Editing Lake Champlain (section)

====Siege of Quebec: 1775–1776====
The Continental Army realized the strategic advantage of controlling Lake Champlain, as it leads directly to the heart of Quebec.<ref>{{Cite book |title=The Iroquois in the American Revolution |last=Graymont |first=Barbara |publisher=Syracuse University Press |year=1975 |page=66}}</ref> Immediately after taking Forts Ticonderoga and Crown Point, the Americans began planning an attack on British Canada. The American siege of Quebec was a two-pronged assault and occurred throughout the winter of 1775–1776.<ref name=":2">{{Cite book |title=The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy |last=Weigley |first=Russell |publisher=Indiana University Press |year=1977 |page=47}}</ref> Brigadier General [[Richard Montgomery]] led the first assault up the Champlain Valley into Canada, while Benedict Arnold led a second army to Quebec via the [[Maine]] wilderness.<ref name=":2" />

Despite the strategic advantage of controlling a direct route to Quebec by way of the Champlain Valley, the American siege of British Canada during the winter of 1775 failed. The Continental Army mistakenly assumed that it would receive support from the Canadians upon their arrival at Quebec. This was not the case, and the rebel army struggled to take Quebec with diminishing supplies, support, and harsh northern winter weather.<ref>{{Cite book |title=The Iroquois in the American Revolution |last=Graymont |first=Barbara |publisher=Syracuse University Press |year=1975 |pages=74}}</ref>

The Continental Army was forced to camp outside Quebec's walls for the winter, with reinforcements from New York, [[Pennsylvania]], [[Massachusetts]], [[New Hampshire]] and [[Connecticut]] allowing the soldiers to maintain their siege of the city. However, smallpox descended on both the sieging forces and their reinforcements and savaged the American force.<ref name=":3">{{Cite book |title=Thrust for Canada: The American Attempt on Quebec in 1775–1776 |last=Hatch |first=Robert |publisher=Houghton Mifflin |year=1979 |location=Boston}}</ref> The reinforcements traveled hundreds of miles up the frozen Lake Champlain and St. Lawrence River, but were too late and too few to influence a successful siege of Quebec. In May 1776, with the arrival of a British convoy carrying 10,000 British and [[Hessian (soldier)|Hessian]] troops to Canada, the Continental forces retreated back down the Champlain Valley to reevaluate their strategy.<ref name=":4">{{Cite book |title=The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy |last=Weigley |first=Russell |publisher=Indiana University Press |year=1977 |pages=23}}</ref>

[[File:Champlain Valley.jpg|thumb|upright=1.5|The Champlain Valley as seen from [[Camel's Hump]]]]
"I know of no better method than to secure the important posts of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, and by building a number of armed vessels to command the lakes, otherwise the forces now in Canada will be brought down upon us as quick as possible, having nothing to oppose them...They will doubtless try to construct some armed vessels and then endeavor to penetrate the country toward New York." (Brigadier General [[John Sullivan (general)|John Sullivan]] to [[George Washington]], June 24, 1776).<ref name=":1" />

Both British and American forces spent the summer of 1776 building their naval fleets, at opposite ends of Lake Champlain.<ref name=":3" /> By the October 1776, the Continental Army had 16 operating naval vessels on Lake Champlain: a great increase to the four small ships they had at the beginning of the summer.<ref name=":1" /> General [[Benedict Arnold]] commanded the American naval fleet on Lake Champlain, which was composed of volunteers and soldiers drafted from the Northern Army. With great contrast to the Continental navy, experienced [[Royal Navy]] officers, British seamen and Hessian artillerymen manned the British fleet on Lake Champlain.<ref name=":1" /> By the end of the summer of 1776, the opposing armies were prepared to battle over the strategic advantage of controlling Lake Champlain.