Editing Manuel Noriega (section)

==''De facto'' ruler of Panama==
Noriega preferred to remain behind the scenes, rather than become president, and to avoid the public scrutiny that came with the post. He did not have a particular social or economic ideology, and used military [[nationalism]] to unify his supporters.{{sfn|Galván|2012|pp=182–183}} The [[Democratic Revolutionary Party|Partido Revolucionario Democrático]] (Democratic Revolutionary Party, PRD), which had been established by Torrijos and had strong support among military families, was used by Noriega as a political front for the PDF.{{sfn|Galván|2012|p=186}}{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=138–140}} This party drew considerable support from low-income employees brought into the government bureaucracy by its expansion under Torrijos and Noriega.{{sfn|Ropp|1992|p=219-222}} Noriega compelled the [[National Assembly (Panama)|Panamanian National Assembly]] to pass Law 20 of 1983, which was supposedly aimed at protecting the Panama Canal from communists, and allowed a huge influx of U.S. weapons to the Panamanian military. The law also tripled the size of the military forces.{{sfn|Galván|2012|pp=186–187}} Noriega's period in power saw significant [[capital flight]] from Panama; according to Kempe, this was at least in part because wealthy individuals worried that their wealth would be seized by Noriega's administration.{{sfn|Kempe|1990|pp=4–5}}

The military government of Torrijos had maintained its power in large part by extracting resources from Panama's expanding service sector, particularly its illicit portions.{{sfn|Ropp|1992|pp=220-227}} According to political scientist Steve Ropp, Torrijos was a "gifted politician with a genuine concern for improving the economic lot of the average Panamanian", but his individual talent had a relatively small role to play in preserving his government.{{sfn|Ropp|1992|p=226}} When Noriega created the PDF in 1983, he brought into its control Panama's customs and immigration apparatus, as well as the country's whole transportation network. This expansion of the military's role occurred simultaneously with a large growth in the cocaine trade, as well as in markets for weapons in various military conflicts in Central America.{{sfn|Ropp|1992|pp=226-228}} The profits the military reaped from these activities gave Noriega's military regime considerable financial clout.{{sfn|Ropp|1992|pp=226-228}}

Noriega took control of most major newspapers by either buying a controlling stake in them or forcing them to shut down. The government also harassed, intimidated, or exiled individual journalists and editors. The newspaper ''[[La Prensa (Panama City)|La Prensa]]'', which remained independent and was frequently critical of Noriega, had its staff intimidated and its offices damaged; eventually, it too was forced to close.{{sfn|Galván|2012|p=187}} In May 1984, Noriega allowed [[1984 Panamanian general election|the first presidential elections]] in 16 years. Noriega and Díaz Herrera picked [[Nicolás Ardito Barletta Vallarino]] to be the PRD's candidate, with the intention of keeping him under close control.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=167–169}} When the initial results showed Arias, who had the support of much of the opposition, on his way to a landslide victory, Noriega halted the count.<ref name="BBC1" />{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=167–169}} After brazenly manipulating the results, the government announced that Barletta had won by a slim margin of 1,713 votes.{{sfn|Koster|Sánchez|1990|p=309}} Independent estimates suggested that Arias would have won by as many as 50,000 votes had the election been conducted fairly.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=188–189}} More than 60,000 votes were not included in the final count.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=194–196}} Noriega's rule became increasingly repressive,<ref name="BBC1" /> even as the U.S. government of [[Ronald Reagan]] began relying on him in its covert efforts to undermine Nicaragua's [[Sandinista National Liberation Front|Sandinista]] government.<ref name=Tran2010/> The U.S. accepted Barletta's election, and signalled a willingness to cooperate with him, despite being aware of the flaws in the election process.{{sfn|Gilboa|1995|pp=541–543}}{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=198–199}}

