Editing Idea (section)

===David Hume===
[[David Hume|Hume]] differs from Locke by limiting ''idea'' to only one of two possible types of perception. The other one is called "impression", and is more lively: these are perceptions we have "when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will." ''Ideas'' are more complex and are built upon these more basic and more grounded perceptions.<ref>{{Citation |last=Hume |first=David |title=Of the Origin of Ideas |work=An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding |date=2008 |url=https://oxfordworldsclassics.com/display/10.1093/owc/9780199549900.001.0001/isbn-9780199549900-book-part-4 |access-date=2024-01-28 |publisher=Oxford University Press |language=en-US |doi=10.1093/owc/9780199549900.003.0004 |isbn=978-0-19-192173-5}}</ref><ref name=EB1911>{{EB1911 |wstitle=Idea |volume=14 |pages=280–281 |inline=1}}</ref><ref>Vol 4: 74–90</ref> Hume shared with Locke the basic empiricist premise that it is only from life experiences (whether their own or others') that humans' knowledge of the existence of anything outside of themselves can be ultimately derived, that they shall carry on doing what they are prompted to do by their emotional drives of varying kinds. In choosing the means to those ends, they shall follow their accustomed associations of ideas.<sup>d</sup> Hume has contended and defended the notion that "reason alone is merely the 'slave of the passions'."<ref>{{cite web |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/#inmo |title=Hume's Moral Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) |publisher=Plato.stanford.edu |access-date=2013-06-15 |archive-date=2021-01-26 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210126100244/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/#inmo |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>Hume, David: A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. (1739–40)</ref>