Editing Nihilism (section)

=== Skepticism ===
{{main|Philosophical skepticism#Epistemological skepticism}}
While relativist versions of epistemological nihilism allow that knowledge exists relative to a perspective, skeptic versions deny the existence of knowledge in general.{{efn|Some philosophers, such as [[Karen L. Carr]], distinguish epistemological nihilism from skepticism and relativism. According to this interpretation, skepticism and relativism imply uncertainty about the existence of knowledge and objectivity, recommending the suspension of judgment. Epistemological nihilism, by contrast, firmly asserts that knowledge or objectivity do not exist.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carr|1992|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_i2VZYYYp-gC&pg=PA20 20–21]}} | {{harvnb|Dowdall|2024|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=bXL6EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA29 29]}} }}</ref>}} Also called ''radical skepticism'', this view argues that there is no foundation or justification of knowledge claims. Unlike more moderate forms of skepticism, it questions even the most reasonable knowledge claims grounded in basic common sense.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=vwZ9wgEACAAJ&pg=PA33 33]}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|pp=671, 673}} | {{harvnb|Bunnin|Yu|2009|p=472}} | {{harvnb|Kyriacou|Wallbridge|2021|pp=1–2}} }}</ref> A closely related form of epistemological nihilism, sometimes called ''alethiological nihilism'', centers on truth rather than knowledge, stating that truth does not exist.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Cuneo|2007|pp=115–116}} | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|p=5}} }}</ref>

One argument in favor of radical skepticism asserts that absolute certainty is required for knowledge. It attempts to show that [[doubt]] can never be fully expelled.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Fallibilism''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Fallibilism''"|loc=§ 8. Implications of Fallibilism: No Knowledge?}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}} }}</ref> For example, the [[dream argument]], suggested by philosophers such as [[René Descartes]], points out that, while [[dream]]ing, people usually cannot distinguish between the [[illusion]]ary dream and factual reality. Based on this observation, it argues that there is no knowledge since an individual can never be certain that they are not currently dreaming.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Windt|2021|loc=§ 1.1 Cartesian Dream Skepticism}} | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 8. The Epistemic Principles and Scepticism}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|loc=§ 4. Sceptical Doubts About Knowing}} }}</ref> A related approach, articulated by philosophers such as [[Roderick Chisholm]], assumes that [[Problem of the criterion|a criterion]] is required to validate knowledge claims. Asserting that one cannot discern this criterion without already assuming some form of knowledge, it infers that knowledge is impossible.<ref>{{harvnb|McCain|loc=§ 1. The Problem, § 2. Chisholm on the Problem of the Criterion}}</ref>{{efn|[[Agrippa's trilemma]] present a similar conundrum for the existence of knowledge.<ref>{{harvnb|Klein|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1ETRCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA484 484–485]}}</ref>}}

Despite these arguments, radical skepticism is a rare position, accepted only by few philosophers and challenged by various criticisms. Its main influence stems from attempts by non-skeptical philosophers to prove that their theories overcome the challenge of skepticism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hookway|2005|p=838}} | {{harvnb|Comesaña|Klein|2024|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Kyriacou|Wallbridge|2021|pp=1–2}} }}</ref> Some objections state that radical skepticism is incoherent or self-refuting. For example, if there is no knowledge then skeptics cannot know that there is no knowledge, making it questionable why anyone should believe their theories.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|pp=671, 673}} | {{harvnb|Huemer|2001|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ccmNDGIiJ3IC&pg=PA27 27]}} }}</ref> Another counterargument asserts that the support for the existence of knowledge provided by common sense is more convincing than the abstract reasoning leading to skepticism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2024|loc=§ 6.2 Responses to the Closure Argument}} | {{harvnb|Reed|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=geSrCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA75 75]}} }}</ref>

Epistemological nihilism can lead to other forms of nihilism. For instance, the inability to discern the meaning of life can lead to the conclusion that there is no such meaning, resulting in existential nihilism.<ref>{{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}}</ref> [[Moral skepticism]], the view that there is no moral knowledge, can have a similar effect: the incapacity to distinguish right from wrong behavior can lead to the rejection of moral facts. Some theorists associate epistemological nihilism primarily with moral skepticism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Olson|2006|pp=618–619}} | {{harvnb|Cuneo|2007|pp=115–116}} }}</ref>