Editing Idealism (section)

==Idealism in Eastern philosophy==
{{Asian philosophy sidebar}}
There are currents of idealism throughout [[Indian philosophy]], ancient and modern. Some forms of Hindu idealism (like [[Advaita Vedanta|Advaita]]) defend a type of [[monism]] or [[non-dualism]], in which a single [[consciousness]] ([[brahman]]) is all that exists. However, other traditions defend a theistic pluralism (e.g. [[Shaiva Siddhanta]]), in which there are many selves ([[Ātman (Hinduism)|atman]]) and one God.<ref name=":03">{{Cite book |last=Flood |first=Gavin D. |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/50516193 |title=An introduction to Hinduism |date=1996 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=0-521-43304-5 |location=New York, NY |pages=163 |oclc=50516193}}</ref>

Buddhist idealism on the other hand is [[Nontheism|non-theistic]] and does not accept the existence of eternal selves (due to their adherence to the theory of [[Anattā|not-self]]).

=== Hindu philosophy ===
[[Image:Yajnavalkya_and_Janaka.jpg|thumb|The Upanishadic [[Rishi|sage]] [[Yājñavalkya]] (c. possibly 8th century BCE) is one of the earliest exponents of idealism, and is a major figure in the ''Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad''.]]

A type of idealistic monism can be seen in the ''[[Upanishads]]'', which often describe the ultimate reality of brahman as "being, consciousness, bliss" (''[[Saccidānanda]]'').<ref>Klaus Witz (1998), The Supreme Wisdom of the Upaniṣads: An Introduction, Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN|978-81-208-1573-5}}, pages 227–228</ref> The ''[[Chāndogya Upaniṣad]]'' teaches that everything is an emanation of the immortal brahman, which is the essence and source of all things, and is identical with the self ([[Ātman (Hinduism)|atman]]).<ref>Nikhilananda, Swami. The Upanishads&nbsp;— A New Translation. [http://www.bharatadesam.com/spiritual/upanishads/chandogya_upanishad.php Chhandogya Upanishad], Parts 5–8.</ref><ref>Warder, Anthony (2009), ''A Course in Indian Philosophy'', Motilal Banarsidass; {{ISBN|978-81-208-1244-4}}, pp. 25–28;</ref> The [[Brihadaranyaka Upanishad|''Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad'']] also describes brahman as awaress and bliss, and states that "this great being (mahad bhūtam) without an end, boundless (apāra), [is] nothing but [[vijñāna]] [consciousness]."<ref>Bausch, L. M. (2015). Kosalan Philosophy in the Kāṇva Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa and the Suttanipāta, p. 163. [[University of California, Berkeley|UC Berkeley]]. Retrieved from: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2940b93h</ref>

Idealist notions can be found in different schools of [[Hindu philosophy]], including some schools of [[Vedanta]]. Other schools like the [[Samkhya]] and [[Nyaya]]-[[Vaisheshika]], [[Mimamsa]], [[Yoga]], [[Vishishtadvaita]], [[Dvaita]], and others opposed idealism in favor of realism.<ref>Sinha, Jadunath ''Indian Realism'' p. 15. Routledge, 2024.</ref>

Different schools of Vedanta have different interpretations of brahman-atman, their foundational theory. Advaita Vedanta posits an absolute idealistic monism in which reality is one single absolute existence. Thus, brahman (the ultimate ground of all) is absolutely identical with all atmans (individual selves). Other forms of Vedanta like the [[Vishishtadvaita]] of [[Ramanuja]] and the [[Bhedabheda]] of [[Bhāskara (philosopher)|Bhāskara]] are not as radical in their non-dualism, accepting that there is a certain difference between individual souls and Brahman.

