Editing Michael Collins (Irish leader) (section)

==Truce==
In 1921 [[Nevil Macready|General Macready]], commander of British forces in Ireland, reported to his government that the Empire's only hope of holding Ireland was by [[martial law]], including the suspension of "all normal life".<ref>''Wilson Diaries'', Vol II p. 293</ref> Westminster's foreign policy ruled out this option: Irish-American public opinion was important to British agendas in Asia. In addition, Britain's efforts at a military solution had already resulted in a powerful peace movement, which demanded an end to the unrest in Ireland. Prominent voices calling for negotiation included the [[Labour Party (UK)|Labour Party]], ''[[The Times]]'' and other leading periodicals, members of the [[House of Lords]], [[English Catholics]], and famous authors such as [[George Bernard Shaw]].<ref>Cabinet Office, (Westminster government) London</ref><ref>British Cabinet minutes, 1921</ref>

Still, it was not the British government that initiated negotiations. Individual English activists, including clergy, made private overtures which reached Arthur Griffith. Griffith expressed his welcome for dialogue. The British MP [[Brigadier General Cockerill]] sent an open letter to Prime Minister [[David Lloyd George]] that was printed in the Times, outlining how a peace conference with the Irish should be organised. [[Pope Benedict XV]] made an urgent public appeal for a negotiated end to the violence. Whether or not Lloyd George welcomed such advisors, he could no longer hold out against this tide.<ref name="Coogan, TP Michael Collins 1990"/>{{page needed|date=July 2020}}

In July, Lloyd George's government [[Irish War of Independence#Truce: July–December 1921|offered a truce]]. Arrangements were made for a conference between the British government and the leaders of the yet-unrecognised Republic. There remains uncertainty as to the two sides' capability to have carried on the conflict much longer. Collins told [[Hamar Greenwood, 1st Viscount Greenwood|Hamar Greenwood]] after signing the Anglo-Irish Treaty: "You had us dead beat. We could not have lasted another three weeks. When we were told of the offer of a truce we were astonished. We thought you must have gone mad".<ref>L. S. Amery, ''My Political Life. Volume Two: War and Peace 1914–1929'' (London: Hutchinson, 1953), p. 230.</ref> However he stated on the record that "there will be no compromise and no negotiations with any British Government until Ireland is recognised as an independent republic. The same effort that would get us Dominion Home Rule will get us a republic."<ref>Michael Collins, quoted by columnist CW Ackerman August 1920</ref> At no time had the Dáil or the IRA asked for a conference or a truce.<ref name="ReferenceF">Deasy, Liam. ''Brother Against Brother''</ref>{{page needed|date=August 2020}}

However, the Dáil as a whole was less uncompromising. It decided to proceed to a peace conference, although it was ascertained in the preliminary stages that a fully independent republic would not be on the table and that the loss of some northeastern counties was a foregone conclusion.<ref name="ReferenceD">Phoenix, Eamonn. ''Michael Collins – The Northern Question 1916–22'', in. ''Michael Collins and the Making of the Irish State'', (Doherty & Keogh, editors)</ref>

Many of the rebel forces on the ground first heard of the Truce when it was announced in the newspapers and this gave rise to the first fissures in nationalist unity, which had serious consequences later on. They felt they had not been included in consultations regarding its terms.<ref name="ReferenceF"/>{{page needed|date=August 2020}}<ref>O'Donoghue, Florence. ''No Other Law'', Dublin, Irish Press 1954</ref>{{page needed|date=August 2020}}

De Valera was widely acknowledged as the most skilful negotiator on the Dáil government side and he participated in the initial parlays, agreeing the basis on which talks could begin. The first meetings were held in strict secrecy soon after the [[Burning of the Custom House|Custom House battle]], with Andrew Cope representing Dublin Castle's British authorities. Later, de Valera travelled to London for the first official contact with Lloyd George. The two met one-on-one in a private meeting, the proceedings of which have never been revealed.<ref name="Coogan, TP Michael Collins 1990"/>{{page needed|date=July 2020}}<ref name="ReferenceG">Neligan, David. ''The Spy in the Castle'', London, Prendeville Publishing 1999</ref>{{page needed|date=July 2020}}

During this Truce period, de Valera sued for official designation as President of the Irish Republic and obtained it from the Dáil in August 1921, in place of the title which had previously been used of President of Dáil Éireann.<ref>Coogan, Tim Pat. ''The IRA: A History'', p. 76</ref> Not long after, the Cabinet was obliged to select the delegation that would travel to the London peace conference and negotiate a treaty. In a departure from his usual role, de Valera adamantly declined to attend, insisting instead that Collins should take his place there, along with Arthur Griffith.<ref>British Cabinet minutes, memoranda</ref>{{full citation needed|date=February 2020}}<ref>De Valera, Eamonn, correspondence to Michael Collins, 13 July 1921</ref>{{full citation needed|date=February 2020}}

Collins resisted the appointment, protesting that he was "a soldier, not a politician" and that his exposure to the London authorities would reduce his effectiveness as a guerrilla leader should hostilities resume. (He had kept his public visibility to a minimum during the conduct of the war; up to this time the British still had very few reliable photographs of him.)<ref name="ReferenceH">O'Connor, Batt. ''With Michael Collins in the Fight For Irish Independence'', 1929</ref>{{page needed|date=July 2020}} The Cabinet of seven split on the issue, with de Valera casting the deciding vote. Many of Collins' associates warned him not to go, that he was being set up as a political scapegoat.