===Relationship with the U.S.===
[[File:Frente Sur Contras 1987.jpg|thumb|right|The [[Contras]] in Nicaragua, who received support from the U.S. via Noriega's administration.]]
Between 1981 and 1987, the relationship between Noriega and the U.S. grew considerably. It was driven both by the U.S.'s pursuit of its security interests, and Noriega using these as an effective means of gaining favor.{{sfn|Scranton|1991|pp=1, 8, 12}} The emergence of internal conflicts in Nicaragua and El Salvador between 1979 and 1981 led the Reagan administration to look for allies in the region, including in Panama.{{sfn|Scranton|1991|pp=11-13}} Noriega acted as a conduit for [[United States and state-sponsored terrorism#The Contras|U.S. support]], including funds and weapons, to the Contra rebels in Nicaragua. He allowed the CIA to establish [[listening posts]] in Panama,<ref name="Ghosh-2009"/> and also helped the U.S.-backed Salvadoran government against the leftist Salvadoran insurgent [[Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front]].<ref name="BBC1" />{{sfn|Scranton|1991|pp=11-13}} U.S. [[spy ship]]s used bases in Panama in their operations against the Nicaraguan government, and much of the intelligence gathered by these ships was processed in the U.S. bases in Panama. Noriega permitted these activities despite the Panama Canal treaties restricting the use of the U.S. bases to protecting the canal.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|p=145-150}}

Bush, now U.S. vice president, met again with Noriega in December 1983 to discuss support for the [[Contras]].{{sfn|Buckley|1991|p=267}} Noriega had a working relationship with U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel [[Oliver North]] by 1985. Noriega offered to assassinate or sabotage Sandinista leaders in return for North helping Noriega improve his image with the U.S. government.<ref name="nytimesobit" />{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=205–209}} In June 1985 North met with Noriega in Panama and Noriega agreed to train Contra soldiers in Panama for an invasion of Nicaragua in 1986.{{sfn|Buckley|1991|p=267}}{{sfn|Dinges|1990|p=207}} In return for Panama's support for U.S. and Israeli efforts to supply the Contras with arms, the U.S. ignored Noriega's use of weapons-shipment networks to smuggle drugs into the U.S.{{sfn|Scranton|1991|pp=11-13}} Noriega was reported to have played a role in the [[Iran–Contra affair]] in the mid-1980s.<ref name="BBC1" />{{sfn|Dinges|1990|p=207}}

There are varying reports about how much Noriega was paid by United States sources. In early 1990, Noriega biographer [[Frederick Kempe]] reported that the United States gave Noriega or his intelligence services annual payments in the range of $110,000 in 1976 increasing to $185,000 to $200,000 when he came to power during the Reagan administration.{{sfn|Kempe|1990|pp=27-29, 419}}<ref name="Chicago Tribune; February 25, 1990">{{cite news |last=Rowley |first=Storer H. |date=February 25, 1990 |title=Doing the U.S.-Noriega Two-Step |url=https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1990-02-25-9001160485-story.html |work=Chicago Tribune |access-date=January 8, 2021}}</ref> Dinges said that he could find no one willing to confirm persistent reports that he received a $200,000 per year stipend from the CIA.<ref name="News & Record">{{cite news |author=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> |title=Manuel Antonio Noriega 'asset' Under Six Presidents; Noriega Kept CIA Happy Three Decades; He Was 'almost' Indicted For Drugs In '71 |url=https://greensboro.com/manuel-antonio-noriega-asset-under-six-presidents-noriega-kept-cia-happy-three-decades-he-was/article_7324f5cc-9050-55ad-abac-d42e03fbde2b.html |work=News & Record |location=Greensboro, North Carolina |date=January 6, 1990 |access-date=January 8, 2021}}</ref>

Prior to and during Noriega's trial, Noriega's lead attorney Frank A. Rubino claimed that Noriega had received $11 million in payments from the CIA.<ref name="The Washington Post; January 19, 1991">{{cite news |last1=McGee |first1=Jim |last2=LaFraniere |first2=Sharon |author-link2=Sharon LaFraniere |date=January 19, 1991 |title=Prosecutors List Cia, Army Payments to Noriega |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/01/19/prosecutors-list-cia-army-payments-to-noriega/5bf7833f-9571-4541-8e97-523483efb7c6/ |newspaper=The Washington Post |access-date=January 8, 2020}}</ref><ref name="apnews.com; May 15, 1991">{{cite news |last=Cole |first=Richard |date=May 15, 1991 |title=Defense: Noriega Was 'CIA's Man in Panama' |url=https://apnews.com/article/e9cd42bf2442c397a9a2353adee54491 |work=apnews.com |agency=Associated Press |access-date=January 8, 2021}}</ref> In January 1991, federal prosecutors filed a financial report indicating that Noriega had received a total of $322,000 from the United States Army and the CIA over a 31-year period from 1955 to 1986.<ref name="Johnston"/> They stated that the release of information was to rebut allegations from defense attorneys that Noriega had been paid "millions of dollars" from the CIA.<ref name="Johnston"/> These payments included a total of $76,039 as "gifts and incentives" from the CIA.<ref name="Johnston"/>

