New York Times |newspaper=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/24/world/asia/biden-taiwan-china-australia.html |access-date=2022-07-05 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220705203130/https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/24/world/asia/biden-taiwan-china-australia.html |archive-date=5 July 2022 |last1=Kanno-Youngs |first1=Zolan }}</ref> Secretary of State [[Antony Blinken]] also delivered a speech in which he stated that U.S. policy regarding the island had not changed, and the State Department updated its fact sheet to reinstate a line stating "we do not support Taiwan independence."<ref>{{Cite web |last= |first= |date=2022-06-04 |title=U.S. updates Taiwan fact sheet again to say it does not support independence |url=https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/06/04/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/us-state-department-taiwan-independence/ |access-date=2022-07-05 |website=The Japan Times |language=en-US |archive-date=6 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220706000953/https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/06/04/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/us-state-department-taiwan-independence/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2022-07-05 |title=U.S. Relations With Taiwan - United States Department of State |url=https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/ |access-date=2022-07-05 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220705202907/https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/ |archive-date=5 July 2022 }}</ref>