Editing National Security Act of 1947 (section)

== Drafting Legislation ==
However, even if everyone could admit that a military reorganization was necessary, they could not agree on how it should be done. The process of obtaining even tentative consensus would take nearly four years.

=== The Woodrum Committee ===
On March 28, 1944, the House passed a resolution introduced by Rep. [[James_W._Wadsworth_Jr.|James W. Wadsworth]] (R-NY) to create a Select Committee On Postwar Military Policy, and this began the debate. The committee chair was Rep. [[Clifton A. Woodrum]] (D-VA), and the committee itself was made up of seven members of the Naval Affairs Committee, seven members of the Military Affairs Committee, and nine other members.<ref name="OSDHistVol1" />

Though the War Department considered asking for the hearings to be postponed to prevent an interservice fight that could hurt wartime unity, they decided not to when Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox told Secretary of War Henry Stimson that he also favored unification.<ref name="USMCDU4447" />

The hearings began on April 24, 1944. On the second day, Lieutenant General [[Joseph_T._McNarney|Joseph McNarney]] presented the War Department's plan for unification, which was essentially Marshall's plan as laid out in his memo.<ref name="OSDHistVol1" /><ref name="USMCDU4447" />

On May 11th, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Alexander Vandegrift, addressed the committee.<ref name="USMCDU4447" />

The hearings ended on May 19, 1944. Due to the increasingly apparent disagreements between the two departments, committee members and military leaders agreed that a fight between them would be bad for the war effort. In June, the committee reported the time was not right for legislation, but encouraged the two departments to continue to study unification.<ref name="USMCDU4447" />

=== The Richardson Committee ===
While the Woodrum Committee met, the JCS continued to study the problem by convening their own committee of two Army officers and two Navy officers. It was led by former Pacific Fleet commander Admiral [[James O. Richardson]]. The Richardson committee interviewed eighty commanders both at war and in Washington, almost all of flag rank, to get their thoughts on postwar reorganization.<ref name="OSDHistVol1" />

On April 18, 1945, the Richardson Committee presented their findings and recommendations.<ref name="OSDHistVol1" /> They found that most Army officers and about half the Navy officers favored unification to a single service, but disagreed on the details. The committee's recommendations went even farther than McNarney's, calling not only for one civilian secretary overseeing the military and none overseeing the individual services, but also calling for a single uniformed "Commander of all Forces."<ref name="OSDHistVol1" />

=== The Eberstadt Report ===
On June 19, 1945, the Department of the Navy began its own investigation. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal requested an objective investigation of the postwar reorganization by his friend [[Ferdinand_Eberstadt_(policy_advisor)|Ferdinand Eberstadt]], the former chairman of the Army-Navy Munitions Board and former vice chair of the War Production Board. By late September, Eberstadt had finished his report, and Forrestal forwarded it to the chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee, David Walsh. The 200 page report's key recommendations included the following:<ref name="OSDHistVol1" /><ref>{{cite web |last1=Eberstadt |first1=Ferdinand |title=Report, to the Honorable James Forrestal, “Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security,” (henceforth, Eberstadt Report), “Introduction” and “Conclusions and Recommendations,” page 1-14, 22 October 1945 |url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/28646-document-2-report-honorable-james-forrestal-unification-war-and-navy-departments-and |website=National Security Archive |publisher=U.S. Senate, 79th Congress, 1st session, Committee on Naval Affairs |access-date=28 July 2024}}</ref>

* Making the Joint Chiefs of Staff permanent.
* Creating an independent air force, but also letting the Army and Navy retain air forces.
* Reorganizing the military into three departments: War, Navy, and Air. Each would be led by a cabinet-rank secretary.
* Changing the administrative structures of the departments to mirror each other as much as possible.
* Creating a National Security Council.
* Creating a National Security Resources Board.
* Creating a Joint Munitions Board.
* Creating a Central Intelligence Agency.
* Creating a Joint Military Education and Training Board.
* Creating a civilian scientific research and development agency, and creating assistant secretaries for research and development in each of the services.
* Reviewing the many other joint boards and committees from World War 2 to determine which should be continued, combined, or dissolved.
* Maintaining close working relations with Congress.
* Appointing a commission to conduct analysis of the overall national security situation before making further changes.