Despite Noriega's alliance with the U.S., he also maintained close relationships with bitter enemies of the U.S., including Cuba, Libya, and Nicaragua.{{sfn|Scranton|1991|pp=14-16}} A 1990 book discussing Noriega's administration stated that he had sold thousands of Panamanian passports to the Cuban government for use by its intelligence services.<ref name="nytimesobit" /> Cuba also obtained hardware imports from Panama that were restricted by the [[United States embargo against Cuba|U.S. embargo]], while it provided Panama with weapons and military advisers.{{sfn|Scranton|1991|pp=14-16}} Libya, as well as some U.S. allies, provided Noriega with funds when the U.S. was seeking to remove him from power.{{sfn|Scranton|1991|pp=14-16}}

===Drug and weapons operations===
Panama's and Noriega's involvement in drug-trafficking grew considerably over the early 1980s, peaking in 1984.{{sfn|Scranton|1991|pp=13-15}} Intensifying conflicts in [[Colombian conflict|Colombia]], [[Salvadoran Civil War|El Salvador]], [[Guatemalan Civil War|Guatemala]], and [[Nicaraguan Revolution#Contra War|Nicaragua]] had led to the creation of covert transportation networks that Noriega used to transport drugs to the U.S., particularly [[cocaine]].{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=125–127}}{{sfn|Scranton|1991|pp=13-15}} During this period, Colombia's [[Medellín Cartel]] was also seeking allies. Noriega became intimately involved with their drug trafficking and money-laundering operations, and received considerable sums as protection money, bribes, or shares of profits.{{sfn|Scranton|1991|pp=13-15}} In June 1986, investigative journalist [[Seymour Hersh]] recorded a U.S. [[White House]] official as saying that reducing Noriega's activities could greatly reduce international drug trafficking.<ref name="Hersh 1986">{{cite news|last1=Hersh|first1=Seymour|title=Panama Strongman Said to Trade in Drugs, Arms, and Illegal Money|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1986/06/12/world/panama-strongman-said-to-trade-in-drugs-arms-and-illicit-money.html?pagewanted=all&mcubz=0|access-date=June 6, 2017|work=[[The New York Times]]|date=June 12, 1986}}</ref>

Hersh reported unnamed U.S. officials as saying that Noriega had amassed a personal fortune in European banks as a result of his illegal activities, as well as owning two homes in Panama and one in France.<ref name="Hersh 1986"/> The wealth generated for the Panamanian military from drug-smuggling also helped stabilize the authoritarian government that it dominated. However, the military's control over wealth from illicit trade alienated the Panamanian business elite that had previously also benefited from such trade. Under Noriega, these profits were shared within the military less evenly than under Torrijos, eventually creating friction in the military leadership.{{sfn|Ropp|1992|pp=215-217}}

Many of the operations Noriega benefited from were run by associates such as [[Floyd Carlton]] and [[Cesar Rodríguez]]. Large sums from drug revenues were brought in from Miami and elsewhere to Panama for laundering, and Noriega received protection payments in these instances as well.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|p=150}} American [[Steven Kalish]] also began a large scale business selling drugs, laundering money and selling hardware to the Panamanian military for considerable profits with Noriega's assistance.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=169–171}} Dinges writes that at the time of the 1984 election, Kalish was preparing to ship a load of [[Cannabis (drug)|marijuana]] worth U.S. $1.4 million through Panama, for which Noriega had agreed to provide false Panamanian customs stamps; Noriega was to be paid $1 million for this exercise.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=174–175}}

