Editing Omnipotence paradox (section)

== Other versions of the paradox ==
In the 6th century, [[Pseudo-Dionysius]] claims that a version of the omnipotence paradox constituted the dispute between [[Paul the Apostle]] and [[Elymas]] the Magician mentioned in [[Acts 13]]:8, but it is phrased in terms of a debate as to whether God can "deny himself" a'la 2 Tim 2:13.<ref name = "psd">[[Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite|Pseudo-Dionysius]], "Divine Names" 893B in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works. trans Colm Luibheid Paulist Press. 1987. {{ISBN|0-8091-2838-1}}</ref> In the 11th century, [[Anselm of Canterbury]] argues that there are many things that God cannot do, but that nonetheless he counts as omnipotent.<ref name="anselm">Anselm of Canterbury Proslogion Chap. VII, in The Power of God: readings on Omnipotence and Evil. Linwood Urban and Douglass Walton eds. Oxford University Press 1978 pp. 35–36</ref>

[[Thomas Aquinas]] advanced a version of the omnipotence paradox by asking whether God could create a triangle with internal angles that did not add up to 180 degrees. As Aquinas put it in ''[[Summa contra Gentiles]]'':

<blockquote>Since the principles of certain sciences, such as logic, geometry and arithmetic are taken only from the formal principles of things, on which the essence of the thing depends, it follows that God could not make things contrary to these principles. For example, that a genus was not predicable of the species, or that lines drawn from the centre to the circumference were not equal, or that a triangle did not have three angles equal to two right angles.<ref>"Cum principia quarundam scientiarum, ut logicae, geometriae et arithmeticae, sumantur ex solis principiis formalibus rerum, ex quibus essentia rei dependet, sequitur quod contraria horum principiorum Deus facere non possit: sicut quod genus non sit praedicabile de specie; vel quod lineae ductae a centro ad circumferentiam non sint aequales; aut quod triangulus rectilineus non habeat tres angulos aequales duobus rectis". Aquinas, T. ''Summa Contra Gentiles'', Book 2, Section 25. trans. Edward Buckner</ref></blockquote>

This can be done on a sphere, and not on a flat surface. The later invention of [[non-Euclidean geometry]] does not resolve this question; for one might as well ask, "If given the axioms of [[elliptic geometry|Riemannian geometry]], can an omnipotent being create a triangle whose angles ''do not'' add up to ''more'' than 180 degrees?" In either case, the real question is whether an omnipotent being would have the ability to evade consequences that follow logically from a system of axioms that the being created.

A version of the paradox can also be seen in non-theological contexts. A similar problem occurs when accessing legislative or [[parliamentary sovereignty]], which holds a specific legal institution to be omnipotent in legal power, and in particular such an institution's ability to regulate itself.<ref>Suber, P. (1990) [http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/psa/sec01.htm#C ''The Paradox of Self-Amendment: A Study of Law, Logic, Omnipotence, and Change''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100528173857/http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/psa/sec01.htm#C |date=2010-05-28 }}. Peter Lang Publishing</ref>

In a sense, the classic statement of the omnipotence paradox—a rock so heavy that its omnipotent creator cannot lift it—is grounded in [[Aristotelianism|Aristotelian]] science. After all, if we consider the stone's position relative to the sun the planet orbits around, one could hold that the stone is ''constantly'' lifted—strained though that interpretation would be in the present context. Modern physics indicates that the choice of phrasing about lifting stones should relate to acceleration; however, this does not in itself of course invalidate the fundamental concept of the generalized omnipotence paradox. However, one could easily modify the classic statement as follows: "An omnipotent being creates a [[universe]] that follows the laws of [[Aristotelian physics]]. Within this universe, can the omnipotent being create a stone so heavy that the being cannot lift it?"

[[Ethan Allen]]'s ''Reason'' addresses the topics of [[original sin]], [[theodicy]] and several others in classic [[Age of Enlightenment]] fashion.<ref name = "allen">[[Ethan Allen|Allen, Ethan]]. [http://libertyonline.hypermall.com/allen-reason.html ''Reason: The Only Oracle of Man.''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100114084738/http://libertyonline.hypermall.com/allen-reason.html |date=2010-01-14 }} J.P. Mendum, Cornill; 1854. Originally published 1784. (Accessed on 19 April 2006)</ref> In Chapter 3, section IV, he notes that "omnipotence itself" could not exempt animal life from mortality, since change and death are defining attributes of such life. He argues, "the one cannot be without the other, any more than there could be a compact number of mountains without valleys, or that I could exist and not exist at the same time, or that God should effect any other contradiction in nature". Labeled by his friends a [[Deism|Deist]], Allen accepted the notion of a divine being, though throughout ''Reason'' he argues that even a divine being must be circumscribed by logic.

In ''[[Principles of Philosophy]],'' [[Descartes]] tried refuting the existence of atoms with a variation of this argument, claiming God could not create things so indivisible that he could not divide them.{{cn|date=May 2025}}