==== Advaita ====
[[file:Raja Ravi Varma - Sankaracharya.jpg|thumb|Śaṅkara, by [[Raja Ravi Varma]]]]
The most influential Advaita philosopher was [[Adi Shankara|Ādi Śaṅkara]] (788–820). In his philosophy, brahman is the single [[Nondualism|non-dual]] foundation (''adhiṣṭhana'') for all existence. This reality is independent, self-established, irreducible, immutable, and free of space, time, and causation.<ref name=":30">Dalal, Neil, "[https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/shankara/ Śaṅkara]", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''  (Winter 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).</ref> In comparison to this reality, the world of plurality and appearances is illusory ([[Maya (religion)|maya]]), an unreal cognitive error (mithya). This includes all individual souls or selves, which are actually unreal and numerically identical to the one brahman.<ref name=":30" />

Śaṅkara did not believe it was possible to prove the view that reality is "one only, without a second" (''[[Chandogya Upanishad|Chandogya]]'' 6.2.1) through independent philosophical reasoning. Instead, he accepts non-duality based on the authority of the Upaniṣads. As such, most of his extant works are scriptural commentaries.<ref name=":30" />

Nevertheless, he did provide various new arguments to defend his theories. A major metaphysical distinction for Śaṅkara is between what changes and may thus be negated (the unreal) and what does not (which is what is truly real).<ref name=":30" /> He compares the real to clay (the substantial cause, analogous to brahman) and the unreal to a pot which depends on the clay for its being (analogous to all impermanent things in the universe).<ref name=":30" /> By relying on dependence relations and on the reality of persistence, Śaṅkara concludes that metaphysical foundations are more real than their impermanent effects, and that effects are fully reducible and indeed identical to their metaphysical foundation.<ref name=":30" /> Through this argument from dependence, Śaṅkara concludes that since all things in the universe undergoes change, they must depend on some really existent cause for their being, and this is the one primordial undifferentiated existence (''Chandogya Bhāṣya,'' 6.2.1–2).<ref name=":30" /> This one reality is the single cause that is in every object, and every thing is not different from this brahman since all things borrow their existence from it. Śaṅkara also provides a [[cosmogony]] in which the world arises from an unmanifest state which is like deep dreamless sleep into a state in which [[Ishvara|īśvara]] (God) dreams the world into existence. As such, the world is not separate from God's mind.<ref name=":30" />

Śaṅkara's philosophy, along with that of his contemporary [[Maṇḍana Miśra]] (c. 8th century CE), is at the foundation of Advaita school. The opponents of this school however, labeled him a māyāvādin (illusionist) for negating the reality of the world.<ref name=":30" /> They also criticized what they saw as a problematic explanation for how the world arises from māyā as an error. For them, if māyā is in brahman, then brahman has ignorance, but if it is not in brahman, then this collapses into a dualism of brahman and māyā.<ref name=":31">{{Cite web |last=Ranganathan |first=Shyam |title=Ramanuja {{!}} Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=https://iep.utm.edu/ramanuja/ |access-date=2024-02-05 |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |language=en-US}}</ref>

==== Other idealist schools ====
Perhaps the most influential critic of Advaita was [[Ramanuja|Rāmānuja]] (c. 1017 – c. 1137), the main philosopher of the competing [[Vishishtadvaita|Viśiṣṭādvaita]] (qualified non-dual) school. His philosophy affirms the reality of the world and individual selves as well as affirming an underlying unity of all things with God.<ref name=":31" /> One of Rāmānuja's critiques of advaita is epistemological. If, as Advaita argues, all cognition other than pure undifferentiated consciousness is based in error, then it follows we would have no knowledge of the very fact that all individual cognition is error (''[[Sri Bhashya|Śrī Bhāṣya]]'', I.i.1).<ref name=":31" />

Furthermore, Rāmānuja also argues contra Advaita that individual selves are real and not illusory. This is because the very idea that an individual can be ignorant presupposes the very existence of that individual.<ref name=":31" /> Furthermore, since all Vedāntins agree that Brahman's nature is knowledge, consciousness and being, to say that brahman is ignorant is absurd, and so it must be individual souls which are ignorant.<ref name=":31" /> Thus, there must be individual selves with a metaphysically prior existence who then fall into ignorance (''Śrī Bhāṣya'', I.i.1.).<ref name=":31" /> Selves might be individual, but as the ''Vedas'' state, they still share a sense of unity with brahman. For Rāmānuja, this is because selves are distinct modes or qualities in the [[Macranthropy|cosmic body]] of Brahman (and are thus different and yet united with brahman).<ref name=":31" /><ref name="staffordbetty215">Stafford Betty (2010), Dvaita, Advaita, and Viśiṣṭādvaita: Contrasting Views of Mokṣa, Asian Philosophy: An International Journal of the Philosophical Traditions of the East, Volume 20, Issue 2, pages 215–224</ref> Brahman meanwhile is like the soul in the body of the world. Furthermore, brahman is a theistic creator God for Rāmānuja, which really exists as the union of two deities: [[Vishnu]], and [[Lakshmi|Lakṣmī]].<ref name=":31" />

