Editing Melvin Laird (section)

===Cold War and nuclear war planning===
Vietnam preoccupied Laird, but not to the exclusion of other pressing matters. Although not intimately involved in the development of strategic nuclear policy as McNamara had been, Laird subscribed to the Nixon administration's program of "[[Strategic Sufficiency]]" – that the United States should have the capability to deter [[nuclear weapons|nuclear]] attacks against its home territory and that of its allies by convincing a potential aggressor that he would suffer an unacceptable level of retaliatory damage; it should also have enough nuclear forces to eliminate possible coercion of its allies. The policy, not much different from McNamara's except in name and phrasing, embraced the need both to avoid mass destruction of civilians and to seek mechanisms to prevent escalation of a nuclear conflict. The administration further refined its strategic ideas in July 1969 when the president issued a statement that came to be known as the "[[Nixon Doctrine]]", stressing "pursuit of peace through partnership with our allies." Instead of the previous administration's "2½ war" concept – readiness to fight simultaneous wars on two major fronts and one minor front – the Nixon Doctrine cut back to the "1½ war" level. Through military aid and credit-assisted sales of military equipment abroad, the United States would prepare its allies to take up a greater share of the defense burden, especially manpower needs, in case of war. U.S. military forces would be "smaller, more mobile, and more efficient general purpose forces that ... [would] neither cast the United States in the role of world policeman nor force the nation into a new isolationism." Laird supported the strategic arms talks leading to the [[SALT I]] agreements with the [[Soviet Union]] in 1972: a five-year moratorium against expansion of strategic nuclear delivery systems, and an [[Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty|antiballistic missile treaty]] limiting each side to two sites (later cut to one) for deployed ABM systems. As Laird put it, "In terms of United States strategic objectives, SALT I improved our deterrent posture, braked the rapid buildup of Soviet strategic forces, and permitted us to continue those programs which are essential to maintaining the sufficiency of our long-term strategic nuclear deterrent."