Editing History of North Korea (section)

=== International relations ===
[[File:Zhou Enlai and Kim Il Sung in Beijing.jpg|thumb|right|[[Kim Il Sung]] and [[Zhou Enlai]] tour Beijing in 1958]]
Like Mao in China, Kim Il Sung refused to accept Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin and continued to model his regime on Stalinist norms.<ref>{{cite book| title = The Making of Modern Korea | last = Buzo | first = Adrian | year = 2002| publisher = Routledge|  location = London | isbn = 978-0-415-23749-9 |pages=95–97}}</ref><ref>{{cite book| title = Korea's Twentieth-Century Odyssey | url = https://archive.org/details/koreastwentieth00robi | url-access = registration | last = Robinson | first = Michael E | year = 2007 | publisher = University of Hawaii Press |  location = Honolulu | isbn = 978-0-8248-3174-5 |page=[https://archive.org/details/koreastwentieth00robi/page/152 152]}}</ref> At the same time, he increasingly stressed Korean independence, as embodied in the concept of ''Juche''.<ref>{{cite book| title = The Making of Modern Korea | last = Buzo | first = Adrian | year = 2002| publisher = Routledge|  location = London | isbn = 978-0-415-23749-9 |pages=95, 122}}</ref> Kim told [[Alexei Kosygin]] in 1965 that he was not anyone's puppet and "We{{nbsp}}... implement the purest Marxism and condemn as false both the Chinese admixtures and the errors of the CPSU".<ref>{{cite journal|author1-link=Sergey Radchenko|last=Radchenko|first=Sergey|title=The Soviet Union and the North Korean Seizure of the USS Pueblo: Evidence from Russian Archives|journal=Cold War International History Project Working Paper|issue=47|page=8|url=http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHP_WP_47.pdf|access-date=2014-03-05|archive-date=2018-08-17|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180817225006/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHP_WP_47.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref>

Relations with China had worsened during the war. [[Mao Zedong]] criticized Kim for having started the whole "idiotic war" and for being an incompetent military commander who should have been removed from power. PLA commander [[Peng Dehuai]] was equally contemptuous of Kim's skills at waging war.<ref>{{cite book | last = Jager | first = Sheila Miyoshi | title = Brothers at War – The Unending Conflict in Korea | year = 2013 | publisher = Profile Books | location = London | isbn = 978-1-84668-067-0|pages=362–363}}</ref>

By some analysis, Kim Il Sung remained in power partially because the Soviets turned their attention to the [[Hungarian Revolution of 1956]] that fall.<ref>{{cite book | last = Jager | first = Sheila Miyoshi | title = Brothers at War – The Unending Conflict in Korea | year = 2013 | publisher = Profile Books | location = London | isbn = 978-1-84668-067-0|pages=363–364}}</ref> The Soviets and Chinese were unable to stop the inevitable purge of Kim's domestic opponents or his move towards a one-man Stalinist autocracy and relations with both countries deteriorated in the former's case because of the elimination of the pro-Soviet Koreans and the latter because of the regime's refusal to acknowledge Chinese assistance in either liberation from the Japanese or the war in 1950–1953.<ref name=person-2008/>

Beginning in the late 1950s, North Korea and China began renegotiating their border, culminating in the 1962 [[Sino–North Korean Border Treaty]] and a 1964 companion that established the modern border between the two countries. [[File:USS Pueblo, Pyongyang, 2012.jpg|thumb|right|The captured USS ''Pueblo'' being visited by tourists in Pyongyang]]

Tensions between North and South escalated in the late 1960s with a series of low-level armed clashes known as the [[Korean DMZ Conflict (1966–1969)|Korean DMZ Conflict]]. In 1966, Kim declared "liberation of the south" to be a "national duty".<ref>{{cite book | last = Jager | first = Sheila Miyoshi | title = Brothers at War – The Unending Conflict in Korea | year = 2013 | publisher = Profile Books | location = London | isbn = 978-1-84668-067-0|page=366}}</ref> In 1968, North Korean commandos launched the [[Blue House Raid]], an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the South Korean President [[Park Chung Hee]]. Shortly after, the US spy ship [[USS Pueblo (AGER-2)|Pueblo]] was captured by the North Korean navy.<ref>{{cite book| title = The Making of Modern Korea | last = Buzo | first = Adrian | year = 2002| publisher = Routledge|  location = London | isbn = 978-0-415-23749-9 |page=99}}</ref> The crew were held captive throughout the year despite American protests that the vessel was in international waters, and they were finally released in December after a formal US apology was issued.<ref>{{cite book|last=Lerner|first=Mitchell|title=The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy|date=2002|publisher=University Press of Kansas|location=Lawrence, KS|isbn=9780700611713}}</ref> In April 1969 a North Korean fighter jet [[1969 EC-121 shootdown incident|shot down]] an [[EC-121]] aircraft, killing all 31 crewmen on board. The Nixon administration found itself unable to react at all, since the US was heavily committed in the [[Vietnam War]] and had no troops to spare if the situation in Korea escalated. However, the ''Pueblo'' capture and EC-121 shootdown did not find approval in Moscow, as the Soviet Union did not want a second major war to erupt in Asia. China's response to the USS ''Pueblo'' crisis is less clear.<ref>[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/nkidp-e-dossier-no-5-new-romanian-evidence-the-blue-house-raid-and-the-uss-pueblo "New Romanian Evidence on the Blue House Raid and the USS Pueblo Incident."] NKIDP e-Dossier No. 5. Retrieved 3 May 2012.</ref>