The philosophy of the [[Yoga|Tantric]] tradition of [[Kashmir Shaivism|Trika Shaivism]] is a non-dual theistic idealism.<ref>S. G. Dyczkowski, Mark. ''The Doctrine of Vibration: An Analysis of Doctrines and Practices of Kashmir Shaivism,'' 1989, pp. 17, 51.</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Lawrence |first=David Peter |title=Kashmiri Shaiva Philosophy {{!}} Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=https://iep.utm.edu/kashmiri/ |access-date=2024-02-05 |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |language=en-US}}</ref> The key thinkers of this philosophical tradition, known as the [[Pratyabhijna|Pratyabhijñā]] (Recognition) school, are the [[Kashmiris|Kashmirian]] philosophers [[Utpaladeva]] (c. 900–950 CE) and [[Abhinavagupta]] (975–1025 CE).<ref>Torella, Raffaele (2021), ''Utpaladeva: Philosopher of Recognition'', pp. 1–3. DK Printworld (P) Ltd.</ref> This tradition affirms a non-dual monism which sees God ([[Shiva]]) as a single cosmic consciousness.<ref name="Parmeshwaranand2004">{{cite book |author=Swami Parmeshwaranand |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=N4xIBNmhpXcC&pg=PA32 |title=Encyclopaedia of the Śaivism |publisher=Sarup & Sons |year=2004 |isbn=978-81-7625-427-4 |page=32}}</ref> All selves (atman) are one with God, but they have forgotten this, and must recognize their true nature in order to reach liberation.<ref>Dyczkowski, Mark S. G. ''The Doctrine of Vibration: An Analysis of the Doctrines and Practices of Kashmir Shaivism,'' Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1989, p. 17-18.</ref>

Unlike in Advaita Vedanta however, the one cosmic consciousness is active and dynamic, consisting of spontaneous vibration (''spanda'') since it has the quality of absolute freedom (''svātāntrya'').<ref>Dyczkowski, Mark S. G. ''The Doctrine of Vibration: An Analysis of the Doctrines and Practices of Kashmir Shaivism,'' Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1989, p. 24.</ref> Through the power (''[[Shakti|Śakti]]'') of dynamic vibrations, the absolute (Shiva-Śakti, consciousness and its power) creates the world, and so, the world is a real manifestation of absolute consciousness.<ref>Dyczkowski, Mark S. G. ''The Doctrine of Vibration: An Analysis of the Doctrines and Practices of Kashmir Shaivism,'' Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1989, p. 25.</ref> Thus, in this system, the world and individual selves (which are dynamic, not an unchanging witness) are not an unreal illusion, but are seen as real and active expressions of God's creative freedom.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Singh |first=Jaideva |title=Vedanta and Advaita Shaivagama of Kashmir: A Comparative Study |date=1985 |publisher=[[Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture]] |isbn=978-81-87332-93-0 |pages=44–51}}</ref>

Idealism has remained influential in [[Modern Hinduism|modern Hindu]] philosophy, especially in [[Neo-Vedanta]] modernism. Prominent modern defenders include [[Raja Ram Mohan Roy|Ram Mohan Roy]] (1772–1833), [[Swami Vivekananda|Vivekananda]] (1863–1902),<ref>Madaio, James (2017), "Rethinking Neo-Vedānta: Swami Vivekananda and the Selective Historiography of Advaita Vedānta", Religions, 8 (6): 101, {{doi|10.3390/rel8060101}}</ref> [[Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan]] (''An Idealist View of Life,'' 1932) and [[Sri Aurobindo|Aurobindo]] (1872–1950).