=== 1945 Senate Military Affairs Hearings ===
On January 3, 1945, the  first day of the 79th Congress, Rep. [[Jennings Randolph]] (D-WV) submitted unification bill H.R. 550 to the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department. Two days later, Sen. [[Lister Hill]] (D-AL) introduced a similar bill, S. 84, in the Senate.

From October 7th to December 17, 1945, the Senate Military Affairs Committee conducted hearings to consider unification bills. These included not only S. 84, but also S. 1482, introduced in the middle of the hearings by Sens. [[Edwin C. Johnson]] (D-CO) and [[Harley M. Kilgore]] (D-WV). However, the hearings mostly became a venue for the two departments, increasingly at odds, to give their official positions on different unification plans.<ref name="USMCDU4447" />

==== The War Department's Collins Plan ====
On October 30th, General [[J. Lawton Collins]] presented the War Department's plan. It combined features of recommendations made by the Richardson committee (other than Richardson's dissent) and Marshall's original plan from November 1942. Its key recommendations included the following:<ref name="USMCDU4447" />

* Reorganizing the military services into a single department led by a civilian cabinet-rank secretary with at least one undersecretary, and assistant secretaries appointed as needed.
* Replacing the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a new chiefs of staff organization called the "US Chiefs of Staff" made up of the department secretary and service chiefs.
* Creating a single uniformed "Commander of the Armed Forces" who would also act as Chief of Staff to the President.
* Creating an independent air force

==== The Department of the Navy's Hensel Plan ====
On November 29th, Assistant Secretary of the Navy [[H. Struve Hensel]] presented the Department of the Navy's plan. It was the recommendations of the Eberstadt Report, but left the question of an independent air force up to Congress.<ref name="USMCDU4447" />

==== Debate ====
Proponents of the Department of the Navy's plan came across as obstructionists due to the previous Woodrum Committee hearings having framed the debate entirely in terms of the War Department plan.

Proponents of the War Department's plan repeatedly emphasized the cost savings it would provide.

==== Truman Intervenes ====
On December 19th, Truman let Congress know his own thoughts on unification. They mirrored the War Department plan in all respects.<ref name="OSDHistVol1" />

The hearings concluded as Congress went into its Christmas recess with the two departments and their congressional allies at an impasse.<ref name="USMCDU4447" />

=== Navy and Marine Corps Resistance ===
Over the course of the 1945 hearings, Navy and Marine Corps resistance to the War Department plan began to coalesce.

==== SCOROR ====
In October, on the advice of Admiral Radford, Forrestal created the Secretary's Committee on Research on Reorganization (SCOROR) to track unification developments and help manage the Navy's response.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Hone |first1=Thomas |last2=Utz |first2=Curtis |title=History of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1915-2015 |date=2020 |publisher=Naval History and Heritage Command |location=Washington, DC |isbn=978-1-943604-02-9 |page=190 |url=https://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/nhhc/research/publications/publication-508-pdf/OPNAV%20100%20508.pdf |access-date=29 July 2024}}</ref> The same month, Forrestal asked Sen. David Walsh, the chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee, to hold hearings of his own so that the Navy would have a chance to properly present their counterargument to the War Department Proposal.<ref name="USMCDU4447" />

==== First Marine Corps Board ====
At the same time, the Commandant directed the head of Marine Corps Schools, Merrill Twining, to create a Marine Corps Board to do the same for the Marine Corps.<ref name="USMCDU4447" />

=== The Thomas Plan ===
In January 1946, Senator [[Elbert D. Thomas]] formed a subcommittee within the Senate Military Affairs Committee to draft unification legislation. The subcommittee included Vice Admiral [[Arthur W. Radford|Arthur Radford]] and Major General [[Lauris Norstad]] as advisors from the Department of the Navy and the War Department. On April 9th, the subcommittee introduced the bill, S. 2044. Its key points were the following:<ref name="USMCDU4447">{{cite book |last1=Keiser |first1=Gordon |title=The US Marine Corps and Defense Unification 1944-1947 |date=1982 |publisher=National Defense University Press |location=Washington, DC |isbn=978-0898758047 |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA121927.pdf}}</ref>