Beginning in 1984, Noriega appeared to reduce the scale of his operations, and even ordered a raid against a cocaine factory in the interior of Panama, a raid which he then emphasized as evidence of his cooperation with the U.S. in their fight against drugs.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=181–185}} He also ordered a crackdown on money laundering by Colombian cartel figures [[Jorge Luis Ochoa Vásquez|Jorge Ochoa]] and [[Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela]].{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=202–204}} Noriega's new image as an opponent of drug trafficking was symbolized by his being invited as a speaker in 1985 to [[Harvard University]], for a conference on the role of the military in Central America's wars, a speech which received a lot of attention in Panama's pro-government press.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|p=200–202}} In 1986, a convoluted operation involving the [[East German]] [[Stasi]] and the Danish ship ''Pia Vesta'' ultimately aimed to sell Soviet arms and military vehicles to South Africa's [[Armscor (South Africa)|Armscor]], with the Soviets using various intermediaries to distance themselves from the deal. Noriega was apparently one of these intermediaries but backed out on the deal as the ship and weapons were seized at a Panamanian port.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|last=Plaut|first=Martin|title=The Chinese and Soviets had a bigger role in supporting apartheid than we previously knew|url=https://qz.com/africa/1449906/china-soviets-backed-both-south-africa-apartheid-and-liberation/|access-date=November 6, 2021|website=Quartz|date=November 3, 2018 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|last=Guerrero|first=Alina|date=June 18, 1986|title=Danish Ship Caught Carrying Soviet-Made Weapons|work=[[Associated Press News]]|url=https://apnews.com/article/c13b61653d7e8d3204fbea0ce6308da1}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Van Vuuren|first=Hennie|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=HgyXDwAAQBAJ|title=Apartheid guns and money : a tale of profit|date=2018|isbn=978-1-78738-247-3|location=London|pages=260–265|oclc=1100767741}}</ref>

=== Murder of Spadafora and aftermath ===
[[Hugo Spadafora]] was a physician and political activist who had first clashed with Noriega when they were both members of Torrijos's government. Though an ally of Torrijos, he and Noriega had been personal enemies for a long time.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=118–121}} Despite not being a member of the opposition, he became a vocal critic of Noriega after returning to Panama from Guatemala in 1981.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=133–135}} Spadafora amassed evidence of corruption within the government by using his position as an ally of Torrijos to question Noriega's allies, including Rodriguez and Carlton.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=179–181}} This included a lengthy conversation with Carlton in mid-1985 after his drug operations had collapsed due to conflicts over a missing shipment, and he had received negative publicity in the Panamanian press.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=212–213}} In September 1985 he accused Noriega of having connections to drug trafficking and announced his intent to expose him. The drug trafficking charges threatened Noriega's support among his own constituency of middle class individuals who had benefited under his and Torrijos's government.{{sfn|Gilboa|1995|pp=541–544}}{{sfn|Koster|Sánchez|1990|p=29}}{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=10–12}}

According to writers R. M. Koster and Guillermo Sánchez, on an occasion when Spadafora was traveling by bus from Costa Rica to Panama, witnesses saw him being detained by the PDF after crossing the border.{{sfn|Koster|Sánchez|1990|p=26}} His decapitated body was later found wrapped in a [[United States Postal Service]] mail bag showing signs of brutal torture.{{sfn|Koster|Sánchez|1990|p=29-31}} Noriega was widely believed to be responsible for the murder, and according to Koster and Sánchez, the U.S. had intelligence implicating Noriega. On the day of Spadafora's arrest, the U.S. National Security Agency monitored a telephone conversation between Noriega and Luis Córdoba, the military commander in Chiriquí province where Spadafora was arrested. During the conversation Córdoba told Noriega, "We have the rabid dog." Noriega responded, "And what does one do with a dog that has rabies?"{{sfn|Koster|Sánchez|1990|p=28}}

Spadafora's murder badly damaged Noriega's image, both within and outside Panama,<ref name=Tran2010/>{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=218–219, 230–231}} and created a crisis for the Panamanian regime.{{sfn|Scranton|1991|p=23}} Barletta, who was in New York City when Spadafora was murdered in September 1985, announced his intention to appoint an independent commission to investigate the murder. Upon his return to Panama, however, he was forced to resign by the PDF and was replaced by Vice President [[Eric Arturo Delvalle]].{{sfn|Galván|2012|p=188}}<ref name = 'Kinzer1'>{{Cite news| issn = 0362-4331| last = Kinzer| first = Stephen| title = Panama Military: Too Deep in Political Trenches?| work = The New York Times| access-date = October 7, 2017| date = February 17, 1986| url = https://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/17/world/panama-military-too-deep-in-political-trenches.html}}</ref>{{sfn|Scranton|1991|pp=22-24}} Barletta was highly regarded in the Reagan administration, and his removal brought a downturn in the relations between the U.S. and Noriega.{{sfn|Kempe|1990|p=125}} After Spadafora's murder the U.S. began to view Noriega as a liability rather than an asset, despite his ongoing support for U.S. interventions elsewhere.<ref name=Tran2010/>{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=218–219, 230–231}} The U.S. response included reducing economic assistance and pressuring Panama to reform its banking secrecy laws, crack down on narcotics trafficking, investigate the murder of Spadafora, and reduce the PDF's role in the government.{{sfn|Galván|2012|p=188}} The response to Spadafora's murder created divisions within the PRD, and further damaged the credibility of the government-controlled news media.{{sfn|Scranton|1991|pp=22-24}}