After Khrushchev was replaced by [[Leonid Brezhnev]] as Soviet Leader in 1964, and with the incentive of Soviet aid, North Korea strengthened its ties with the USSR. Kim condemned China's [[Cultural Revolution]] as "unbelievable idiocy". In turn, China's Red Guards labelled him a "fat revisionist".<ref>{{cite book | last = Jager | first = Sheila Miyoshi | title = Brothers at War – The Unending Conflict in Korea | year = 2013 | publisher = Profile Books | location = London | isbn = 978-1-84668-067-0|page=376}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Radchenko|first=Sergey|title=The Soviet Union and the North Korean Seizure of the USS Pueblo: Evidence from Russian Archives|journal=Cold War International History Project Working Paper|issue=47|pages=11, 16|url=http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHP_WP_47.pdf|access-date=2014-03-05|archive-date=2018-08-17|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180817225006/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHP_WP_47.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref name="China Quarterly 30">{{cite journal |date=April–June 1967 |title=Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation |jstor= 651878|journal=[[The China Quarterly]] |issue= 30|pages= 195–249}}</ref>

In 1972, the first formal summit meeting between Pyongyang and Seoul was held, but the cautious talks did not lead to a lasting change in the relationship.<ref>{{cite web|last=Shin|first=Jong-Dae|title=DPRK Perspectives on Korean Reunification after the July 4th Joint Communiqué|url=http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/dprk-perspectives-korean-reunification-after-the-july-4th-joint-communiqu%C3%A9|work=NKIDP e-Dossier no. 10|publisher=Woodrow Wilson Center|access-date=5 March 2014}}</ref>

With the fall of South Vietnam to the North Vietnamese on 30 April 1975, Kim Il Sung felt that the US had shown its weakness and that reunification of Korea under his regime was possible. Kim visited Beijing in May 1975<ref name="China Quarterly 63">{{cite journal  |last1= Hook|first1=Brian | last2= Wilson|first2=Dick |last3=Yahuda |first3=Michael |date=September 1975 |title=Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation |jstor= 652772|journal=[[The China Quarterly]] |issue= 63|pages=572–610 }}</ref><ref name="Zagoria 1975">{{cite journal |last1= Zagoria|first1=Donald S. |last2= Kim|first2= Young Kun|date= December 1975|title=North Korea and the Major Powers |jstor= 2643582|journal= Asian Survey|volume= 15|issue= 12|pages=1017–1035 |doi= 10.2307/2643582}}</ref><ref name="Kim 1976">{{cite journal |last= Kim|first= Young C.|date= January 1976|title=The Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 1975 |jstor=2643284 |journal= Asian Survey|volume=16 |issue= 1|pages= 82–94|doi= 10.2307/2643284}}</ref> in the hope of gaining political and military support for this plan to invade South Korea again, but Mao Zedong refused.<ref name="auto3">{{cite book| title = The Making of Modern Korea | last = Buzo | first = Adrian | year = 2002| publisher = Routledge|  location = London | isbn = 978-0-415-23749-9 |page=128}}</ref> Despite public proclamations of support, Mao privately told Kim that China would be unable to assist North Korea because of the lingering after-effects of the Cultural Revolution throughout China, and because Mao had recently decided to restore diplomatic relations with the US.<ref>{{cite web|last=Chae|first=Ria|title=East German Documents on Kim Il Sung's April 1975 Trip to Beijing|url=http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/east-german-documents-kim-il-sung%E2%80%99s-april-1975-trip-to-beijing|work=NKIDP e-Dossier no. 7|publisher=Woodrow Wilson Center|access-date=5 March 2014}}</ref>

Meanwhile, North Korea emphasized its independent orientation by joining the [[Non-Aligned Movement]] in 1975.<ref>{{cite book| title = The Making of Modern Korea | last = Buzo | first = Adrian | year = 2002| publisher = Routledge|  location = London | isbn = 978-0-415-23749-9 |page=129}}</ref> It promoted ''[[Juche]]'' as a model for developing countries to follow.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Armstrong|first=Charles|title=Juche and North Korea's Global_Aspirations|journal=NKIDP Working Paper|date=April 2009|issue=1|url=http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/NKIDP_Working_Paper_1_Juche_and_North_Koreas_Global_Aspirations_web.pdf}}</ref> It developed strong ties with the regimes of Bokassa in the [[Central African Republic]], Macias Nguema in [[Equatorial Guinea]], Idi Amin in [[Uganda]], Pol Pot in Cambodia, Gaddafi in [[Libya]], and Ceausescu in [[Romania]].<ref name="auto1"/>