Editing Ngo Dinh Diem (section)

==Presidency (1955–1963)==
===Establishment of the Republic of Vietnam===
{{Main|1955 State of Vietnam referendum}}
[[File:VA066641 Referendum Diem v. Bao Dai 1955.jpg|thumb|Results of the 1955 referendum posted on [[Ho Chi Minh City Hall|Saigon City Hall]]]]
In South Vietnam, a referendum was scheduled for 23 October 1955 to determine the future direction of the south, in which the people would choose Diệm or Bảo Đại as the leader of [[South Vietnam]].{{sfn|Moyar|2006|p=54}} Diệm, with the support of his brother Ngô Đình Nhu and the Cần Lao Party, used an avid propaganda campaign to destroy Bảo Đại's reputation and garner support for Diem. Supporters of Bảo Đại were not allowed to campaign, and were physically attacked by Nhu's workers.<ref name="karnow55" /> Official results showed 98.2 per cent of voters favoured Diệm, an implausibly high result that was condemned as fraudulent. The total number of votes far exceeded the number of registered voters by over 380,000, further evidence that the referendum was heavily rigged.<ref name="karnow55">{{harvnb|Karnow|1997|pp= 223–224}}</ref>{{sfn|Jacobs|2006|p=95}} For example, only 450,000 voters were registered in Saigon, but 605,025 were said to have voted for Diệm.<ref name="karnow55" />{{sfn|Jacobs|2006|p=95}}
 
[[File:Ap540721012 geneva conference 1954.jpg|alt=Representatives meeting at the 1954 Geneva Accords|left|thumb|Representatives meeting at the [[Geneva Accords (1954)|1954 Geneva Accords]]]]
On 26 October 1955, Diệm proclaimed the formation of the Republic of Vietnam, with himself as its first President until 26 October 1956. The first Constitution provided articles to establish the republic and organize the election of its president.<ref name="Grant">{{cite journal|title=The Viet Nam Constitution of 1956|first=J. A. C.|last= Grant|date=June 1958| url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/viet-nam-constitution-of-1956/59720690F963611C93A9DA2E40CF4350=|journal=[[American Political Science Review]]|volume=52|issue=2|pages=437–462|access-date=28 October 2022|doi=10.2307/1952326|jstor=1952326 |s2cid=143647818 }}</ref> The 1954 Geneva Accords prescribed elections to reunify the country in 1956. Diệm refused to hold these elections, claiming that a free election was not possible in the North<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=KaootJV5BR4C&dq=Unheralded+victory+Poland&pg=PA8 |title=Unheralded Victory: The Defeat of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army, 1961–1973|first=Mark|last= William Woodruff|year=2005|publisher=[[Random House]]|isbn=978-0891418665}}</ref> and that since the previous State of Vietnam had not signed the accords, they were not bound by it.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://mcfarlandbooks.com/product/vietnamese-communists-relations-with-china-and-the-second-indochina-conflict-1956-1962/|title=Vietnamese Communists' Relations with China and the Second Indochina War (1956–62)|first=Ang|last= Cheng Guan|date=1997| publisher=[[McFarland & Company]]| page=11|isbn=0-7864-0404-3}}</ref> Diệm claimed his government had the legal right to refuse the general elections, because the State of Vietnam had been recognized by France as a fully sovereign state within the French Union on 4 June 1954 and the country became independent from the treaties signed by France.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Turner |first=Robert F. |title=Vietnamese Communism: Its Origins and Development |publisher=[[Hoover Institution|Hoover Institution Publications]] |year=1975 |isbn=978-0-8179-1431-8 |location=Stanford|p=93}}</ref> According to historian [[Keith Taylor (historian)|Keith Taylor]], Diệm's rejection of the Geneva Accords was a way of objecting to the French colonization of Vietnam, while at the same time expressing his opinion of Bảo Đại, and the establishment of the First Republic of Vietnam served to assert Vietnamese independence from France.{{sfn|Taylor|2015|p=6}} At the same time, the first Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam was promulgated. According to the Constitution, the President was granted an inordinate amount of power, and his governing style became increasingly authoritarian over time.{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=137}}
 
Diệm's rule was [[authoritarian]] and [[nepotism|nepotistic]]. His most trusted official was his brother Nhu, leader of the primary pro-Diệm party, the Cần Lao Party. Nhu was an [[opium]] addict and admirer of [[Adolf Hitler]]. He modeled the Cần Lao secret police's marching style and torture styles on Nazi methodology.{{sfn|Olson|1996|p=65}} Cẩn, another brother, was put in charge of the former Imperial City of Huế. Although neither Cẩn nor Nhu held any official role in the government, they ruled their regions of South Vietnam absolutely, commanding private armies and secret police forces. Diệm's youngest brother Luyện was appointed Ambassador to the United Kingdom. His elder brother, Ngô Đình Thục, was [[Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Huế|Archbishop of Huế]]. Despite this, Thuc lived in the Presidential Palace, along with Nhu, Nhu's wife, and Diệm. Diệm was [[Nationalism|nationalistic]], devoutly Catholic, [[anti-Communist]], and preferred the philosophies of [[personalism]] and [[Confucianism]].{{sfn|Karnow|1997|p=326}}{{sfn|Moyar|2006|p=36}}
 
[[File:Presidential Standard of South Vietnam (1955–1963).svg|thumb|Presidential Standard of South Vietnam (1955–1963)]]
Diệm's rule was also pervaded by family corruption. Cẩn was widely believed to be involved in several illegal operations, namely the illegal smuggling of [[rice]] to North Vietnam on the black market, the opium trade via [[Laos]], in monopolizing the [[cinnamon]] trade, and amassing a fortune in foreign banks.{{sfn|Buttinger|1967|p=954-955}}{{sfn|Langguth|2000|p=258}} With Nhu, Cẩn competed for U.S. contracts and rice trade.{{sfn|Karnow|1997|p= 246}} Thuc, the most powerful religious leader in the country, was allowed to solicit "voluntary contributions to the Church" from Saigon businessmen, which was likened to "tax notices."{{sfn|Jacobs|2006|p=89}} Thuc also used his position to acquire farms, businesses, urban real estate, rental property, and rubber plantations in the name of the Catholic Church. He also used [[Army of the Republic of Vietnam]] (ARVN) personnel to work on his timber and construction projects. The Nhus amassed a fortune by running numbers and lottery rackets, manipulating currency and extorting money from Saigon businesses, while Luyen became a multimillionaire by speculating in [[Piastre]]s and [[British Pounds|Pounds]] on the currency exchange using inside government information.{{sfn|Olson|1996|p=98}}
 
