Editing Industrial espionage (section)

===20th century===
East-West commercial development opportunities after [[World War I]] saw a rise in [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] interest in [[Manufacturing in the United States|American]] and [[Economy of Europe|European]] [[manufacturing]] know-how, exploited by [[Amtorg Trading Corporation|Amtorg Corporation]].<ref>{{cite journal|last=Zelchenko|first=Henry L.|date=Feb 1952|title=Stealing America's Know-How: The Story of Amtorg|journal=American Mercury|volume=74|issue=338|pages=75–84}}</ref> Later, with Western restrictions on the [[export]] of items thought likely to increase military capabilities to the [[USSR]], Soviet industrial espionage was a well known adjunct to other spying activities up until the 1980s.{{sfn|Hanson|1987}} ''[[BYTE]]'' reported in April 1984, for example, that although the Soviets sought to develop their own [[microelectronics]], their technology appeared to be several years behind the [[Western world|West's]]. Soviet [[Central processing unit|CPUs]] required multiple [[Integrated circuit|chips]] and appeared to be close or exact copies of American products such as the [[Intel 3000]] and [[LSI-11|DEC LSI-11/2]].<ref name="heuertz198404">{{cite news|author=Heuertz, Ruth|date=April 1984|title=Soviet Microprocessors and Microcomputers|pages=348|work=BYTE|url=https://archive.org/stream/byte-magazine-1984-04/1984_04_BYTE_09-04_Real-World_Interfacing#page/n349/mode/2up|access-date=23 October 2013}}</ref>{{Efn|These technologies, however, wren't streamlined or industrialized. Some of these findings were applied on plants used to produce chips for military purposes.}}

===="Operation Brunnhilde"====
Some of these activities were directed via the [[East Germany|East German]] [[Stasi]] (Ministry for State Security). One such operation, "Operation Brunnhilde," operated from the mid-1950s until early 1966 and made use of spies from many [[Communist Bloc]] countries. Through at least 20 forays, many western European industrial secrets were compromised.{{sfn|Palmer|1974|p=13}} One member of the "Brunnhilde" ring was a [[Swiss people|Swiss]] [[chemical engineer]], Dr. Jean Paul Soupert (also known as "Air Bubble"), living in [[Brussels]]. He was described by [[Peter Wright (MI5 officer)|Peter Wright]] in [[Spycatcher]] as having been "doubled" by the [[Belgium|Belgian]] [[Belgian State Security Service|Sûreté de l'État]].{{sfn|Palmer|1974|p=13}}{{sfn|Wright|1987|p=183}} He revealed information about industrial espionage conducted by the ring, including the fact that [[Russians|Russian]] agents had obtained details of [[Concorde]]'s advanced electronics system.{{sfn|Wright|1987|p=184}} He testified against two [[Kodak]] employees, living and working in Britain, during a trial in which they were accused of passing information on industrial processes to him, though they were eventually acquitted.{{sfn|Palmer|1974|p=13}}

According to a 2020 ''American Economic Review'' study, East German industrial espionage in West Germany significantly reduced the gap in [[total factor productivity]] between the two countries.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Glitz|first1=Albrecht|last2=Meyersson|first2=Erik|year=2020|title=Industrial Espionage and Productivity|journal=American Economic Review|language=en|volume=110|issue=4|pages=1055–1103|doi=10.1257/aer.20171732|issn=0002-8282|hdl-access=free|hdl=10230/33897|s2cid=27286076}}</ref>

====Soviet {{Transliteration|ru|spetsinformatsiya}} system====
A secret report from the [[Military-Industrial Commission of the USSR]] (VPK), from 1979–80, detailed how {{Transliteration|ru|spetsinformatsiya}} ({{langx|ru|специнформация}}, "special records") could be utilised in twelve different military industrial areas. Writing in the [[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]], [[Philip Hanson (civil servant)|Philip Hanson]] detailed a {{Transliteration|ru|spetsinformatsiya}} system in which 12 industrial branch ministries formulated requests for information to aid technological development in their military programs. Acquisition plans were described as operating on 2-year and 5-year cycles with about 3000 tasks underway each year. Efforts were aimed at civilian and military industrial targets, such as in the [[Petrochemical industry|petrochemical industries]]. Some information was gathered to compare Soviet technological advancement with that of their competitors. Much unclassified information was also gathered, blurring the boundary with "[[competitive intelligence]]".{{sfn|Hanson|1987}}

The [[Soviet military#The Cold War|Soviet military]] was recognised as making much better use of acquired information than civilian industries, where their record in replicating and developing industrial technology was poor.{{Efn|This may be explained by the fact that the defense industry was supported better than a civil one.}}{{sfn|Hanson|1987}}