Editing George Meade (section)

===Gettysburg campaign===
In June 1863, Lee took the initiative and moved his [[Army of Northern Virginia]] into Maryland and Pennsylvania.{{sfn|Brown|2021|p=4}} Hooker responded rapidly and positioned the Army of the Potomac between Lee's army and Washington D.C. However, the relationship between the Lincoln administration and Hooker had deteriorated due to Hooker's poor performance at Chancellorsville.{{sfn|Brown|2021|p=25}} Hooker requested additional troops be assigned from Harper's Ferry to assist in the pursuit of Lee in the [[Gettysburg Campaign]]. When Lincoln and General in Chief [[Henry Halleck]] refused, Hooker resigned in protest.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Schroeder |first1=Patrick |title=Joseph Hooker (1814-1879) |url=https://encyclopediavirginia.org/entries/hooker-joseph-1814-1879/#start_entry |website=www.encyclopediavirginia.com |publisher=Virginia Humanities |access-date=14 February 2023}}</ref>

====Command of the Army of the Potomac====
In the early morning hours of June 28, 1863, a messenger from [[President of the United States|President]] [[Abraham Lincoln]] arrived to inform Meade of his appointment as Hooker's replacement.{{sfn|Pennypacker|1901|p=130}} Upon being woken up, he'd assumed that army politics had caught up to him and that he was under arrest, only to find that he'd been given leadership of the [[Army of the Potomac]]. 

He had not actively sought command and was not the president's first choice. [[John F. Reynolds]], one of four major generals who outranked Meade in the Army of the Potomac, had earlier turned down the president's suggestion that he take over.{{sfn|Hyde|2003|p=18}} Three corps commanders, [[John Sedgwick]], [[Henry Slocum]], and [[Darius N. Couch]], recommended Meade for command of the army and agreed to serve under him despite outranking him.{{sfn|Tagg|1998|pp=2-3}} While his colleagues were excited for the change in leadership, the soldiers in the Army of Potomac were uncertain of Meade since his modesty, lack of the theatrical and scholarly demeanor did not match their expectations for a General.{{sfn|Coddington|1997|p=210}}

Meade assumed command of the Army of the Potomac on June 28, 1863.{{sfn|Pennypacker|1901|p=1}} In a letter to his wife, Meade wrote that command of the army was "more likely to destroy one's reputation then to add to it."{{sfn|Chick|2015|p=10}}

====Battle of Gettysburg====
[[File:Gettysburg Council of War.jpg|thumb|Engraving by [[James E. Kelly (artist)|James E. Kelly]] of Meade and the Council of War - July 2, 1863]]
{{main|Battle of Gettysburg}}
Meade rushed the remainder of his army to Gettysburg and deployed his forces for a defensive battle.{{sfn|Hall|2003|p=75}} Meade was only four days into his leadership of the Army of the Potomac and informed his corps commanders that he would provide quick decisions and entrust them with the authority to carry out those orders the best way they saw fit. He also made it clear that he was counting on the corps commanders to provide him with sound advice on strategy.{{sfn|Hall|2003|p=75}}

Since Meade was new to high command, he did not remain in headquarters but constantly moved about the battlefield, issuing orders and ensuring that they were followed. Meade gave orders for the Army of the Potomac to move forward in a broad front to prevent Lee from flanking them and threatening the cities of Baltimore and Washington D.C. He also issued a conditional plan for a retreat to Pipe Creek, Maryland in case things went poorly for the Union. By 6 pm on the evening of July 1, 1863, Meade sent a telegram to Washington informing them of his decision to concentrate forces and make a stand at Gettysburg.{{sfn|Tagg|1998|p=}}

On July 2, 1863, Meade continued to monitor and maintain the placement of the troops. He was outraged when he discovered that Daniel Sickles had moved his Corps one mile forward to high ground without Meade's permission and left a gap in the line which threatened Sickles' right flank. Meade recognized that [[Little Round Top]] was critical to maintaining the left flank. He sent chief engineer [[Gouverneur Warren]] to determine the status of the hill and quickly issued orders for the V Corps to occupy it when it was discovered empty. Meade continued to reinforce the troops defending Little Round Top from Longstreet's advance and suffered the near destruction of thirteen brigades. One questionable decision Meade made that day was to order Slocum's [[XII Corps (Union Army)|XII Corps]] to move from [[Culp's Hill]] to the left flank which allowed Confederate troops to temporarily capture a portion of it.{{sfn|Tagg|1998|p=}}

On the evening of July 2, 1863, Meade called a "council of war" consisting of his top generals. The council reviewed the battle to date and agreed to keep fighting in a defensive position.{{sfn|Hall|2003|p=167}}

[[File:Meade-Headquarters Gettysburg.jpg|thumb|General Meade's headquarters, [[Gettysburg, Pennsylvania]]]]
On July 3, 1863, Meade gave orders for the XII Corps and XI Corps to retake the lost portion of Culp's Hill and personally rode the length of the lines from Cemetery Ridge to Little Round Top to inspect the troops. His headquarters were in the Leister House directly behind Cemetery Ridge which exposed it to the 150-gun cannonade which began at 1 pm. The house came under direct fire from incorrectly targeted Confederate guns; Butterfield was wounded and sixteen horses tied up in front of the house were killed. Meade did not want to vacate the headquarters and make it more difficult for messages to find him, but the situation became too dire and the house was evacuated.{{sfn|Tagg|1998|p=}}

