Editing Nash equilibrium (section)

=== Strict/non-strict equilibrium ===
Suppose that in the Nash equilibrium, each player asks themselves: "Knowing the strategies of the other players, and treating the strategies of the other players as set in stone, would I suffer a loss by changing my strategy?"

If every player's answer is "Yes", then the equilibrium is classified as a ''strict Nash equilibrium''.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://hoylab.cornell.edu/nash.html |title=Nash Equilibria |author=Robert Wyttenbach |website=hoylab.cornell.edu |access-date=2019-12-08 |url-status=dead |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20190616093922/http://hoylab.cornell.edu/nash.html |archive-date= Jun 16, 2019 }}</ref>

If instead, for some player, there is exact equality between the strategy in Nash equilibrium and some other strategy that gives exactly the same payout (i.e. the player is indifferent between switching and not), then the equilibrium is classified as a ''weak''{{NoteTag|This term is dispreferred, as it can also mean the opposite of a "strong" Nash equilibrium (i.e. a Nash equilibrium that is vulnerable to manipulation by groups).}} or ''non-strict Nash equilibrium''{{Citation needed|date=February 2024}}{{Clarify|reason=Is the term used exclusively to mean the equilibrium is non-strict for some players, or is it sometimes used to mean the Nash equilibrium is non-strict for every player?|date=February 2024}}.