[[Roberto Díaz Herrera|Díaz Herrera]] considered using the uproar around Spadafora to seize power during a brief period that Noriega was traveling outside the country, but despite mobilizing some troops, eventually decided against following through with the coup, realizing he could not count on sufficient support.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=222–224}} Furthermore, Noriega had made a deal with his deputy, to the effect that he would step down as military leader in 1987 and allow Díaz Herrera to succeed him. In 1987, however, Noriega went back on this agreement, announced he would be heading the military for the next five years, and assigned Díaz Herrera to a diplomatic post.{{sfn|Gilboa|1995|pp=544–545}} Díaz Herrera retaliated by making public statements accusing Noriega of rigging the 1984 election, murdering Spadafora, and of trafficking in drugs, as well as of assassinating Torrijos with a bomb on his plane.{{sfn|Gilboa|1995|pp=544–545}}

Díaz Herrera's statements provoked huge protests against Noriega, with 100,000 people, approximately 25% of the population of Panama City, marching in protest on June 26, 1987.{{sfn|Gilboa|1995|pp=544–545}} As with Spadafora's murder, these incidents strengthened and brought together the internal opposition to Noriega.{{sfn|Scranton|1991|pp=25-27}} Noriega charged Díaz Herrera with treason, and cracked down hard on the protesters.{{sfn|Gilboa|1995|pp=544–545}} The U.S. Senate passed a resolution asking Noriega to step down until Díaz Herrera could be tried; in response Noriega sent government workers to protest outside the U.S. embassy, a protest which quickly turned into a riot. As a result, the U.S. suspended all military assistance to Panama, and the CIA stopped paying Noriega a salary.{{sfn|Gilboa|1995|pp=544–545}} The Senate resolution had the effect of identifying the U.S. with the effort to remove Noriega; Noriega exploited the rising anti-American sentiment to strengthen his own position.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=268–269}} Without the support of the U.S., Panama defaulted on its international debt, and that year the country's economy shrank by 20%.<ref name="nytimesobit" /> Though the U.S. considered not recognizing Delvalle as president, the [[United States Department of State|State Department]] decided against it, as it would have amounted to breaking relations with Noriega.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=232–233}}

===1989 election===
{{main|1989 Panamanian general election}}
Noriega's relationship with the U.S. deteriorated further during the late 1980s, particularly after the U.S. began to suspect that Noriega was supporting other intelligence services.<ref name=Tran2010/><ref name="BBC1" /> Hersh wrote in 1986 that U.S. intelligence officials suspected that Noriega was selling intelligence to the Cuban government of [[Fidel Castro]];<ref name="Hersh 1986"/> his report received widespread attention. [[Bob Woodward]] published a story about Noriega in ''[[The Washington Post]]'' soon afterward, going into even greater detail about Noriega's intelligence connections. Woodward and Hersh's reputations made certain that the stories were taken seriously.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=240–242}} Spadafora had also informed the U.S. [[Drug Enforcement Administration]] (DEA) of some of his findings about Noriega's involvement in drug smuggling.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=214–215}} Multiple U.S. agencies continued to investigate Noriega despite opposition from the [[Presidency of Ronald Reagan|Reagan administration]].{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=275–279}} In 1988 Noriega was indicted by U.S. [[Grand juries in the United States#Federal law|federal grand juries]] in courts in Miami and [[Tampa]] on charges of drug-trafficking.<ref name="BBC1" /><ref>{{cite news |last1=Pichirallo |first1=Joe |title=Indictments Depict Noriega as Drug-Trafficking Kingpin |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/02/06/indictments-depict-noriega-as-drug-trafficking-kingpin/1a1675d6-88ec-449a-9147-07f55c78a326/ |access-date=July 25, 2020 |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |date=February 6, 1988}}</ref> The indictment accused him of "turning Panama into a shipping platform for South American cocaine that was destined for the U.S., and allowing drug proceeds to be hidden in Panamanian banks".<ref name="nytimesobit" /> Soon afterward an army colonel and a few soldiers made an attempt to overthrow Noriega; their poorly planned effort was crushed within a day.{{sfn|Dinges|1990|pp=298–299}}