===Buddhist philosophy===
Buddhist views reminiscent of idealism appear in [[Mahayana]] scriptures like the [[Samdhinirmocana sutra|''Explanation of the Profound Secrets'']], [[Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra|''Descent into Laṅka'']], and ''[[Ten Stages Sutra]]''.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Tola |first1=Fernando |last2=Dragonetti |first2=Carmen |date=December 2005 |title=Philosophy of mind in the Yogacara Buddhist idealistic school |url=https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00570832/file/PEER_stage2_10.1177%252F0957154X05059213.pdf |journal=History of Psychiatry |volume=16 |issue=4 |pages=453–465 |doi=10.1177/0957154X05059213 |pmid=16482684 |s2cid=21609414}}</ref> These theories, known as "mind-only" (''cittamatra'') or "the consciousness doctrine" (''vijñanavada'') were mostly associated with the Indian Buddhist philosophers of the [[Yogacara|Yogācāra]] school and the related [[Buddhist logico-epistemology|epistemological school]] (Pramāṇavāda).<ref name=":02">Finnigan, Bronwyn (2017). "Buddhist Idealism." In Tyron Goldschmidt & Kenneth Pearce (eds.), ''Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics''. Oxford University Press. pp. 178–199.</ref> These figures include: [[Vasubandhu]], [[Asaṅga]], [[Dignāga]], [[Dharmakīrti]], [[Sthiramati]], [[Dharmapala of Nalanda|Dharmapāla]], [[Jñanasrimitra|Jñānaśrīmitra]], [[Śaṅkaranandana]], and [[Ratnākaraśānti]]. Their arguments were a lively subject of debate for Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophers in India for centuries.<ref name=":02" /> These discussions had a lasting influence on the later [[Buddhist philosophy]] of [[East Asian Buddhism]] and [[Tibetan Buddhism]].<ref name=":02" />

There is some modern scholarly disagreement about whether Indian Yogācāra Buddhism can be said to be a form of idealism.<ref name="Trivedi, Saam 2005, pp. 231">{{cite journal |last1=Trivedi |first1=Saam |date=November 2005 |title=Idealism and Yogacara Buddhism |journal=Asian Philosophy |volume=15 |issue=3 |pages=231–246 |doi=10.1080/09552360500285219 |s2cid=144090250}}</ref><ref name=":02" /> Some writers like philosopher [[Jay L. Garfield|Jay Garfield]] and German philologist [[Lambert Schmithausen]] argue that Indian Yogacarins are metaphysical idealists that reject the existence of a mind independent external world.<ref name=":212">Schmithausen, Lambert (2005). ''On the Problem of the External World in the Ch’eng wei shih lun''. Tōkyō: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies. The International Institute for Buddhist Studies.</ref> Others see them as closer to an epistemic idealist like Kant who holds that our knowledge of the world is simply knowledge of our own concepts and perceptions.<ref name="Trivedi, Saam 2005, pp. 231" /> However, a major difference here is that while Kant holds that the thing-in-itself is unknowable, Indian Yogacarins held that ultimate reality is knowable, but only through the non-conceptual yogic perception of a highly trained meditative mind.<ref name="Trivedi, Saam 2005, pp. 231" /> Other scholars like [[Dan Lusthaus]] and Thomas Kochumuttom see Yogācāra as a kind of phenomenology of experience which seeks to understand how suffering ([[Duḥkha|dukkha]]) arises in the mind, not provide a metaphysics.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Kochumuttom |first1=Thomas A. |title=A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu, the Yogācārin |date=1989 |publisher=Motilal Banarsidass |isbn=978-81-208-0662-7}}{{page needed|date=May 2021}}</ref><ref name="acmuller.net">[[Dan Lusthaus]], "What is and isn't Yogācāra". {{cite web |title=What is and isn't Yogacara |url=http://www.acmuller.net/yogacara/articles/intro-uni.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131216190312/http://www.acmuller.net/yogacara/articles/intro-uni.htm |archive-date=16 December 2013 |access-date=2016-01-12}}</ref>