However, Miller wrote that Diệm also clamped down on corruption.{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=152}} South Vietnam was divided into colonial-era provinces, of which governors enjoyed sweeping powers and firmly controlled local administrations, creating a problem of corruption and cronyism. The governors were seen as petty tyrants, and Diệm launched corruption probes while also replacing many of the governors. However, starting in 1954, the political turmoil prevented him from taking further measures.{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=152}} The MSUG, an American advisory body created to aid the Diệm's regime, recommended that Diệm centralize power by abolishing local administrations and reforming the existing ones into much larger "areas", with much less power and no financial autonomy. Diệm objected to abolishing the position of province chiefs, arguing that only local governments could address "the needs of local people" as he believed that requiring fiscal self-sufficiency from the local governments was key to creating the "ethos of mutual responsibility" – a key concept in Diệm's communitarian interpretation of democracy.{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=155}}
 
The Cần Lao Party played a key role in Diệm's regime, often acting as much more than a tool of political organization. Initially, the party acted secretly based on a network of cells, and each member only knew the identities of a few other members. When necessary, the Party could assume the role of the government. After 1954, the existence of the party was recognized, but its activities were hidden from public view. In the early 1950s, Diệm and Nhu used the party to mobilize support for Diệm's political movements. According to the Republic of Vietnam decree 116/BNV/CT, the Cần Lao Party was established on 2 September 1954. Personalism, as part of [[Person Dignity Theory]], officially became the basic doctrine of Diệm's regime, reflected in the Constitution's preface, which declared that "Building Politics, Economy, Society, Culture for the people based on respecting Personalism".<ref>Nguyễn, Xuân Hoài (2011). ''Chế độ Việt Nam cộng hòa ở miền Nam Việt Nam giai đoạn 1955–1963 Republic of Vietnam regime in South Vietnam (1955–1963), Dissertation''. Ho Chi Minh city: University of Social Sciences and Humanities – Ho Chi Minh city. pp. 43–47.</ref>
 
=== Elections ===
{{see also|1956 South Vietnamese Constitutional Assembly election|1959 South Vietnamese parliamentary election}}
[[File:Ngô Đình Diệm voting in 1959 South Vietnamese parliamentary election, August 30th 1959.jpg|thumb|Diệm (right) voting in the [[1959 South Vietnamese parliamentary election|1959 parliamentary election]]|left]]
According to Miller, democracy, to Diệm, was rooted in his dual identity as Confucian and Catholic, and was associated with [[communitarianism]] and the doctrine of Personalism. He defined democracy as "a social ethos based on certain sense of moral duty", not in the U.S. sense of "political right" or political pluralism and in the context of an Asian country like Vietnam, Confucian and Catholic values were relevant to deal with contemporary problems in politics, governance, and social change. In this sense, Diệm was not a reactionary mandarin lacking an interest in democracy as he has been portrayed by some scholars. His way of thinking about democracy became a key factor of his approach to political and administrative reform.{{sfn|Miller|2013|pp=137-139}} Diệm argued that post-colonial Vietnam must be a democratic country, but noted that Vietnamese democracy should develop out of its precolonial models, rather than European and American concepts, arguing that Vietnamese "institutions, customs and the principles underlying them are democratic facts."{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=136}} Researching the [[Nguyễn dynasty]], Diệm asserted that the moral norm of Nguyễn-era Vietnam was that it was founded "on the people", following the Confucian concept of [[Mandate of Heaven]]; people could and often did withdraw their support from unpopular monarchs, causing their downfall. Diệm considered it an "indigenous Vietnamese democratic tradition" and wished to make it the basis of democracy that would emerge in Vietnam.{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=139}}
 
Diệm's ideology of personalism was largely influenced by the Confucian notion that self-improvement meant cooperation with one's local community and society at large; he thought that there is a tension between individual's personal ambitions and community's ethos of mutual responsibility. Inspired by the writings of Catholic philosopher [[Emmanuel Mounier]], Diệm considered his ideology of personalism a "third way" of communitarianism, presenting an alternative to both [[individualism]] and [[Bureaucratic collectivism|collectivism]], insisting that democracy couldn't be realised "by drafting and promulgating documents and regulations", but that civil liberties granted by democratic regime to its citizens should serve "collective social improvement", serving each person's community rather than the individual itself.{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=138}}
 
In 1955, Diệm wrote that "democracy is primarily a state of mind, a way of living that respects the human person, both with regard to ourselves and with regard to others" and that "more than any other form of government, democracy demands that we all display wisdom and virtue in our dealings with each other." In 1956, Diem added that democracy had to foster a feeling of community and mutual responsibility, arguing that respect for democracy lays in "decency in social relations", thus defining Vietnamese democracy as inherently communitarian and not individualist.{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=139}}
[[File:President Ngo dinh Diem taking the oath as First President of the Republic of Viet Nam on Constitution Promulgation Day (26 October 1956).jpg|alt=Diệm taking the oath as First President of the Republic of Vietnam|thumb|271x271px|Diệm taking the oath as First President of the [[South Vietnam|Republic of Vietnam]]]]
In summer and fall of 1955, Diệm's administration had to decide the fate of the former emperor Bảo Đại. Bảo Đại was initially supposed to remain the head of state until the National Assembly elections, but Diệm's cabinet decided to decide the monarch's fate through a referendum. Miller highlights that despite the popular belief that the referendum was put forward by [[Edward Lansdale]], it was Diệm who decided to organise the referendum as a way to burnish his democratic credentials and attempt to realise his democratic ideas. While the monarch was highly unpopular given his collaboration with the French colonial regime, the new government committed to further diminishing Đại's reputation with aggressive smear campaign and large pro-rallies. Additionally, the referendum itself was considered non-secret, given that the voters were given ballots with the photos of Diệm and Bảo Đại on it and were supposed to tear it in half and deposit the slice with their preferred candidate into the box – this made one's choice visible to everyone.{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=141}} Miller notes that the referendum reveals the eccentric nature of Diệm's understanding of democracy – in the sense of [[pluralist democracy|political pluralism]], the vote appeared inherently authoritarian; but to Diệm his margin appeared legitimate, as he described democracy as "state of mind" in which the people elect the morally superior leader. Thus Diệm was "adamant that the outcome was entirely consistent with his view of democracy as the citizenry's embrace of a common moral ethos".{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=142}}
 
