Editing Nuclear proliferation (section)

===Additional Protocol===
In 1993 a program was initiated to strengthen and extend the classical safeguards system, and a model protocol was agreed by the [[Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency|IAEA Board of Governors]] 1997. The measures boosted the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, including those with no connection to the civil fuel cycle.

Innovations were of two kinds. Some could be implemented on the basis of IAEA's existing legal authority through safeguards agreements and inspections. Others required further legal authority to be conferred through an '''Additional Protocol'''. This must be agreed by each non-weapons state with IAEA, as a supplement to any existing comprehensive safeguards agreement. Weapons states have agreed to accept the principles of the model additional protocol.

Key elements of the model Additional Protocol:
* The IAEA is to be given considerably more information on nuclear and nuclear-related activities, including R & D, production of uranium and [[thorium]] (regardless of whether it is traded), and nuclear-related imports and exports.
* IAEA inspectors will have greater rights of access. This will include any suspect location, it can be at short notice (e.g., two hours), and the IAEA can deploy environmental sampling and remote monitoring techniques to detect illicit activities.
* States must streamline administrative procedures so that IAEA inspectors get automatic visa renewal and can communicate more readily with IAEA headquarters.
* Further evolution of safeguards is towards evaluation of each state, taking account of its particular situation and the kind of nuclear materials it has. This will involve greater judgement on the part of IAEA and the development of effective methodologies which reassure NPT States.

As of 3 July 2015, 146 countries have signed the Additional Protocols and 126 have brought them into force.  The IAEA is also applying the measures of the Additional Protocol in Taiwan.<ref name=iaea-add-protocols>{{cite web|url=https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/safeguards-legal-framework/additional-protocol/status-of-additional-protocol|title=Status of the Additional Protocol|date=11 June 2015|access-date=27 August 2015|archive-date=5 September 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150905104739/https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/safeguards-legal-framework/additional-protocol/status-of-additional-protocol|url-status=live}}</ref> Under the [[Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]], [[Nuclear program of Iran|Iran]] has agreed to implement its protocol provisionally.  Among the leading countries that have not signed the Additional Protocol are Egypt, which says it will not sign until Israel accepts comprehensive IAEA safeguards,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Egypt/Nuclear/chronology_2008.html|title=NTI Egypt Profile|access-date=22 November 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081012145648/http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Egypt/Nuclear/chronology_2008.html|archive-date=12 October 2008|url-status=dead}}</ref> and Brazil, which opposes making the protocol a requirement for international cooperation on enrichment and reprocessing,<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.economist.com/research/backgrounders/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12516611|title=When nuclear sheriffs quarrel|date=30 October 2008|newspaper=The Economist}}</ref> but has not ruled out signing.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/36801.htm|title=Technical Difficulties|website=2001-2009.state.gov|access-date=23 May 2019|archive-date=24 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201024144215/https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/36801.htm|url-status=live}}</ref>