==== Vasubandhu ====
[[File:Kofukuji Monastery Hosso Patriarchs of Hokuendo (Seshin) (413).jpg|thumb|Statue of Vasubandhu (jp. Seshin), [[Kōfuku-ji]], [[Nara, Nara|Nara]], Japan]]
Whatever the case, the works of [[Vasubandhu]] (fl. c.360) certainly include a refutation of mind-independent "external" objects (Sanskrit: bāhyārtha) and argue that the true nature of reality is beyond subject-object distinctions.<ref name="Trivedi, Saam 2005, pp. 231" /><ref name=":02" /> He views ordinary conscious experience as deluded in its perceptions of an external world separate from itself (which does not exist), and instead argues that all there is ''vijñapti'' (ideas, mental images, conscious appearances, representations).<ref name="Trivedi, Saam 2005, pp. 231" /><ref>Siderits, Mark, ''Buddhism as philosophy'', 2017, p. 149.</ref><ref name=":02" /> Vasubandhu begins his ''[[Viṃśatikā-vijñaptimātratāsiddhi|Twenty verses]]'' (''Viṃśikā'') by affirming that "all this [everything we take to exist] is mere appearance of consciousness [''vijñapti''], because of the appearance of non-existent objects, just as a man with an eye disease sees non-existent hairs" (Viṃś.1).<ref name="Trivedi, Saam 2005, pp. 231" /><ref name=":02" /> His main argument against external objects is a critique of the atomist theories of his realist opponents ([[Nyaya|Nyāya]] and [[Abhidharma]] theorists).<ref name=":02" />

Vasubandhu also responds against three objections to idealism which indicate his view that all appearances are caused by mind: (1) the issue of spatio-temporal continuity, (2) accounting for [[intersubjectivity]], and (3) the causal efficacy of matter on subjects.<ref name=":02" /><ref>Siderits, Mark. ''Buddhism as philosophy'', 2017, pp. 150–151.</ref> For the first and third objections, Vasubandhu responds by arguing that dreams can also include spatio-temporal continuity, regularity and causal efficacy.<ref name=":02" /> Regarding intersubjectivity, Vasubandhu appeals to shared karma as well as mind to mind causation.<ref name=":21">Siderits, Mark. ''Buddhism as philosophy'', 2017, pp. 157–170.</ref> After answering these objections, Vasubandhu argues that idealism is a better explanation than [[Philosophical realism|realism]] for everyday experiences. To do this, he relies on the Indian "Principle of Lightness" (an appeal to parsimony like [[Occam's razor|Occam's Razor]]) and argues that idealism is the "lighter" theory since it posits a smaller number of entities.<ref name=":21" /> This is thus an argument from simplicity and an inference to the best explanation (i.e. an [[Abductive reasoning|abductive argument]]).<ref name=":21" />

As such, he affirms that our usual experience of being a self (ātman) that knows objects is an illusory construct, and this constitutes what he calls the "imagined nature" aspect of reality.<ref name=":02" />

Thus, for Vasubandhu, there is a more fundamental "root consciousness" that is empty of subject-object distinctions and yet originates all experiences "just as waves originate on water" ([[Triṃśikā-vijñaptimātratā|''Thirty Verses'', ''Triṃś'']].17).<ref name=":02" /> However, Vasubandhu sees this philosophy as a mere [[Two truths doctrine|conventional]] description, since [[ultimate reality]] is "inconceivable" (''Triṃś.''29), an ineffable and non-conceptual "[[Tathātā|thusness]]" which cannot be fully captured in words and can only be known through meditative realization by [[yogis]] ("yogacaras", hence the name of his school). This is why certain modern interpreters, like Jonathan Gold, see Vasubandhu's thought as a "conventionalist idealism" or even a type of epistemic idealism like Kant's (and not a full blown objective idealism).<ref name=":172">Gold, Jonathan C., "Vasubandhu", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/vasubandhu/</ref><ref name="Trivedi, Saam 2005, pp. 231" /><ref name=":02" />

==== The Buddhist epistemologists ====
Buddhist arguments against external objects were further expanded and sharpened by later figures like [[Dignāga]] (<abbr>fl. 6th century</abbr>) and [[Dharmakirti|Dharmakīrti]] (fl. 7th century) who led an epistemological turn in medieval Indian philosophy.<ref>Dreyfus, Georges B. J. ''Recognizing Reality: Dharmakirti’s Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations'', Suny, 1997, pp. 15–16.</ref><ref name=":02" />

Dignāga's main arguments against external objects (specifically, [[Atomism|atomic]] [[particle]]s) are found in his ''[[Ālambanaparīkṣā]]'' (''Examination of the Object of Consciousness'').<ref name=":02" /> Dignāga argues that for something to be an object (ālambana) of a conscious state, that object must be causally related to the consciousness and it must resemble that consciousness (in appearance or content). Dignāga then attempts to show that realism about external particulars cannot satisfy these two conditions.<ref name=":02" /> Since individual atoms lack a resemblance to the conscious state they supposedly cause, they cannot be the object of cognition. Furthermore, aggregates of atoms also cannot be the object, since they are merely a conceptual grouping of individual atoms (and thus, unreal), and only atoms have causal efficacy.<ref name=":02" />