On 4 March 1956, the elections for the first National Assembly were held. These elections were considerably more free and fair than the referendum, and some governmental candidates would highly contest with independents and oppositionist candidates for their seats, according to Miller. On this occasion, non-government candidates were allowed to campaign and the election had an atmosphere of legitimate pluralism, but the government retained the right to ban candidates deemed to be linked to the communists or other 'rebel' groups, and campaign material was screened. However, Miller notes that in some districts the opposition candidates withdrew due to police intimidation and military presence.{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=144}} Surprisingly, instead of letting the draft constitution be created by a handpicked commission, Diệm dissolved it and had the constitution be made by the National Assembly deputies instead. The government hailed the process as democratic and transparent, given how the Assembly meetings were open and media presence was allowed; the National Revolutionary Movement dominated the council, but a handful of opposition figures had won seats as well.<ref name="Grant"/>
 
However, Diệm's regime of "democratic one man rule" faced increasing difficulties. After coming under pressure from within Vietnam and from the United States, Diệm agreed to hold legislative elections in August 1959 for South Vietnam. However, in reality, newspapers were not allowed to publish names of independent candidates or their policies, and political meetings exceeding five people were prohibited. Candidates who ran against government-supported opponents faced harassment and intimidation. In rural areas, candidates who ran were threatened using charges of conspiracy with the Việt Cộng, which carried the death penalty. [[Phan Quang Đán]], the government's most prominent critic, was allowed to run. Despite the deployment of 8,000 [[ARVN]] plainclothes troops into his district to vote, Đán still won by a ratio of six to one. The busing of soldiers to vote for regime approved candidates occurred across the country. When the new assembly convened, Đán was arrested.{{sfn|Jacobs|2006|pp=112-115}}
 
[[File:Lbj diem nolting.jpg|thumb|Diệm with U.S. Vice President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] and Ambassador [[Frederick Nolting]] in 1961|left]]
In May 1961, U.S. Vice President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] visited Saigon and enthusiastically declared Diệm the "[[Winston Churchill]] of Asia". When asked why he had made the comment, Johnson replied, "Diệm's the only boy we got out there." Johnson assured Diệm of more aid in molding a fighting force that could resist the communists.{{sfn|Jacobs|2006|pp=123-125}}
 
===Socio-economic policies===
During his presidency, Diệm imposed programs to reform Saigon society in accordance with Catholic and Confucian values. Brothels and opium dens were closed, divorce and abortion were made illegal, and adultery laws were strengthened.{{sfn|Kolko|1994|p=89}} Additionally, Diệm's government established many schools and universities, such as the [[National Technical Center (Vietnam)|National Technical Center]] at Phú Thọ in 1957, the [[Ho Chi Minh City University of Science|University of Saigon]] (1956), the [[Huế University|University of Hue]] (1957), and the [[Dalat University|University of Dalat]] (1957).<ref>{{Cite web |date=6 July 2016 |title=Trường Đại Học Khoa Học Tự Nhiên TP Hồ Chí Minh - Lịch sử phát triển |url=http://www.hcmus.edu.vn/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=546&Itemid=88 |access-date=30 August 2023 |archive-date=6 July 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160706180940/http://www.hcmus.edu.vn/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=546&Itemid=88 |url-status=bot: unknown }}</ref>
 
===Rural development===
Diệm hoped to develop a national, revolutionary spirit within the citizens of South Vietnam as well as a vibrant communal democracy and an independent, non-communist Vietnam. He saw the peasantry as the key to this nation-building as he believed the peasantry was more likely to put the country before their own self interest in a spirit of volunteerism. A Special Commissariat for Civic Action was established to extend the reach of the Saigon government into rural areas and to help create 'model villages' to show rural peasants that the South Vietnamese government was viable as well as allowing citizen volunteers, and experts, to help these communities develop and tie them to the nation. The Special Commissariat for Civic Action was considered a practical tool of Diệm's government to serve "the power vacuum", and be a force of influence for Diệm's government, in the rural countryside following the departure of Việt Minh cadres after the Geneva Accords (1954).<ref name="Civic Action"/>
 
Geoffrey C. Stewart's study provides a clearer picture of Diệm's domestic policies and a further understanding of his government's efforts in reaching and connecting with local communities in South Vietnam that shows "an indigenous initiative" of the government in building an independent and viable nation.<ref name="Civic Action">{{cite journal|title= Hearts, Minds and Công Dân Vụ: The Special Commissariat for Civic Action and Nation Building in Ngô Đình Diệm's Vietnam, 1955–1957|last= Stewart|first= Geoffrey C.|date= 2011|journal= Journal of Vietnamese Studies |volume=6 |issue=3 |page=44|doi= 10.1525/vs.2011.6.3.44}}</ref>
[[File:NARA 111-CCV-221-CC33513 Vietnamese farmers working in fields guarded by ROK Marines 1966.jpg|alt=Vietnamese farmers in Tuy Hoa, 1966.|thumb|[[Agriculture in Vietnam|Vietnamese farmers]] in [[Tuy Hòa|Tuy Hoa]], 1966.]]
'''Land Reform''' In South Vietnam, especially in [[Mekong Delta]], landholdings in rural areas were concentrated in small number of rich landlord families. Thus, it was urgent to implement land reform in South Vietnam. Diệm had two attempts to control the excesses of the land tenancy system by promulgating the Ordinance 2 on 28 January 1955 to reduce land rent between 15% and 25% of the average harvest and the Ordinance 7 on 5 February 1955 to protect the rights of tenants on new and abandoned land and enhancing cultivation. In October 1956, with the urge from [[Wolf Ladejinsky]], Diệm's personal adviser on agrarian reform, Diệm promulgated a more serious ordinance on the land reform, in which he proclaimed a "land to the tiller" (not to be confused with other [[Land reform in South Vietnam]] like [[Nguyễn Văn Thiệu]]'s later 'Land to the Tiller" program) program to put a relatively high 100 hectares limit on rice land and 15 hectares for ancestral worship.{{sfn|Trần Quang Minh|2015|p=54}}
 
