Editing Neutral monism (section)

=== Present ===
[[David Chalmers]]<ref name="Edward Craig 1998 p. 816"/> has been known to express sympathy toward neutral monism. In ''[[The Conscious Mind]]'' (1996) he concludes that facts about consciousness are "further facts about our world" and that there ought to be more to reality than just the physical. He then goes on to engage with a Platonic rendition of neutral monism that holds information as fundamental. Though Chalmers believes neutral monism and panpsychism ought to be taken seriously, he considers the combination problem to be point of concern. He considers Russell's solution of "protophenominal properties" to be ad hoc, and thinks such speculation undercuts the parsimony that made neutral monism initially appealing.

According to [[Stephen Stich]] and Ted Warfield, neutral monism has not been a popular view in philosophy as it is difficult to develop or understand the nature of the neutral elements.<ref>[[Stephen Stich|Stich, Stephen]]; Warfield, Ted. (2003). ''The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind''. Blackwell Publishing. pp. 20-21. {{ISBN|0-631-21774-6}}</ref> Nevertheless, a Machian version of the view has been defended by [[Jonathan Westphal]] in ''The Mind–Body Problem'', 2016.<ref>MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 2016.</ref>