Editing Gerd von Rundstedt (section)

===Invasion of France and the Low Countries===
On 25 October, Rundstedt took up his new post as commander of Army Group A, facing the French border in the [[Ardennes|Ardennes mountains]] sector, and based in [[Koblenz]]. To his north [[Army Group B]] under General [[Fedor von Bock]] faced the Dutch and Belgian borders, while to his south [[Army Group C]] under General [[Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb]] faced the French along the [[Maginot Line]]. Manstein was again his chief of staff and Blumentritt his chief of operations, although Manstein soon departed to command an infantry corps and was replaced by General [[Georg von Sodenstern]]. Rundstedt's main field commanders (from north to south) were Blaskowitz (9th Army), List (12th Army) and General [[Ernst Busch (military)|Ernst Busch]] (16th Army).{{Sfn|Messenger|2011|loc=ch. 6}}

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-L08129, Gerd v. Rundstedt.jpg|thumb|upright|Rundstedt in 1940]]
Hitler's original plan was to attack in late November, before the French and British had time fully to deploy along their front. The plan, devised by Hitler, was essentially for a re-run of the invasion of 1914, with the main assault to come in the north, through Belgium and the Netherlands, then wheeling south to capture Paris, leaving the French Army anchored on the Maginot Line. Most senior officers were opposed to both the timing and the plan. Rundstedt, Manstein, Reichenau (commanding 6th Army in Army Group B), List and Brauchitsch remonstrated with Hitler in a series of meetings in October and November. They were opposed to an offensive so close to the onset of winter, and they were opposed to launching the main attack through Belgium, where the many rivers and canals would hamper armoured operations. Manstein in particular, supported by Rundstedt, argued for an armoured assault by Army Group A, across the Ardennes to the sea, cutting the British and French off in Belgium. This "[[Manstein Plan]]" was the genesis of the [[blitzkrieg]] of May 1940.

A combination of bad weather, the arguments of his generals, and a breach of security when the details of the original plan fell into Allied hands, eventually led Hitler to agree to postpone the attack until early 1940, when it was again delayed by the [[Operation Weserübung|invasion of Denmark and Norway]]. In February, Hitler finally accepted the Manstein Plan. General [[Günther von Kluge]]'s 4th Army and General [[Maximilian von Weichs|Maximilian Reichsfreiherr von Weichs]]'s 2nd Army were transferred from Army Group B to Rundstedt's command. General [[Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist|Ewald von Kleist]] was now to command [[Panzer]] (Armoured) Group Kleist, consisting of three armoured corps, led by [[Heinz Guderian]], [[Georg-Hans Reinhardt]] and [[Gustav Anton von Wietersheim]]. These armoured corps were to be the spearhead of the German thrust into France. Although Manstein is often credited for the change of plans, he himself acknowledged Rundstedt's decisive role. "I would stress that my commander, Colonel-General von Rundstedt, agreed with my view throughout, and backed our recommendations to the full. Without his sanction we could never have kept up our attempts to change [[Oberkommando der Wehrmacht|OKW]]'s mind."{{Sfn|Melvin|2011|p=94}}

During this hiatus, the group of senior officers who were plotting against Hitler's war plans, led by Halder, renewed their efforts, convinced that an attack in the west would lead to a war which Germany would lose. Brauchitsch agreed with Halder's fears, but continued to vacillate about opposing Hitler – he asked Reichenau and Rundstedt to remonstrate with Hitler, but they refused.<ref>{{harvnb|Fest|1996|p=120}}</ref> Witzleben suggested that Rundstedt, Leeb and Bock should jointly refuse to carry out Hitler's orders to carry out the attack. Two of the conspirators, [[Abwehr]] officers [[Hans Oster]] and [[Hans Bernd Gisevius]], discussed this with Leeb, who turned them down but did not report them.<ref>{{harvnb|Fest|1996|p=129}}</ref> On 13 March, Himmler came to Koblenz to give the generals, including Rundstedt, an ideological lecture, in the course of which he made it clear that the atrocities against civilians which some of them had witnessed in Poland had been carried out on his orders, and with the approval of Hitler. "I do nothing that the Führer does not know", he said.<ref>{{harvnb|Browning|2004|p=79}}</ref>