However, this measure had no real effect because many landlords evaded the redistribution by transferring the property to the name of family members. Besides, during the 1946–54 war against the French Union forces, the Việt Minh had gained control of parts of southern Vietnam, initiated land reform, confiscated landlords' land and distributed it to the peasants.<ref>{{cite book|title= The Vietnam Wars|last= Young|first= Marilyn B.|publisher= HarperPerennial|year= 1991|isbn= 0-06-016553-7|location= New York|pages= 56–57}}</ref> Additionally, the ceiling limit was more than 30 times that allowed in Japan, [[South Korea]], and [[Taiwan]], and the 370,000 acres (1,500&nbsp;km<sup>2</sup>) of the Catholic Church's landownings in Vietnam were exempted. The political, social, and economic influences of the land reform was minimal.{{sfn|Trần Quang Minh|2015|p=53}} From 1957 to 1963, only 50 percent of expropriated land was redistributed, and only 100,000 out of approximately one million tenant farmers in South Vietnam benefited from the reform.{{sfn|Trần Quang Minh|2015|p=54}} Farmers were required to pay for land they acquired under the program, and the program was riddled with corruption and inefficiency.<ref>Tucker, Spencer C., Ed. (1998), ''Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War'', Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 219</ref>
 
Support for the Vietcong was driven by resentment of Diem's reversal of Viet Minh land reforms in the countryside. The Viet Minh had confiscated large private landholdings, reduced rents and debts, and leased communal lands, mostly to poorer peasants. Diem brought the landlords back, people who had been farming land for years had to return it to landlords and pay years of back rent. [[Marilyn B. Young]] wrote that "The divisions within villages reproduced those that had existed against the French: 75% support for the Vietcong, 20% trying to remain neutral and only 5% firmly pro-Saigon government".<ref name="Young">{{Cite book |last=Young |first=Marilyn |url=https://archive.org/details/vietnamwars194510000youn |title=The Vietnam Wars: 1945–1990 |date=1991 |publisher=Harper Perennial |isbn=978-0-06-092107-1 |url-access=registration}}</ref>
 
'''Resettlement''' According to Miller, Diệm, who described tenant farmers as a "real proletariat" and pursued the goal of "middle peasantization", was not a beholden to large landowners, instead of vigorously implementing Land Reform, Diệm had his own vision in Vietnamese rural development based on resettlement, which focused on redistribution of people (rather than land), could reduce overpopulation and lead to many benefits in socio-economic transformation as well as military affairs and security, especially anti-communist infiltration. Moreover, Diệm was ambitious to envision Resettlement as a tactic to practice the government's ideological goals. The differences between the US and Diệm over nation building in countryside shaped the clashes in their alliance.{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=160}}
 
The [[Cái Sắn]] resettlement project: In late 1955, with the help of US material support and expertise, Diệm's government implemented the project Cái Sắn in [[An Giang province]], which aimed to resettle one hundred thousand northern refugees.<ref name=":6">{{harvnb|Miller|2013|pp=165-184}}</ref>
 
'''Land Development program''' (''Khu dinh điền''): In early 1957, Diệm started a new program called the ''Land Development'' to relocate poor inhabitants, demobilized soldiers, and minority ethnic groups in central and southern Vietnam into abandoned or unused land in Mekong Delta and Central Highlands, and cultivating technological and scientific achievements to transform South Vietnam and ensure security and prevent communist infiltration. Diệm believed that the program would help improve civilians' lives, teach them the values of being self-reliant and hard working. At the end of 1963, the program had built more than two hundred settlements for a quarter of a million people. Nevertheless, the lacks of conditions in these areas along with the corruption and mercilessness of local officials failed the program.<ref name=":6"/>
[[File:President Diem is welcomed by monks and village elders.jpg|left|thumb|297x297px|Diem (center right) is welcomed by [[monk]]s and [[Elder (administrative title)|village elders]] in central Vietnam.]]
'''Agroville program''' (''khu trù mật''): During late 1959 and early 1960, motivated by the idea of population reunification, Diệm introduced the [[Strategic Hamlet Program|Agroville Program]], which he intended to physically relocate residents who lived in remote and isolated regions in Mekong delta into new settlements in "dense and prosperous areas"{{snd}}proposing to offer them urban modernity and amenities without leaving their farms, and to keep them far away from the communists. Nonetheless, by late 1960, Diệm had to admit that the program's objective failed since the residents were not happy with the program and the communists infiltrated it, and he had to discard it.<ref name=":6" />
 
According to Miller, the disagreement between the US and Diệm over agrarian reform made their alliance "move steadily from bad to worse".<ref name=":6" /> Miller argues that Diệm wished to support poor peasantry by gradual modernisation and moderate redistribution of land. Diệm wanted to acquire and distribute the land of rich landowners, but also wished to protect the property of middle-landlords.{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=161}} One of the main concerns of Diệm was overpopulation, aggravated by the mass migration of refugees from the North, something that Diệm wished to alleviate by resettlement. Diệm considered resettlement an important part of his economic nationalism, arguing that utilising Vietnamese land would increase the production of grains and rubber and allow South Vietnam to enter international trade. Ideologically, Diệm considered this policy a key to his "Personalist revolution" – the resettled villages would be "neither communist-style collectives nor incubators of rugged individualism", but they would rather conform to his ideal of communitarianism. Rendering landless peasants freeholders was seen as a step towards reforming the Vietnamese society as a whole.{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=163}}
 
In late 1955, a Cai San Project was launched that aimed to settle northern refugees in rural areas previously occupied by Hòa Hảo partisans. This project created an intense social conflict between the settlers and Cai San natives, and Diệm offered a concession to the local landowners by decreeing that refugees must sign rental contracts with them. This sparked refugee demonstrations that only started to fade away when Diệm ordered that refugees have the right to buy out the land they worked at.{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=169}} While initially considered a failure, especially due to the fact that the resettlement sparked anti-government sentiment and created social conflicts, Miller notes that Cai San became fairly prosperous by 1960, and the settlement did gradually evolve into a pro-government stronghold, thus succeeding in its aim at counter-insurgency. Many of the counter-insurgency programs progressed too quickly however, and ended up destabilising the regime.{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=170}} When Robert Thompson sent Filipino field operatives into local hamlet settlements, they reported that South Vietnamese peasants accepted [[Viet Cong]] claims that “America had replaced France as a colonial power in Vietnam”.<ref> Latham, Michael (2000). Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and 'Nation Building' in the Kennedy Era. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. p. 188.</ref>
 