Dharmakīrti's view is summed up in the [[Pramanavarttika|''Pramānaṿārttika'']] (''Commentary on Epistemology'') as follows: "cognition experiences itself, and nothing else whatsoever. Even the particular objects of perception, are by nature just consciousness itself."<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kapstein |first1=Matthew T. |date=July 2014 |title=Buddhist Idealists and Their Jain Critics on Our Knowledge of External Objects |journal=Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement |volume=74 |pages=123–147 |doi=10.1017/S1358246114000083 |s2cid=170689422}}</ref> One of his main arguments for idealism is the inference from "the necessity of things only ever being experienced together with experience" (Sanskrit: ''sahopalambhaniyama'')''.<ref name=":02" />'' Dharmakīrti consicely states this argument in the ''Ascertainment of Epistemology'' (''[[Pramāṇaviniścaya]]''): "blue and the consciousness of blue are not different, because they must always be apprehended together."''<ref name=":02" />'' Since an object is never found independently of consciousness, objects cannot be mind-independent. This can be read as an epistemological argument for idealism which attempts to show there is no good reason (empirically or inferentially) to accept the existence of external objects.''<ref name=":02" />''

Most of the Yogācāra thinkers and epistemologists (including Dharmakīrti) defended the existence of multiple [[mindstream]]s, and even tackled the [[problem of other minds]]. As such, thinkers like Dharmakīrti were pluralists who held there were multiple minds in the world (in this they differ with Hindu Advaita thinkers who held there was a single cosmic consciousness).''<ref name=":02" />'' However, there was a certain sub-school of Indian Buddhists, exemplified by [[Prajñakaragupta]], [[Jñanasrimitra|Jñānaśrīmitra]] (fl. 975–1025 C.E.) and [[Ratnakīrti]] (11th century CE) who were not pluralists. In his ''Refutation of Other mindstreams'' (''Santānāntaradūṣaṇa''), Ratnakīrti argues that the existence of other minds cannot be established ultimately, and as such ultimate reality must be an undifferentiated [[Nonduality (spirituality)|non-dual]] consciousness (''vijñānādvaita'').<ref name=":210">Chakrabarti, Arindam; Weber, Ralph; [https://books.google.com/books?id=lfiiCgAAQBAJ&q=Ratnak%C4%ABrti Comparative Philosophy without Borders]. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015. pp 103–104.</ref> This [[Monism|monistic]] interpretation of [[Yogācāra]] is known as the ''Citrādvaitavāda'' school (the view of variegated non-duality) since it sees reality as a single multifaceted non-dual luminosity (''citrādvaitaprakāśa'').<ref>Wood, Thomas E. ''Mind Only: A Philosophical and Doctrinal Analysis of the Vijñānavāda'', p. 205. University of Hawaii Press, 1991</ref><ref>Patil, Parimal G. (2009). ''Against a Hindu God: Buddhist Philosophy of Religion in India,'' p. 254''.'' New York: Columbia University Press. {{ISBN|978-0-231-14222-9}}.</ref>

=== Chinese philosophy ===
[[File:Great_philosopher_Wang_Shouren.jpg|thumb|272x272px|[[Wang Yangming]], a leading Neo-Confucian scholar during the Ming and a founder of the "[[Yangmingism|school of mind]]".]]
In [[Chinese philosophy]], Yogācāra idealism was defended by Chinese Buddhists like [[Xuanzang]] (602–664) and his students [[Kuiji]] (632–682) and [[Woncheuk|Wŏnch'ŭk]] (613–696). Xuanzang had studied Yogācāra Buddhism at the great Indian [[Nalanda University|university of Nalanda]] under the Indian philosopher [[Śīlabhadra]]. His work, especially ''[[Cheng Weishi Lun|The Demonstration of Consciousness-only]]'', was pivotal in the establishment of [[East Asian Yogācāra]] Buddhism (also known as "consciousness only", Ch: ''Weishi'' 唯識), which in turn influenced [[East Asian Buddhism|East Asian Buddhist]] thought in general.<ref name=":04">Cook, Francis (1999). ''[https://bdkamerica.org/download/1861 Three Texts on Consciousness Only]'', pp. 1–3. Berkeley: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research</ref><ref name=":35">Hammerstrom, Erik J.. [https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-Expression-%22The-Myriad-Dharmas-are-Only-in-20-Hammerstrom/ff3f2e8c08a79c4b8c618347dacb4b4baa5bfb91 “The Expression "The Myriad Dharmas are Only Consciousness"] in Early 20th Century Chinese Buddhism". (2010).</ref>