*Replacing the Navy and War Departments with a single "Department of Common Defense" led by a civilian secretary with one undersecretary and four assistant secretaries.
*Creating an independent air force under the new department.
*Creating a "Joint Staff of the Armed Forces" made up of the three service chiefs plus a chief of staff to submit recommendations and non-concurrences once a year to the president through the secretary of defense.
*Creating a "Council of Common Defense" based on Eberstadt's concept for a National Security Council.
*Creating a National Security Resources Board.
*Creating a Central Intelligence Agency.

==== JCS 1478 ====
On March 15th and 16th, Army Air Corps Commanding General Carl Spaatz and Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower wrote two papers regarding unification JCS 1478/10 and 1478/11, that dealt with Army objectives for postwar unification. Marked "TOP SECRET", the two papers were blunt in their statement of their intent to marginalize the Marine Corps. The Eisenhower-Spaatz proposal's key points were the following:<ref name="USMCDU4447" />

*Limit Marine Corps units to the size of regiments and below, and cap the total size of the Marine Corps at 50,000-60,000.
*Bar the Marine Corps from wartime expansion, eliminating the need for the Marine Corps Reserve.
*Limit Marine Corps missions to guarding naval ships and shore establishments.
*Limit Marines to participating "only in minor shore combat operations in which the Navy alone is interested."
*Bar the Marine Corps from engaging in operations that required combined arms since this would duplicate the functions of the Army and Air Force.

The papers were forwarded to the chief of naval operations, Admiral Chester Nimitz, for his thoughts. There the papers came to the attention of Merritt Edson, the Marine Corps liaison to the chief of naval operations. Edson alerted the commandant of the Marine Corps and the members of the Marine Corps Board, most of whom, particularly Merrill Twining, believed that the only purpose of the papers' high classification was to conceal the Army's goals from Congress.<ref name="USMCDU4447" />

Nimitz replied on March 30th, and included responses by the Commandant and by the head of Naval Aviation, both of whom were strongly against the proposals.<ref name="USMCDU4447" />

==== Lobbying and Gag Order ====
Following the bill's introduction, the Department of the Navy openly opposed it.

In a press conference on April 11th, Truman said he had not authorized Navy officers to speak against unification, only to offer their honest opinions. He demanded that members of both the War Department and Department of the Navy "get in line" behind the official White House policy. When questioned about Army lobbying tactics, Truman claimed ignorance, but stated he was opposed to all congressional lobbying by the two departments.<ref name="USMCDU4447" />

On April 30th, the Senate Naval Affairs Committee began hearings to consider S. 2044.

==== The Bended Knee Speech ====
On May 6th, Commandant of the Marine Corps Alexander Vandegrift testified. His testimony noted that on multiple occasions there had been efforts to marginalize and disband the Marine Corps, all of which had been ended by congressional oversight. He noted Marine Corps successes such as the prediction of the course of the Pacific War by Pete Ellis, and a history of extreme frugality that did not characterize other services. Finally, he denounced the War Department plan as a transparent attempt to quietly marginalize and disband the Marine Corps by removing its congressional protection.<ref name="USMCDU4447" />

==== Defeat ====
On May 7th, Clark Clifford, Truman's lead for unification legislation, told General Norstad and Assistant Secretary of War Stuart Symington that the Thomas Bill could not pass in its current form, and that the Naval Affairs Committee hearings were causing it to lose more support every day. He also admitted he had been swayed by some of the Navy's objections, especially regarding the role of the chief of staff. Clifford recommended that Truman meet with the secretaries of War and the Navy and their advisors to clarify points of agreement and disagreement and find a way forward.<ref name="USMCDU4447" />

