Editing Maastricht Treaty (section)

===Franco-German agreement===
French President [[François Mitterrand]] was forced to abandon the centrepiece of his [[Socialist Party (France)|Socialist]] programme in 1983, a job creating [[reflation]],<ref>{{cite journal |last=Lombard |first=Marc |date=April 1995 |title=A re-examination of the reasons for the failure of Keynesian expansionary policies in France, 1981–1983 |journal=Cambridge Journal of Economics |volume=19 |issue=2 |pages=359–372 |doi=10.1093/oxfordjournals.cje.a035318}}</ref> due to speculation against the [[French franc|franc]]. Since then, Mitterrand had been committed to drawing Germany into a currency partnership. After the [[fall of the Berlin Wall]] in late 1989, Germany sought re-unification. France, the UK, and the rest of Europe [[German Reunification#Foreign support and opposition|expressed their concerns]] over re-unification. When [[Chancellor of Germany|German Chancellor]] [[Helmut Kohl]] asked for re-unification in 1990, Mitterrand would only accept in the event Germany would abandon the [[Deutsche Mark]] and adopt a common currency.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,719608,00.html |title=Mitterrand forderte Euro als Gegenleistung für die Einheit |trans-title=Mitterrand demanded Euro in exchange for unity |language=German |author=<!--not stated--> |date=25 August 2010 |website=spiegel.de |publisher=[[Der Spiegel]]}};{{cite magazine |author=<!--not stated--> |date=27 April 1998 |title=Dunkelste Stunden – Der Kanzler öffnet die Akten über die deutsche Einheit. Die Dokumente zeigen: Frankreich hat das schnelle Ende der Mark erzwungen. |trans-title=Darkest Hours – The Chancellor opens the files on German unity. The documents show: France forced the quick end of the Mark |language=German |publisher=[[Der Spiegel]] |volume=18/1998, 'Abschied von der Mark' |at=Article 3 |url=http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-7870401.html}}</ref> Without consulting [[Karl Otto Pöhl]], President of the [[Bundesbank]], Kohl accepted the deal.<ref>{{cite magazine |author=Klaus Wirtgen |date=2 March 1998 |title=Weg ohne Wiederkehr |trans-title=Way of no return |language=German |publisher=[[Der Spiegel]] |volume=10/1998, 'Der göttliche Funke' |at=Article 20 |url=http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-7833746.html}};{{cite web |url=http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/euro-struggles-can-be-traced-to-origins-of-common-currency-a-831842.html |last1=Böll |first1=Sven |last2=Reiermann |first2=Christian |last3=Sauga |first3=Michael |last4=Wiegrefe |first4=Klaus |date=8 May 2012 |title=Operation Self-Deceit: New Documents Shine Light on Euro Birth Defects |website=spiegel.de |publisher=[[Der Spiegel]]}}</ref> Despite this win for France, it was widely perceived that the cost of German cooperation was German dictation of the rules for a single currency.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Sutton |first=Michael |date=January 1993 |title=France and the Maastricht Design |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/40396436 |journal=The World Today |volume=49 |issue=1 |pages=4–8 |jstor=40396436 |access-date=29 September 2020}}</ref> The Bundesbank had signalled that Germany's economic success would come before being "a good european".<ref name="Abbey and Bromfield">{{cite journal |last1=Abbey |first1=Michael |last2=Bromfield |first2=Nicholas |date=1994 |title=A Practitioner's Guide to the Maastricht Treaty |url=https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1557&context=mjil |journal=Michigan Journal of International Law |volume=15 |issue=4 |pages=1335 |access-date=21 September 2020}}</ref>