===Counter-insurgency===
{{Main|1960 South Vietnamese coup attempt|1962 South Vietnamese Independence Palace bombing}}
During his presidency, Diệm strongly focused on his central concern: internal security to protect his regime as well as maintain order and social change: staunch anti-subversion and anti-rebellion policies. After the Bình Xuyên was defeated and the Hòa Hảo and Cao Đài were subdued, Diệm concentrated on his most serious threat: the communists. Diệm's main measures for internal security were threats, punishment and intimidation.{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=187}} His regime countered North Vietnamese and communist subversion (including the assassination of over 450 South Vietnamese officials in 1956) by launching campaigns known as "Denounce the Communists". Tens of thousands of suspected communists were detained in "political re-education centers". The North Vietnamese government claimed that over 65,000 individuals were imprisoned and 2,148 killed in the process by November 1957.<ref>{{cite book|last=Turner|first=Robert F.|title=Vietnamese Communism: Its Origins and Development|year=1975|publisher=[[Hoover Institution]] Publications|isbn=978-0817964313|pages=174–178}}</ref> In a 1961 letter to the [[International Control Commission]], North Vietnamese general [[Võ Nguyên Giáp]] stated that each "Denounce the Communists" campaign had resulted in hundreds arrested, wounded or killed, sometimes thousands.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Vo |first=Nguyen Giap |title=We Open The File |publisher=Foreign Languages Publishing House (Hanoi)|page=36 |year=1961}}</ref> According to historian [[Gabriel Kolko]], from 1955 to by the end of 1958, 40,000 political prisoners had been jailed and many were executed.{{sfn|Kolko|1994|p=89}} Historian [[Guenter Lewy]] considers such figures exaggerated, stating that there were only 35,000 prisoners in total in South Vietnam during the period.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Lewy |first=Guenter |url=https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/America_in_Vietnam.html?id=LtDufIAplzkC&redir_esc=y |title=America in Vietnam |date=1980-05-29 |page=294–95|publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-987423-1 |language=en}}</ref>
 
By the end of 1959, Diệm was able to entirely control each family and the communists had to suffer their "darkest period" in their history. Membership declined by two thirds and they had almost no power in the countryside of South Vietnam.<ref>{{multiref|{{harvnb|Jacobs|2006|p=90}}|{{harvnb|Moyar|2006|pp = 85-86}}}}</ref> Diệm's repression extended beyond communists to anti-communist dissidents and anti-corruption [[whistleblowers]]. In 1956, after the "Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign", Diệm issued Ordinance No. 6, which placed anyone who was considered a threat to the state and public order in jail or house arrest.{{sfn|Jacobs|2006|pp=89-90}}
 
Nevertheless, Diệm's hard policies led to fear and resentment in many quarters in South Vietnam and negatively affected his relations with the US in terms of counter-insurgent methods.{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=187}} On 22 February 1957, when Diệm delivered a speech at an agricultural fair in [[Buôn Ma Thuột]], a communist named [[Hà Minh Tri]] attempted to assassinate the president. He approached Diệm and fired a pistol from close range, but missed, hitting the Secretary for Agrarian Reform's left arm. The weapon then jammed and security overpowered Tri before he was able to fire another shot. Diệm was unmoved by the incident.<ref name="Moyar, pp. 66–67">{{harvnb|Moyar|2006|pp= 66–67}}</ref> The assassination attempt was the desperate response of the communists to Diệm's relentless anti-communist policies.<ref name="Moyar, pp. 66–67"/>
 
As opposition to Diệm's rule in South Vietnam grew, a low-level insurgency began to take shape there in 1957. Finally, in January 1959, under pressure from southern communist cadres who were being successfully targeted by Diệm's secret police, Hanoi's [[Central Committee]] issued a secret resolution authorizing the use of armed insurgency in the South with supplies and troops from the North. On 20 December 1960, under instructions from Hanoi, southern communists established the [[Vietcong]] (VC) in order to overthrow the government of the south. On 11 November 1960, a failed [[1960 South Vietnamese coup attempt|coup attempt]] against Diệm was led by Lieutenant Colonel [[Vương Văn Đông]] and Colonel [[Nguyễn Chánh Thi]] of the ARVN [[Republic of Vietnam Airborne Division|Airborne Division]].{{sfn|Karnow|1997|p=252-253}} There was a further attempt to assassinate Diệm and his family in February 1962 when two air force officers{{snd}}acting in unison{{snd}}[[1962 South Vietnamese Independence Palace bombing|bombed the Presidential Palace]].{{sfn|Karnow|1997|p= 280-281}}{{sfn|Jacobs|2006|pp=131-132}}{{sfn|Moyar|2006|pp=151-152}}
 
[[File:Gvnhamlet.jpg|thumb|South Vietnamese "Strategic Hamlet"|229x229px]]
In 1962, the cornerstone of Diệm's counterinsurgency effort – the [[Strategic Hamlet Program]] (''Vietnamese:'' ''Ấp Chiến lược''), "the last and most ambitious of Diem's government's nation building schemes", was implemented, calling for the consolidation of 14,000 villages of South Vietnam into 11,000 secure hamlets, each with its own houses, schools, wells, and watchtowers supported by South Vietnamese government. The hamlets were intended to isolate the VC from the villages, their source for recruiting soldiers, supplies, and information, and to transform the countryside. In the end, because of many shortcomings, the Strategic Hamlet Program was not as successful as had been expected and was cancelled after the assassination of Diệm. However, according to Miller, the program created a remarkable turnabout in Diệm's regime in their war against communism.{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=247}} [[Frederick Nolting]] reported that Diệm named reestablishing control and security as his number one priority regarding the countryside. While appearing receptive to building an "infrastructure of democracy" in the rural areas, Diệm emphasised that it would have to wait until the conclusion of the war.{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=247}} However, the Strategic Hamlet Program was exposed as an almost complete failure in the aftermath of the [[1963 South Vietnamese coup|November 1, 1963 coup]] that left Diem murdered. US officials discovered, for example, that only 20% of the 8,600 hamlets that the Diem regime had reported "Complete" met the minimum American standards of security and readiness.<ref> Tucker, Spencer, The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History, ABC-CLIO, 2011, p. 1070</ref>