The presidential election of May 1989 was marred by fraud and violence. ''Coalición para la Liberación Nacional'' (Coalition for National Liberation), a pro-military coalition led by the PRD, named [[Carlos Duque]], a former business partner of Noriega, as its candidate.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-8119843.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160309193716/https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-8119843.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=March 9, 2016 |title=Panama Casts Votes for Leader |author=Phillip Bennett |date=May 8, 1999 |work=The Boston Globe |access-date=September 2, 2012}} {{subscription required}}</ref> The ''Alianza Democrática de Oposición Cívica'' (Democratic Alliance of Civic Opposition), an opposition coalition, nominated [[Guillermo Endara]], a member of Arias' Panameñista Party, and two other prominent oppositionists, [[Ricardo Arias Calderón]] and [[Guillermo Ford]], as vice-presidential candidates.{{sfn|Scranton|1991|pp=159–160}} Anticipating fraud, the opposition tracked ballot counts at local precincts on the day of the election (local ballot counts were done in public).{{sfn|Scranton|1991|pp=161–162}} As an exit poll made it clear that the opposition slate was winning by a wide margin, reports of missing tally sheets and seizures of ballot boxes by the PDF soon emerged. In the afternoon of the day after the election, the [[Roman Catholic Church|Catholic]] bishops conference announced that a quick count of public tallies at polling centers showed the opposition slate winning 3–1. Official tallies the day after that, however, had Duque winning by a 2–1 margin.{{sfn|Scranton|1991|pp=161–162}}

Rather than publish the results, Noriega voided the election, claiming that "foreign interference" had tainted the results. Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, present in Panama as an observer, denounced Noriega, saying the election had been "stolen", as did [[Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Panamá|Archbishop of Panama]] [[Marcos G. McGrath]].{{sfn|Koster|Sánchez|1990|pp=362–366}}{{sfn|Galván|2012|p=189}} Noriega had initially planned to declare Duque the winner regardless of the actual result. Duque knew he had been badly defeated and refused to go along.{{sfn|Koster|Sánchez|1990|pp=362–366}} The next day, Endara, Arias Calderón, and Ford rolled through the old part of the capital in a triumphant motorcade, only to be intercepted by a detachment of Noriega's paramilitary [[Dignity Battalions]]. Arias Calderón was protected by a couple of troops, but Endara and Ford were badly beaten. Images of Ford running to safety with his [[guayabera]] shirt covered in blood were broadcast around the world. When the 1984–1989 presidential term expired, Noriega named a longtime associate, [[Francisco Rodríguez (President of Panama)|Francisco Rodríguez]], acting president. The U.S. recognized Endara as the new president.{{sfn|Koster|Sánchez|1990|pp=362–366}}{{sfn|Galván|2012|p=189}} Noriega's decision to void the election results led to [[1989 Panamanian coup d'état attempt|another coup attempt]] against him in October 1989. A number of Noriega's junior officers rose up against him, led by Lieutenant Colonel Moisés Giroldi Vera, but the rebellion was easily crushed by the members of the PDF loyal to Noriega. After this attempt, he declared himself the "maximum leader" of the country.<ref name="nytimesobit" />{{sfn|Galván|2012|p=189}}{{sfn|Kempe|1990|pp=8–9}}<ref name="Palm 2017">{{cite news |last1=Palm |first1=Mónica |title=Manuel Antonio Noriega acumulaba 60 años en condenas por homicidio y asociación ilícita |url=https://www.prensa.com/judiciales/Noriega-acumulaba-condenadas-homicidio-asociacion_0_4768773124.html |access-date=January 11, 2021 |work=La Prensa |date=May 30, 2017|trans-title=Manuel Antonio Noriega accumulated 60 years in convictions for homicide and illicit association|language=es}}</ref> The rebels were captured and taken to a military base outside Panama City, where they were tortured and then executed.{{sfn|Galván|2012|p=189}}