Editing Korean War (section)

===Prelude to war (1950)===
By 1949, South Korean and US military actions had reduced indigenous communist guerrillas in the South from 5,000 to 1,000. However, Kim Il Sung believed widespread uprisings had weakened the South Korean military and that a North Korean invasion would be welcomed by much of the South Korean population. Kim began seeking Stalin's support for an invasion in March 1949, traveling to Moscow to persuade him.{{Sfn|Weathersby|2002|pp=3–4}}

Stalin initially did not think the time was right for a war in Korea. PLA forces were still embroiled in the Chinese Civil War, while US forces remained stationed in South Korea.{{Sfn|Weathersby|2002|p=3}} By spring 1950, he believed that the strategic situation had changed: PLA forces under [[Mao Zedong]] had secured final victory, US forces had withdrawn from Korea, and the Soviets [[Soviet atomic bomb project|had detonated their first nuclear bomb]], breaking the US monopoly. As the US had not directly intervened to stop the communists in China, Stalin calculated they would be even less willing to fight in Korea, which had less strategic significance.{{Sfn|Weathersby|2002|pp=9, 10}} The Soviets had cracked the codes used by the US to communicate with their [[Embassy of the United States, Moscow|embassy in Moscow]], and reading dispatches convinced Stalin that Korea did not have the importance to the US that would warrant a nuclear confrontation.{{Sfn|Weathersby|2002|pp=9, 10}} Stalin began a more aggressive strategy in Asia based on these developments, including promising economic and military aid to China through the [[Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance]].{{Sfn|Weathersby|2002|p=11}}

In April 1950, Stalin permitted Kim to attack the government in the South, under the condition that Mao would agree to send reinforcements if needed.{{Sfn|Weathersby|2002|p=10}} For Kim, this was the fulfillment of his goal to unite Korea. Stalin made it clear Soviet forces would not openly engage in combat, to avoid a direct war with the United States.{{Sfn|Weathersby|2002|p=10}}

Kim met with Mao in May 1950 and differing historical interpretations of the meeting have been put forward. According to Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgeng, Mao agreed to support Kim despite concerns of American intervention, as China desperately needed the economic and military aid promised by the Soviets.{{Sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|pp=139–40}} Kathryn Weathersby cites Soviet documents which said Kim secured Mao's support.{{Sfn|Weathersby|1993|p=29}} Along with Mark O'Neill, she says this accelerated Kim's war preparations.{{Sfn|Weathersby|2002|p=13}}<ref>Mark O'Neill, "Soviet Involvement in the Korean War: A New View from the Soviet-Era Archives", OAH Magazine of History, Spring 2000, p. 21.</ref> [[Chen Jian (academic)|Chen Jian]] argues Mao never seriously challenged Kim's plans and Kim had every reason to inform Stalin that he had obtained Mao's support.<ref name=Jian>{{cite book |last1=Jian |first1=Chen |title=China's Road to the Korean War |date=27 November 1994 |publisher=Columbia University Press |location=New York |isbn=9780231100250}}</ref>{{rp|112}} Citing more recent scholarship, [[Suisheng Zhao|Zhao Suisheng]] contends Mao did not approve of Kim's war proposal and requested verification from Stalin, who did so via a telegram.<ref name=Zhao>{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1332788951 |title=The dragon roars back : transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy|date=2022|publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3415-2 |location=Stanford, California |pages=28–29|oclc=1332788951}}</ref>{{rp|28–9}} Mao accepted the decision made by Kim and Stalin to unify Korea but cautioned Kim over possible US intervention.<ref name=Zhao/>{{rp|30}}

Soviet generals with extensive combat experience from World War II were sent to North Korea as the Soviet Advisory Group. They completed plans for attack by May{{Sfn|Weathersby|1993|pp=29–30}} and called for a skirmish to be initiated in the [[Ongjin County, South Hwanghae|Ongjin Peninsula]] on the west coast of Korea. The North Koreans would then launch an attack to capture Seoul and encircle and destroy the ROK. The final stage would involve destroying South Korean government remnants and capturing the rest of South Korea, including the ports.{{Sfn|Weathersby|2002|p=14}}

On 7 June 1950, Kim called for a Korea-wide election on 5–8 August 1950 and a consultative conference in [[Haeju]] on 15–17 June. On 11 June, the North sent three diplomats to the South as a peace overture, which Rhee rejected outright.{{Sfn|Weathersby|2002|p=10}} On 21 June, Kim revised his war plan to involve a general attack across the 38th parallel, rather than a limited operation in Ongjin. Kim was concerned that South Korean agents had learned about the plans and that South Korean forces were strengthening their defenses. Stalin agreed to this change.{{Sfn|Weathersby|2002|p=15}}

While these preparations were underway in the North, there were clashes along the 38th parallel, especially at [[Kaesong]] and Ongjin, many initiated by the South.{{Sfn|Cumings|2005|pp=247–53}}{{Sfn|Stueck|2002|p=71}} The ROK was being trained by the US [[Korean Military Advisory Group]] (KMAG). On the eve of the war, KMAG commander General William Lynn Roberts voiced utmost confidence in the ROK and boasted that any North Korean invasion would merely provide "target practice".{{Sfn|Cumings|2005|pp=255–56}} For his part, Syngman Rhee repeatedly expressed his desire to conquer the North, including when US diplomat [[John Foster Dulles]] visited Korea on 18 June.{{Sfn|Cumings|2005|pp=249–58}}

Though some South Korean and US intelligence officers predicted an attack, similar predictions had been made before and nothing had happened.{{Sfn|Millett|2007|p=17}} The [[Central Intelligence Agency]] noted the southward movement by the KPA but assessed this as a "defensive measure" and concluded an invasion was "unlikely".<ref>{{Cite news |last=Tom Gjelten |date=25 June 2010 |title=CIA Files Show U.S. Blindsided By Korean War |work=[[National Public Radio]] |url=https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128092817 |url-status=live |access-date=16 February 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130824155650/http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128092817 |archive-date=24 August 2013}}</ref> On 23 June UN observers inspected the border and did not detect that war was imminent.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Seth |first=Michael J. |title=A history of Korea: From Antiquity to the Present |title-link=A History of Korea: From Antiquity to the Present |date=2010 |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |isbn=978-0742567160 |location=Lanham, MD |page=[https://archive.org/details/historykoreafrom00seth/page/n344 324]}}</ref>