===Religious policies and the Buddhist crisis===
{{Main|Buddhist crisis}}{{See also|Huế Phật Đản shootings|Huế chemical attacks|Thích Quảng Đức|Xá Lợi Pagoda raids}}
By most estimates, Buddhism was followed by 70–90% of the population,<ref>[http://www.historynet.com/wars_conflicts/vietnam_war/3033916.html The 1966 Buddhist Crisis in South Vietnam] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080304102006/http://www.historynet.com/wars_conflicts/vietnam_war/3033916.html |date=4 March 2008 }} HistoryNet</ref>{{sfn|Gettleman|1966|pp=275-276, 366}}{{sfn|Moyar|2006|pp=215-216}}<ref>{{cite magazine| url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,874816-2,00.html | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070930041419/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,874816-2,00.html | url-status=dead | archive-date=30 September 2007 | magazine=Time | title=South Viet Nam: The Religious Crisis | date=14 June 1963 | access-date=20 May 2010}}</ref>{{sfn|Tucker|2001|pp=49, 291, 293}}{{sfn|Maclear|1981|p=63}}<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/doc125.htm |title=SNIE 53-2-63, "The Situation in South Vietnam, 10 July 1963<!-- Bot generated title --> |access-date=19 April 2007 |archive-date=9 November 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171109110224/https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/doc125.htm |url-status=dead }}</ref> though some estimates place it lower, and Buddhism was followed alongside other traditions such as [[Vietnamese folk religion]] and [[Taoism]].<ref name="Słowiak">{{cite journal |last1=Słowiak |first1=Jerema |title=Role of the Religion and Politico-Religious Organizations in the South Vietnam During Ngo Dinh Diem Period |journal=Nauki Społeczne |date=2017 |issue=16 |pages=109–124 |publisher=Zeszyty Naukowe Towarzystwa Doktorantów UJ |location=Kraków |url=https://depot.ceon.pl/bitstream/handle/123456789/13747/Jarema%20S%C5%82owiak%20Role%20of%20the%20Religion%20and%20Politico-Religious%20Organizations.pdf?isAllowed=y&sequence=1 |issn=2082-9213}}</ref>
 
Diem was widely regarded by historians as having pursued pro-Catholic policies that antagonized many Buddhists. Specifically, the government was regarded as being biased towards Catholics in public service and military promotions, as well as the allocation of land, business favors, and tax concessions.{{sfn|Tucker|2001|p=291}} Diệm allegedly once told a high-ranking officer, forgetting that he was a Buddhist, "Put your Catholic officers in sensitive places. They can be trusted."<ref name="Słowiak"/> Many officers in the ARVN converted to Catholicism in the belief that their military prospects depended on it.{{sfn|Gettleman|1966|pp=280-282}} The distribution of weapons to village self-defense militias intended to repel VC guerrillas saw weapons only given to Catholics. Some Buddhist villages converted en masse to Catholicism in order to receive aid or to avoid being forcibly resettled by Diệm's regime,{{sfn|Buttinger|1967|p=993}} with Buddhists in the army being denied promotion if they refused to convert to Catholicism.<ref name="sv">{{cite news|title=South Vietnam: Whose funeral pyre? |publisher=[[The New Republic]] |page=9| date=29 June 1963}}</ref> Some Catholic priests ran their own private armies,{{sfn|Warner|1964|p=210}} and in some areas forced conversions, looting, shelling, and demolition of [[pagoda]]s occurred.{{sfn|Fall|1967|p=199}} Słowiak argues that Diệm's favoritism towards Catholics was not a sign of corruption and nepotism, but that it was necessary for Diệm to favor people loyal towards him, given the precarious internal situation of Vietnam.<ref name="Słowiak"/>
[[File:Flag of Buddhism.svg|alt=Flag flown by Vietnamese buddhist during the protests.|thumb|231x231px|Flag flown by [[Buddhism in Vietnam|Vietnamese buddhists]] during the protests.]]
The Catholic Church was the largest landowner in the country, and the "private" status imposed on Buddhism by the French required official permission to conduct public Buddhist activities and was never repealed by Diệm.{{sfn|Karnow|1997|p= 294}} Catholics were also ''de facto'' exempt from the ''[[corvée]]'' labor that the government obliged all citizens to perform; US aid was disproportionately distributed to Catholic-majority villages.<ref name=j91>{{harvnb|Jacobs|2006|p=91}}</ref> The land owned by the Catholic Church was exempt from land reform.{{sfn|Buttinger|1967|p=933}} Under Diệm, the Catholic Church enjoyed special exemptions in property acquisition, and in 1959, Diệm dedicated his country to the [[Virgin Mary]].<ref name=j91/> The white and gold Vatican flag was regularly flown at all major public events in South Vietnam.<ref name="crusade">{{cite news|title=Diem's other crusade| date=22 June 1963|publisher=[[The New Republic]]|pages=5–6}}</ref> The newly constructed [[Hue University|Hue]] and Dalat universities were placed under Catholic authority to foster a Catholic-skewed academic environment.<ref name="diembudd">{{cite news|first=David |last=Halberstam| author-link=David Halberstam| title=Diệm and the Buddhists| work=[[New York Times]]| date=17 June 1963}}</ref> Nonetheless, Diệm had contributed to Buddhist communities in South Vietnam by giving them permission to carry out activities that were banned by the French and supported money for Buddhist schools, ceremonies, and building more pagodas. Among the eighteen members of Diệm's cabinet, there were five Catholics, five [[Confucian]]s, and eight Buddhists, including a vice-president and a foreign minister. Only three of the top nineteen military officials were Catholics.{{sfn|Moyar|2006|p=216}}
 
The regime's relations with the United States worsened during 1963, as discontent among South Vietnam's Buddhist majority was simultaneously heightened. In May, in the heavily Buddhist central city of Huế{{snd}}the seat of Diệm's elder brother as the local Catholic archbishop{{snd}}the Buddhist majority was prohibited from displaying [[Buddhist flag]]s during [[Vesak]] celebrations commemorating the [[Buddha's Birthday|birth of Gautama Buddha]] when the government cited a regulation prohibiting the display of non-government flags.{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=266}} A few days earlier, however, white and yellow Catholic [[papal flag]]s flew at the 25th anniversary commemoration of Ngô Đình Thục's elevation to the rank of bishop.{{sfn|Jarvis|2018|p=59}} According to Miller, Diệm then proclaimed the flag embargo because he was annoyed with the commemoration for Thục.{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=266}} However, the ban on religious flags led to a protest led by [[Thích Trí Quang]] against the government, which was suppressed by Diệm's forces, and unarmed civilians were killed in [[Huế Phật Đản shootings|the clash]]. Diệm and his supporters blamed the Việt Cộng for the deaths and claimed the protesters were responsible for the violence.{{sfn|Moyar|2006|pp=212-213}} Although the provincial chief expressed sorrow for the killings and offered to compensate the victims' families, they resolutely denied that government forces were responsible for the killings and blamed the Viet Cong. According to Diệm, it was the communists who threw a grenade into the crowd.{{sfn|Jacobs|2006|p=143}}
 