The attack was finally launched on 10 May. By 14 May, armoured units under [[Hermann Hoth]] and Guderian had crossed the [[Meuse]] and had broken open the Allied front. As planned, the British and French had advanced into Belgium to meet Bock's offensive, and were in danger of being cut off there by a German thrust to the sea. Both Hitler and Rundstedt had doubts about the safety of allowing the armoured corps to get too far ahead of their infantry support, however. Hitler sent the chief of staff of the [[Oberkommando der Wehrmacht|Armed Forces Supreme Command]] ({{lang|de|Oberkommando der Wehrmacht}}, OKW), General [[Wilhelm Keitel]], to Rundstedt's headquarters, to urge caution. In Halder's words, Hitler was "frightened by his own success&nbsp;... afraid to take any chance."<ref>{{harvnb|Messenger|2011|p=110}}</ref> Guderian objected vehemently to being ordered to halt, and Rundstedt was forced to mediate between Hitler and his impetuous armoured commanders, who were backed by Halder. By 20 May, Guderian's tanks had reached the sea at [[Abbeville]] and closed the trap on the British and French, who were already in retreat to the [[English Channel]] ports.

By this time, however, Kleist's armoured forces were thinly stretched and had suffered losses of up to 50% of their tanks.<ref>{{harvnb|Messenger|2011|p=113}}</ref> Kleist asked Rundstedt for a pause while the armoured units recovered and the infantry caught up, and Rundstedt agreed to this. At the same time, Göring attempted to persuade Hitler that the [[Luftwaffe]] could destroy the trapped Allied armies, freeing the German forces to turn south towards Paris. Hitler accepted this view, and on 24 May issued what became known as the [[Battle of France#Halt orders|Halt Order]], preventing the German armour from rapidly capturing [[Calais]] and [[Dunkirk]]. The Luftwaffe were unable to destroy the Allied armies, however, and the halt allowed the [[British Expeditionary Force (World War II)|British Expeditionary Force]] and many French troops to be [[Dunkirk evacuation|evacuated from Dunkirk]]. This decision, for which Hitler, Rundstedt and Kleist shared responsibility, proved very costly to Germany's war effort in the long term. After the war, Rundstedt described the Halt Order as "an incredible blunder" and assigned full blame to Hitler. His biographer concedes that this "does not represent the whole truth", because the original impetus for a pause came from Kleist and Rundstedt himself.<ref>{{harvnb|Messenger|2011|p=120}}</ref>

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-L15196, Paris, Besuch Gerd v. Rundstedt im Louvre.jpg|thumb|upright|Rundstedt by [[Venus de Milo]] while touring [[The Louvre]], [[Military Administration in France (Nazi Germany)|occupied France]], October 1940]]

Attention then turned to the attack on the French armies to the south. On 29 May, Hitler came to Rundstedt's headquarters at [[Charleville-Mézières]] to discuss the new offensive. Bock's Army Group B on the right was to advance on Paris, while Rundstedt's Army Group A, now consisting only of List's 12th Army, Weichs's 2nd Army and Busch's 16th Army, was to attack towards [[Soissons]] and [[Rheims]]. Rundstedt's attack began on 9 June, and within a few days had broken the French resistance. By 12 June, his forces were across the [[Marne (river)|Marne]] and advancing south-east towards [[Alsace]]. [[Dijon]] fell on 16 June and [[Lyon]] on 20 June. By this time French resistance was crumbling and on 22 June the French requested an armistice. In July, Hitler announced that Rundstedt and a number of other field commanders were to be promoted to the rank of Field Marshal ({{lang|de|Generalfeldmarschall}}) during the [[1940 Field Marshal Ceremony]]. Although Rundstedt wished to resume his retirement, he was persuaded by Hitler to stay in France and set up headquarters at [[Saint-Germain-en-Laye]] about {{convert|20|km|mi|abbr=on}} outside Paris. There he oversaw the planning for the proposed invasion of Britain, [[Operation Sealion]], but never took the prospects for this operation seriously, and was not surprised when Hitler called it off in September after the Luftwaffe's setback in the [[Battle of Britain]]. Even then, Rundstedt was not to be allowed to retire, when in October Hitler appointed him Commander-in-Chief West ({{lang|de|Oberbefehlshaber West}}, or OB West).{{Sfn|Messenger|2011|loc=ch. 6, 7}}