Yogācāra Buddhism also influenced the thought of other Chinese Buddhist philosophical traditions, such as [[Huayan]], [[Tiantai]], [[Pure Land Buddhism|Pure Land]], and [[Zen]].<ref name=":38" /> Many Chinese Buddhist traditions like Huayan, [[Zen]], and [[Tiantai]] were also strongly influenced by an important text called the ''[[Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana|Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna]],'' which synthesized consciousness-only idealism with [[buddha-nature]] thought''.''<ref>Makeham, John. ''The Buddhist Roots of Zhu Xi's Philosophical Thought'', p. 277. Oxford University Press, 2018.</ref><ref name=":32">Aviv, E. (2020). "Chapter 3 The Debate over the Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna".  In ''Differentiating the Pearl from the Fish-Eye''. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. {{doi|10.1163/9789004437913_005}}</ref><ref>Hsieh, Ding-Hwa (2004). "Awakening of Faith (Dasheng Qixin Lun)". MacMillan Encyclopedia of Buddhism. Vol. 1. New York: MacMillan Reference USA. pp. 38–9. {{ISBN|0-02-865719-5}}.</ref> This text promoted an influential theory of mind which holds that all phenomena are manifestations of the "One Mind". Some scholars have seen this as an ontological monism''.''<ref name=":32" /> One passage from the text states: "the [[Trailokya|three worlds]] are illusory constructs, created by the mind alone" and "all dharmas are produced from the mind's giving rise to false thoughts".<ref name=":33">Jorgensen, John; Lusthaus, Dan; Makeham, John; Strange, Mark, trans. (2019), ''Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith'', p. 85. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, {{ISBN|978-0-19-029771-8}}</ref> Jorgensen et al. note that this indicates metaphysical idealism.<ref name=":33" /> The new philosophical trend ushered in by the ''Awakening of Faith'' was resisted by some Chinese Yogācāra thinkers, and the debates between the Yogācāra school of Xuanzang and those who instead followed the doctrines of the ''Awakening of Faith'' continued until the modern era. These debates happened in China as well as in Japan and Korea.<ref name=":38">Makeham, John. ''Transforming Consciousness: Yogacara Thought in Modern China'', p. 9. Oxford University Press, 2014</ref>

The doctrine that all phenomena arise from an ultimate principle, the One Mind, was adapted by the influential [[Huayan]] school, whose thought is exemplified by thinkers such as [[Fazang]] (643–712) and [[Guifeng Zongmi|Zongmi]] (780–841).<ref name="norden23">Van Norden, Bryan and Nicholaos Jones, "[https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/buddhism-huayan/ Huayan Buddhism]", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''  (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).</ref><ref name=":111">{{cite book |last1=Tiwald |first1=Justin |title=Readings in Later Chinese Philosophy: Han to the 20th century |last2=Van Norden |first2=Bryan |publisher=Hackett Publishing |year=2014 |isbn=978-1-62466-190-7 |location=Indianapolis, Indiana |pages=80–87}}</ref> This tradition also promoted a kind of [[holism]] which sees every phenomenon in the cosmos as interfused and interconnected with every other phenomenon.<ref>Fox, Alan. (2013). "The Huayan Metaphysics of Totality." In ''A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy'', S.M. Emmanuel (Ed.). {{doi|10.1002/9781118324004.ch11}}</ref> Chinese scholars like [[Feng Youlan|Yu-lan Fung]] and [[Wing-tsit Chan]] see Huayan philosophy as a form of idealism, though other scholars have defended alternative interpretations.<ref name=":37">Chan, Wing-tsit (1963), ''A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy,'' p. 408. Princeton: Princeton University Press.</ref><ref>Liu, Jeeloo. (2022). ''[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/363872025_Huayan_Buddhism%27s_Conceptions_of_the_Realness_of_Reality_A_Transformation_from_Subjective_Idealism_into_Holistic_Realism Huayan Buddhism’s Conceptions of the Realness of Reality: A Transformation from Subjective Idealism into Holistic Realism.]'' 10.5040/9781350238534.ch-7.</ref><ref>Fung, Yu-lan (1983). ''A History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. II'', trans. D. Bodde, p. 359. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.</ref> According to Wing-tsit Chan, since Huayan patriarch Fazang sees the One Mind as the basis for all things, including the external world, his system is one of objective idealism.<ref name=":37" /> A key distinction between Huayan's view of the world and that of the Yogācāra school is that in Huayan, there is a single intersubjective world (which nevertheless arises from mind), while Yogācāra holds that each mindstream projects its own world out of their underlying root consciousness.<ref name=":37" /><ref>Ernest Billings Brewster. [http://buddhism.lib.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-BJ001/bj001577597.pdf What is Our Shared Sensory World?: Ming Dynasty Debates on Yogacara versus Huayan Doctrines.] Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies  (2018, 31: 117–170)  New Taipei: Chung-Hwa Institute of Buddhist Studies, pp. 117–170. ISSN: 2313-2000 e-ISSN: 2313-2019</ref>