The Buddhists pushed for a five-point agreement: freedom to fly religious flags, an end to arbitrary arrests, compensation for the Huế victims, punishment for the officials responsible, and [[religious equality]]. Diệm then banned demonstrations and ordered his forces to arrest those who engaged in civil disobedience. On 3 June 1963, protesters attempted to march towards the [[Từ Đàm pagoda]]. Six waves of ARVN tear gas and attack dogs failed to disperse the crowds. Finally, brownish-red liquid chemicals [[Hue chemical attacks|were doused on praying protesters]], resulting in 67 being hospitalized for chemical injuries. A curfew was subsequently enacted.{{sfn|Jacobs|2006|p=145}}
[[File:Thích_Quảng_Đức_self-immolation.jpg|thumb|[[Buddhist monk]], [[Thích Quảng Đức]], set himself on fire in the middle of a busy Saigon intersection in protest of Diệm's policies|left|272x272px]]
The turning point came in June when a [[Buddhist monk]], [[Thích Quảng Đức]], set himself on fire in the middle of a busy Saigon intersection in protest of Diệm's policies; photos of this event were disseminated around the world, and for many people these pictures came to represent the failure of Diệm's government.{{sfn|Moyar|2006|p=220}} A number of other monks publicly [[self-immolated]], and the US grew increasingly frustrated with the unpopular leader's public image in both Vietnam and the United States. Diệm used his conventional anti-communist argument, identifying the dissenters as communists. As demonstrations against his government continued throughout the summer, the special forces loyal to Diệm's brother, Nhu, conducted an August raid of the [[Xá Lợi pagoda]] in Saigon. Pagodas were vandalized, monks beaten, and the cremated remains of Quảng Đức, which included his heart, a religious relic, were confiscated. [[Xá Lợi Pagoda raids|Simultaneous raids]] were carried out across the country, with the Từ Đàm pagoda in Huế looted, the statue of [[Gautama Buddha]] demolished, and the body of a deceased monk confiscated.{{sfn|Jacobs|2006|pp=147-154}} When the populace came to the defense of the monks, the resulting clashes saw 30 civilians killed and 200 wounded. In all 1,400 monks were arrested, and some thirty were injured across the country. The United States indicated its disapproval of Diệm's administration when ambassador [[Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.]] visited the pagoda. No further mass Buddhist protests occurred during the remainder of Diệm's rule.{{sfn|Moyar|2006|pp=212–216, 231–234}}
 
[[Madame Nhu]] Trần Lệ Xuân, Nhu's wife, inflamed the situation by mockingly applauding the suicides, stating, "If the Buddhists want to have another barbecue, I will be glad to supply the gasoline."{{sfn|Jacobs|2006|p=149}} The pagoda raids stoked widespread public disquiet in [[Saigon]]. Students at Saigon University boycotted classes and rioted, which led to arrests, imprisonments, and the closure of the university; this was repeated at Huế University. When high school students demonstrated, Diệm arrested them as well; over 1,000 students from Saigon's leading high school, most of them children of Saigon civil servants, were sent to re-education camps, including, reportedly, children as young as five, on charges of anti-government graffiti. Diệm's foreign minister [[Vũ Văn Mẫu]] resigned, shaving his head like a Buddhist monk in protest.{{sfn|Jacobs|2006|p=154}} When he attempted to leave the country on a religious pilgrimage to India, he was detained and kept under house arrest.{{sfn|Sheehan|1989|p=357}}
 
At the same time that the [[Buddhist crisis]] was taking place, a French diplomatic initiative to end the war had been launched. The initiative was known to historians as the "Maneli affair", after [[Mieczysław Maneli]], the Polish Commissioner to the International Control Commission who served as an intermediary between the two Vietnams. In 1963, North Vietnam was suffering its worst drought in a generation. Maneli conveyed messages between Hanoi and Saigon negotiating a declaration of a ceasefire in exchange for South Vietnamese rice being traded for North Vietnamese coal.{{sfn|Jacobs|2006|p=165}} On 2 September 1963, Maneli met with Nhu at his office in the Gia Long Palace, a meeting that Nhu leaked to the American columnist [[Joseph Alsop]], who revealed it to the world in his "A Matter of Fact" column in the ''Washington Post''.{{sfn|Langguth|2000|p=234}} Nhu's purpose in leaking the meeting was to blackmail the United States with the message that if Kennedy continued to criticize Diệm's handling of the Buddhist crisis, Diem would reach an understanding with the Communists. The Kennedy administration reacted with fury at what Alsop had revealed.<ref name="Karnow, p. 292">{{harvnb|Karnow|1997|p= 292}}</ref> In a message to Secretary of State [[Dean Rusk]], [[Roger Hilsman]] urged that a coup against Diệm be encouraged to take place promptly, saying that the mere possibility that Diệm might make a deal with the Communists meant that he had to go.<ref name="Karnow, p. 292"/>
 
There have been many interpretations of the Buddhist crisis and the immolation of Thích Quảng Đức in 1963. Relating the events to the larger context of [[Vietnamese Buddhism]] in the 20th century and looking at the interactions between Diệm and Buddhist groups, the Buddhist protests during Diệm's regime were not only the struggles against discrimination in religious practices and religious freedom, but also the resistance of Vietnamese Buddhism to Diệm's [[nation-building]] policies centered by a [[personalist]] revolution that Buddhists considered a threat to the revival of Vietnamese Buddhist power.{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=262}} Until the end of his life, Diệm, along with his brother Nhu still believed that their nation-building was successful and they could resolve the Buddhist crisis in their own way, like what they had done with the Hinh crisis in 1954 and the struggle with the Bình Xuyên in 1955.{{sfn|Miller|2013|pp=277-278}}
 