On May 13th, Truman held the meeting, and demanded that Patterson and Forrestal find a way to break the impasse by the end of the month due to the urgency of passing unification legislation. He also said that he had accepted the Navy's arguments against the chief of staff. Finally, he told his chief of staff, Admiral William Leahy, to silence criticism of unification by naval officers.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Wolk |first1=Herman |title=Planning and Organizing the Postwar Air Force 1943-1947 |date=1984 |publisher=Office of Air Force History |location=Washington, DC |isbn=978-1508659587 |url=https://media.defense.gov/2010/Sep/28/2001329803/-1/-1/0/planning_and_organizing_the_postwar_af.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180424071613/https://media.defense.gov/2010/Sep/28/2001329803/-1/-1/0/planning_and_organizing_the_postwar_af.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=April 24, 2018 |access-date=29 July 2024}}</ref>

May 31st Patterson and Forrestal reported to him that of the twelve points in S. 2044 they agreed on eight and disagreed on four. The points of agreement were as follows:<ref name="USMCDU4447" />

*That there should not be a single military Chief of Staff
*The creation of a permanent Joint Chiefs of Staff
*The creation of a Council of Common Defense
*The creation of a Central Intelligence Agency
*The creation of a National Security Resources Board
*The creation of an agency for joint military education and training
*The creation of an agency for joint research
*The creation of an agency for procurement and supply.

The remaining points of disagreement were the following:

*Whether or not to reorganize into a single Department of Defense
*Whether or not to establish a separate Air Force
*The status of Army and Navy aviation
*The status of the Marine Corps

The period of rival Military Affairs Committee and Naval Affairs Committee hearings came to an end for good on August 2nd, when Truman signed the [[Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946]]. It combined the Military Affairs and Naval Affairs Committees into Armed Services Committees in the House and Senate, and would go into effect for the 80th United States Congress.<ref name="USMCDU4447" />

Additionally, in August, Thomas suggested to Truman that he use an executive order to execute some unification changes, for example by creating a Council of Common Defense led by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. Thomas believed that forcing the military to operate under unification for several months might convince all involved, particularly Congress, that unification legislation was feasible.<ref>{{cite journal |title=Unification of the Armed Forces |journal=CQ Almanac |date=1947 |url=http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal46-1410852}}</ref>

=== The Patterson-Forrestal Compromise ===
On November 7, 1946, Forrestal called a meeting at his home with Army and Navy representatives to attempt to find a way forward. the attendees included the two departments' primary negotiators Norstad and Radford, the Assistant Secretary of War for Air Stuart Symington, and Forrestal's friend Admiral Forrest Sherman. The main outcome of the meeting was the replacement of Admiral Radford as the Navy's primary negotiator with Forrestal's friend Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman. According to Marine Corps Brigadier General Gerald Thomas, this was due to Patterson's suggestion since the Army found Radford difficult to work with.<ref name="OSDHistVol1" /><ref name="USMCDU4447" />

On January 16, 1947, Norstad, Sherman, and Symington forwarded a letter to the White House with an outline of a joint Army-Navy agreement.<ref name="OSDHistVol1" />

==== Second Marine Corps Board ====
Vandegrift and the other Marines involved with unification believed they had been betrayed. Admiral Radford had been a close ally of the Marine Corps, and Admiral Sherman was not. There had been no Marine Corps input into the Patterson-Forrestal Compromise, and many Marines, Vandegrift included, believed Sherman had cut a deal with Norstad to preserve Navy aviation in exchange for abandoning demands for statutory protections of the Marine Corps.<ref name="USMCDU4447" />

The same month the Patterson-Forrestal Compromise went to the White House, Vandegrift appointed a second Marine Corps board to "Conduct Research and Prepare Material in Connection with Pending Legislation" led by [[Merritt Edson]] and [[Gerald C. Thomas]]. Other members formally appointed to the board in writing included Col [[Merrill Twining]], Col [[Edward_C._Dyer|Edward Dyer]], LtCol [[Victor_H._Krulak|Victor Krulak]], LtCol [[Samuel_R._Shaw|Samuel Shaw]], LtCol DeWolf Schatzel, LtCol James C. Murray, LtCol [[James_D._Hittle|James Hittle]], LtCol [[Edward_H._Hurst|Edward Hurst]], LtCol Robert Heinl, and Maj [[Jonas_M._Platt|Jonas Platt]].<ref name="USMCDU4447" />