During the three days, Meade made excellent use of capable subordinates, such as Maj. Gens. [[John F. Reynolds]] and [[Winfield S. Hancock]], to whom he delegated great responsibilities.{{sfn|Gallagher|1999|p=144}} He reacted swiftly to fierce assaults on his line's left and right which culminated in Lee's disastrous assault on the center, known as [[Pickett's Charge]].{{sfn|Tagg|1998|pp=4-6}}

By the end of three days of fighting, the Army of the Potomac's 60,000 troops and 30,000 horses had not been fed in three days and were weary from fighting.{{sfn|Brown|2021|p=5}} On the evening of July 4, 1863, Meade held a second council of war with his top generals, minus Hancock and Gibbon, who were absent due to duty and injury. The council reviewed the status of the army and debated staying in place at Gettysburg versus chasing the retreating Army of Northern Virginia. The council voted to remain in place for one day to allow for rest and recovery and then set out after Lee's army. Meade sent a message to Halleck stating, "I make a reconnaissance to-morrow, to ascertain what the intention of the enemy is … should the enemy retreat, I shall pursue him on his flanks."<ref name=nps.gov>{{cite web |title=General George Meade's Forgotten Council of War |url=https://www.nps.gov/articles/000/meades-council-of-war.htm |website=www.nps.gov |publisher=National Park Service United States Department of the Interior |access-date=21 March 2023}}</ref>

====Lee's retreat====
On July 4, it was observed that the [[Confederate States Army|Confederate Army]] was forming a new line near the [[Catoctin Mountain|nearby mountains]] after pulling back their left flank, but by July 5 it was clear that they were making a retreat, leaving Meade and his men to tend to the wounded and fallen soldiers until July 6, when Meade ordered his men to Maryland.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The War of the Rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate armies. |url=https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3701sm.gcw0099000/?st=gallery |access-date=2023-03-06 |website=Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540 USA}}</ref>

Meade was criticized by President Lincoln and others for not aggressively pursuing the Confederates during their retreat.{{sfn|Hall|2003|p=264}} Meade's perceived caution stemmed from three causes: casualties and exhaustion of the Army of the Potomac which had engaged in forced marches and heavy fighting for a week, heavy general officer casualties that impeded effective command and control, and a desire to guard a hard-won victory against a sudden reversal.{{sfn|Chick|2015|p=11}} Halleck informed Meade of the president's dissatisfaction which infuriated Meade that politicians and non-field-based officers were telling him how to fight the war. He wrote back and offered to resign his command, but Halleck refused the resignation and clarified that his communication was not meant as a rebuke but an incentive to continue the pursuit of Lee's army.{{sfn|Hyde|2003|p=25}}

At one point, the Army of Northern Virginia was trapped with its back to the rain-swollen, almost impassable [[Potomac River]]; however, the Army of Northern Virginia was able to erect strong defensive positions before Meade, whose army had also been weakened by the fighting, could organize an effective attack.{{sfn|Hall|2003|p=259}} Lee knew he had the superior defensive position and hoped that Meade would attack and the resulting Union Army losses would dampen the victory at Gettysburg. By July 14, 1863, Lee's troops built a temporary bridge over the river and retreated into Virginia.{{sfn|Chick|2015|p=11}}

Meade was rewarded for his actions at Gettysburg by a promotion to brigadier general in the [[Regular Army (United States)|regular army]] on July 7, 1863, and the [[Thanks of Congress]],{{sfn|Warner|1964|pp=316-317}} which commended Meade "... and the officers and soldiers of the Army of the Potomac, for the skill and heroic valor which at Gettysburg repulsed, defeated, and drove back, broken and dispirited, beyond the [[Rappahannock River|Rappahannock]], the veteran army of the rebellion."<ref>{{cite book |title=The Centennial of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York |date=1904 |publisher=Government Printing Office |location=Washington |page=503 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TVQyAQAAMAAJ |access-date=11 March 2023}}</ref>

Meade wrote the following to his wife after meeting President Lincoln:
{{blockquote|"Yesterday I received an order to repair to Washington, to see the President. ... The President was, as he always is, very considerate and kind. He found no fault with my operations, although it was very evident he was disappointed that I had not got a battle out of Lee. He coincided with me that there was not much to be gained by any farther advance; but [[Henry W. Halleck|General Halleck]] was very urgent that something should be done, but what that something was he did not define. As the Secretary of War was absent in Tennessee, final action was postponed till his return."<ref>{{cite book |last1=Meade |first1=George |title=The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade Major-General United States Army |date=1913 |publisher=Charles Scribner's Sons |location=New York |page=154 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3zITAAAAYAAJ |access-date=8 February 2023}}</ref>}}