Jerema Słowiak of [[Jagiellonian University]] notes that the American media coverage skewed the true background of the conflict, spreading the "narrative of evil dictator Diệm oppressing good, peaceful Buddhists". Because of this, Diệm was considered a brutal and corrupt dictator in the United States at the time of his assassination.<ref name="Słowiak"/> However, Diệm enjoyed relatively good relations with the Buddhists until 1963, and sponsored numerous Buddhist temples, especially [[Xá Lợi Pagoda]] in 1956. Vietnamese Buddhists had a nationalist vision for Vietnam of their own, and were political enemies of Diệm, engaged in "a clash of two competing visions of Vietnam".<ref name="Słowiak"/> The Buddhist challenge to Diệm was politically motivated and constituted struggle for power rather than a religious conflict – the Buddhists protested mainly against the Ngo family and rejected Diệm's concessions, as their explicit goal was removal of Diệm.<ref name="Słowiak"/> Thích Trí Quang, the leader of the Buddhist movement, insisted that the agitation must not stop until the South Vietnamese government is overthrown, and stated his intention to "call for suicide volunteers" if necessary. Edward Miller also argues that the primary cause of the protests was the opposition to Diệm and his agenda rather than the discriminatory policies, as the Buddhist movements of Vietnam had their own political goals that starkly contrasted with Diệm's.{{sfn|Miller|2013|p=262}} Diệm reacted to the Buddhist resistance the same way he reacted to the Sect Crisis of 1955, and Xá Lợi Pagoda raids successfully broke the protesters' movement. The military supported Diệm, and army leaders helped plan the raids and advocated for a forceful response to the protests, and only American disapproval drove military cliques to reconsider their support for Diệm.<ref name="Słowiak"/>
 
===Foreign policy===
[[File:Ngo Dinh Diem at Washington - ARC 542189.jpg|thumb|Diệm, accompanied by US Secretary of State [[John Foster Dulles]], arrives at [[Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport|Washington National Airport]] in 1957. Diệm is shown shaking hands with the president of the U.S. [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]].|left|230x230px]]
{{Main|Ngo Dinh Diem presidential visit to Australia|State visit by Ngo Dinh Diem to the United States}}The foreign policy of the [[Republic of Vietnam]] (RVN), according to Fishel, "to a very considerable extent", was the policy of Ngô Đình Diệm himself during this period.{{sfn|Henderson|Fishel|1966|p=4}} He was the decisive factor in formulating foreign policies of the RVN, besides the roles of his adviser – Ngô Đình Nhu and his foreign ministers: [[Trần Văn Độ]] (1954–1955), Vũ Văn Mẫu (1955–1963) and [[Phạm Đăng Lâm]] (1963) who played subordinate roles in his regime. Nevertheless, since Diệm had to pay much attention to domestic issues in the context of the Vietnam War, foreign policy did not receive appropriate attention from him. Diệm paid more attention to countries that affected Vietnam directly and he seemed to personalize and emotionalize relations with other nations.<ref name=":7">{{harvnb|Henderson|Fishel|1966|p=5}}</ref> The issues Diệm paid more attention in foreign affairs were: the Geneva Accords, the withdrawal of the French, international recognition, the cultivation of the legitimacy of the RVN and the relations with the United States, Laos (good official relations) and [[Cambodia]] (complicated relations, especially due to border disputes and minority ethnicities), and especially North Vietnam.<ref name=":7"/> Besides, the RVN also focused on [[diplomatic relations]] with other Asian countries to secure its international recognition.{{sfn|Henderson|Fishel|1966|pp=13-14}}
[[File:Jawaharlal Nehru and Ngo Dinh Diem in 1957.jpg|alt=Ngo Dinh Diem meeting with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru during a visit to India on 8 November 1957|thumb|228x228px|Ngô Đình Diệm meeting with [[Prime minister of India|Indian Prime Minister]] [[Jawaharlal Nehru]] during a visit to India on 8 November 1957]]
Diệm's attitude toward [[India]] was not harmonious due to India's non-alignment policy, which Diệm assumed favored communism. It was not until in 1962, when India voted for a report criticizing the communists for supporting the invasion of South Vietnam, that Diệm eventually reviewed his opinions toward India.{{sfn|Henderson|Fishel|1966|p=22}} For [[Japan]], Diệm's regime established diplomatic relations for the recognition of war reparations, which led to a reparation agreement in 1959 with the amount of US$49&nbsp;million (equivalent to US$514&nbsp;million in 2023). Diệm also established friendly relations with non-communist states, especially [[Republic of Korea|South Korea]], [[Republic of China|Taiwan]], the [[Republic of the Philippines|Philippines]], [[Kingdom of Thailand|Thailand]], Laos and the [[Federation of Malaya]], where Diệm's regime shared the common recognition of communist threats.{{sfn|Henderson|Fishel|1966|pp=23-24}}
 
Regarding the relations with communist North Vietnam, Diệm maintained total hostility and never made a serious effort to establish any relations with it.{{sfn|Henderson|Fishel|1966|pp=17-18}} In relations with [[France]], as an anti-colonialism nationalist, Diệm did not believe in France and France was always a negative factor in his foreign policy. He also never "looked up on France as a counterweight to American influence".{{sfn|Henderson|Fishel|1966|p=21}} However, in 1963, Diệm's government entered into secret negotiations with communist North Vietnam, partly because of the economic difficulties of the North. The two sides agreed that the two Vietnams would exist for a period of exchange and interaction before general elections and a coalition government headed by Diệm in the South would be established.<ref>[http://www.nytimes.com/1975/01/27/archives/vietnam-63-and-now.html Vietnam, ‘63 and Now], By MIECZYSLAW MANELIJAN. 27, 1975, The New York Times</ref>
 
Concerning relations with the US, although Diệm admitted the importance of the US-RVN alliance, he perceived that the US's assistance to the RVN was primarily serving its own national interest, rather than the RVN's national interest.{{sfn|Henderson|Fishel|1966|p=9}} Taylor adds that Diệm's distrust of the US grew because of its Laotian policy, which gave North Vietnam access to South Vietnam's border through southern Laos. Diệm also feared the escalation of American military personnel in South Vietnam, which threatened his nationalist credentials and the independence of his government.<ref name="Taylor, p.3">{{harvnb|Taylor|2015|p=3}}</ref> In early 1963, the Ngô brothers even revised their alliance with the US.{{sfn|Miller|2013|pp=253-260}} Moreover, they also disagreed with the US on how to best react to the threat from North Vietnam. While Diệm believed that before opening the political system for the participation of other political camps, military, and security matters should be taken into account; the US wanted otherwise and was critical of Diệm's clientelistic government, where political power based on his family members and trusted associates. The Buddhist crisis in South Vietnam decreased American confidence in Diệm, and eventually led to the coup d'état sanctioned by the US.<ref name="Taylor, p.3"/> Ultimately, nation-building politics "shaped the evolution and collapse of the US-Diem alliance". The different visions in the meanings of concepts – democracy, community, security, and social change – were substantial, and were a key cause of the strains throughout their alliance.{{sfn|Miller|2013|pp=253-260}}