Chinese Buddhist idealism also influenced [[Confucianism|Confucian philosophy]] through the work of thinkers like the [[Ming dynasty|Ming era]] (1368–1644) [[Neo-Confucianism|neo-confucian]] [[Wang Yangming]] (1472–1529). Wang's thought has been interpreted as a kind of idealism.<ref>"35. Dynamic Idealism in Wang Yang-ming". ''A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy'', edited by, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 654–691. {{doi|10.1515/9781400820030-041}}</ref> According to Wang, the ultimate principle or pattern (''lǐ'') of the whole universe is identical with the mind, which forms one body or substance (''yì tǐ'') with "Heaven, Earth, and the myriad creatures" of the world.<ref name=":34">Van Norden, Bryan, "[https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/wang-yangming/ Wang Yangming]", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''  (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).</ref> Wang argues that only this view can explain the fact that human beings experience innate care and [[Ren (philosophy)|benevolence]] for others as well as a sense of care for inanimate objects.<ref name=":34" /> Wang's thought, along with that of [[Lu Xiangshan]], led to the creation of the [[Yangmingism|School of Mind]], an important Neo-Confucian tradition which emphasized these idealist views.<ref name=":34" />

Yogācāra idealism saw a revival in the 20th century, associated figures like [[Yang Wenhui]] (1837–1911), [[Taixu]], [[Liang Shuming]], [[Ouyang Jingwu]] (1870–1943), Wang Xiaoxu (1875–1948), and Lu Cheng.<ref name=":36" /><ref name=":35" /> Modern Chinese thinkers associated with consciousness-only linked the philosophy with Western philosophy (especially Hegelian and Kantian thought) and modern science.<ref name=":35" /><ref>Makeham, John. ''Transforming Consciousness: Yogacara Thought in Modern China'', p. 1. Oxford University Press, 2014</ref> A similar trend occurred among some Japanese philosophers like [[Inoue Enryō]], who linked East Asian philosophies like Huayan with the philosophy of Hegel.<ref name=":35" />

Both modern Chinese Buddhists and [[New Confucianism|New Confucian]] thinkers participated in this revival of consciousness-only studies.<ref name=":36">Makeham, John. ''Transforming Consciousness: Yogacara Thought in Modern China'', Oxford University Press, 2014</ref><ref name=":32" /><ref name=":35" /> The thought of New Confucians like [[Xiong Shili]], Ma Yifu, [[Tang Chun-i|Tang Junyi]] and [[Mou Zongsan]], was influenced by Yogācāra consciousness-only philosophy, as well as by the metaphysics of the ''[[Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana|Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna]],'' though their thought also contained many critiques of Buddhist philosophy''.''<ref>Makeham, John. ''The Awakening of Faith and New Confucian Philosophy,'' Brill, 2021, introduction.</ref><ref>Makeham, John. ''Transforming Consciousness: Yogacara Thought in Modern China'', p. 30. Oxford University Press, 2014.</ref>